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Abstract 
 
This study critically analyses whether ICASA effectively regulates the SABC so that it plays 
its role as a public service broadcaster in the public interest and promotes democracy. The 
study applies a combination of critical political economy of the media, theories of regulation 
and public service broadcasting as an analytical framework, and employs document analysis 
and qualitative interviews as methods.  
 
The study finds that in relation to monitoring the SABC’s license conditions, ICASA is to a 
large degree effective in the regulatory practices it employs. However ICASA tends to take a 
problematic stance by limiting its regulatory mandate to only monitor the license conditions. 
The study argues that ICASA’s mandate is and should be broader. Further, the study 
identifies an antagonistic relationship between ICASA and the SABC, which undermines the 
regulator’s ability to effectively regulate the SABC.  
 
The study also finds that ICASA’s regulation in general is characterized by a lack of pro-
active regulation in several areas. In this regard, the study demonstrates that ICASA has a 
regulatory practice that can be characterized as silent. The areas in which ICASA is silent 
when it should act include the SABC’s problematic commercial funding model which 
undermines its public service role. Editorial biases towards those in authority and 
controversial practices like withdrawing programmes and “blacklisting” commentators who 
are considered too critical of those in power, in ways that undermines its editorial and 
programming independence. The suspensions of the SABC’s two Executive members and 
calls for the SABC board to step down, which undermine the institutional independence that 
a public service broadcaster should possess.  
 
The study identifies a number of ICASA’s institutional weaknesses, which include its lack of 
independence in reality, its “politicised” appointment process, a lack of skilled personnel and 
“poaching”, “politicised” and inefficient accountability mechanisms, a lack of clarity of 
mandate and power regarding the SABC, as well as a lack of adequate and independent 
funding which result in ineffective regulatory practices. Finally the study makes 
recommendations for the strengthening of ICASA so that it becomes in an effective regulator 
functioning in the public interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………8 
 
        1.1 Motivation…………………………………………………………………………..8 
        1.2 Historical context .......................................................................................................9 
        1.3 The case against ICASA.............................................................................................9 
        1.4 The case against the SABC.......................................................................................10 
        1.5 Research questions....................................................................................................11 
        1.6 Chapter organisation ………………………………………………………………11 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework………………………………………………………..12 
 
        2.   Introduction…………………………………………………………………………12 
        2.1 Research on ICASA and the SABC………………………………………………...12 
        2.2 Critical political economy of the media ……………………………………………14 
 
                   2.2.1   “Critical” strand………………………………………………………….14 
                   2.2.2    Participatory democracy ………………………………………………..14 
                   2.2.3    Policy and regulatory choices…………………………………………...15 
                   2.2.4    Institutional arrangements……………………………………………….16 
 
        2.3 Theories of regulation………………………………………………………………16 
 
                   2.3.1    Conceptualising the “public interest”……………………………………17 
                   2.3.2    Public interest regulatory theory of regulation…………………………..18 
                   2.3.3    “Perverted” public interest theory of regulation…………………………18 
 
                                         2.3.3.1 “Instrumental” explanation………………………………..19 
                                         2.3.3.2 “Structural” analysis explanation…………………………20 
                                         2.3.3.3 “Capture” explanation…………………………………….20 
 
          2.4 Characteristics of an independent regulator……………………………………….21 
 
                   2.4.1      Guarantees of independence……………………………………………21 
                   2.4.2      Participatory and transparent appointment process…………………….22 
                   2.4.3      Qualified and independent personnel with integrity…………………...22 
                   2.4.4      Public accountability…………………………………………………...23 
                   2.4.5      Sufficient mandate and power………………………………………….23 
                   2.4.6      Sufficient and independent funding……………………………………23 
     
          2.5 Regulating a public service broadcaster ………………………………………….24 
 
                    2.5.1     Public service broadcasting……………………………………………24 
 
           2.6 Characteristics of a public service broadcaster…………………………………...25 
 
                    2.6.1    Universality and accessibility…………………………………………..26 
                    2.6.2    Diversity of and in programming……………………………………….26 
 
 
4
                    2.6.3    Distinctiveness…………………………………………………………26 
                    2.6.4    Independence…………………………………………………………..27 
                    2.6.5    Public funding………………………………………………………….27 
            
           2.7 The democratic role of a public service broadcaster…………………………….28 
           2.8 The regulator’s role in the survival of public service broadcasters……………...29 
           2.9 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….30 
 
Chapter 3: Methods………………………………………………………………………..31 
 
         3. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………31 
        3.1 Document analysis…………………………………………………………………31 
 
        3.1.1     Policy and regulatory documents……………………………………...31 
        3.1.2     ICASA’s monitoring documents on the SABC……………………….31 
        3.1.3     A range of press reports……………………………………………….32 
        3.1.4     The Freedom of Expression Institute’s online website………………..32 
        3.1.5     The ICASA and SABC Annual Report 2007………………………….32 
        3.2 Qualitative interviews………………………………………………………………33 
        3.3 Limitations to the study …………………………………………………………….36 
        3.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..37 
 
Chapter 4: Findings………………………………………………………………………...38 
 
          4. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………38 
         4.1 Findings structure…………………………………………………………………..38 
         4.2 ICASA’s regulation of the SABC………………………………………………….39 
         4.3 An effective regulator ……………………………………………………………...40 
 
                    4.3.1    Guarantees of independence ……………………………………………40 
4.3.2 Participatory and transparent appointment process …………………….40 
4.3.3 Appointment on merit…………………………………………………..40 
4.3.4 Public accountability mechanisms……………………………………...41 
4.3.4 Mandate and power …………………………………………………….41 
        4.3.6    Funding …………………………………………………………………42 
         4.4 The scope of ICASA’s mandate with regard to the SABC………………………...42 
 
                    4.4.1    The SABC Charter……………………………………………………...42 
                    4.4.2    The SABC’s television and radio licenses……………………………...42 
 
             4.5 ICASA and the SABC’s relationship……………………………………………44 
             4.6. Co-operative relationship………………………………………………….……44 
 
             4.7 Unsatisfactory regulation of the SABC………………………………………….47 
                     4.7.1     Enforcement………………………………………………………...…47 
                     4.7.2     Independence…………………………………………………………..48 
                     4.7.3     Legislation……………………………………………………………..48 
                     4.7.4     Resources………………………………………..…………………….48 
 
 
5
              4.8   Tense relationship……………………………………………………………..49 
              4.9   Troubled relationship……………………………………………………….…49 
              4.10 Confrontational relationship…………………………………………………..50 
4.11 Silent relationship……………………………………………………………..51 
 
                    4.11.1     The SABC’s commercial funding model……………………….……51 
        4.11.2     Political independence…………………………………..…………....52 
                    4.11.3     Editorial timidity……………………………………………………..53 
        4.11.4     Internal report into alleged corruption……………………………….54 
        4.11.5     The “blacklisting” saga………………………...……...……………..54 
        4.11.6     The Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint…………………...56 
        4.11.7     The suspensions……………………………………………………...57 
        4.11.8     Calls for the SABC board to step down……………………………...58 
 
4.12 Interviewees’ calls for ICASA to take action………………………………....58 
 
       4.12.1      Resources and capacity………………………………………………61 
       4.12.2      Appointments……………………………………………………….. 61 
                   4.12.3      Legislation…........................................................................................61 
                   4.12.4      Fear and lack of will…………………………………...……………..61 
 
              4.13 ICASA’s institutional weaknesses…………………………………...……….62 
 
                   4.13.1      Independence…………………………………………………………62 
                   4.13.2      Appointment process………………………………………….……...63 
                   4.13.3      Expertise and staff “poaching”……………………………….............63  
                   4.13.4      Public accountability…………………………………………………64 
                   4.13.5      Mandate and power……………………………………………...........64 
                   4.13.6      Resources and capacity……………………………………………….64 
               
              4.14 Conclusion………………………………………..……………………………65 
 
Chapter 5: Analysis…………………………………………………………………………66 
 
                5. Introduction……………………………………………………………………..66 
               5.1 Public interest enhancing regulations and practices……………………………66 
               5.2 Problematic regulatory practices……………………………………………….68 
               5.3 Antagonistic relationship……………………………………………………….69 
               5.4 The SABC’s problematic commercial funding model…………………………70  
               5.5 “Silent” regulation……………………………………………………………...72 
 
                   5.5.1       The “blacklisting” saga and FXI’s  complaint………………….……...72   
                   5.5.2       The suspensions………………………………………………………..73 
                   5.5.3       Calls for the SABC board to step down……………………………….74 
                   5.5.4       ICASA’s regulatory practice of silence………………………..............74   
 
 
 
 
6
5.6 “Troubled” regulator…………………………………………………………......76 
                  5.6.1       Lack of independence………………………………………………….76 
      5.6.2       “Politicized” appointment process……………………………………..78 
      5.6.3       Inadequately skilled personnel…………………………………………80 
                  5.6.4       “Politicized” and “inefficient” accountability mechanisms……………81  
                  5.6.5.      “Controversial” mandate and power……………...……………………82 
                  5.6.6       Lack of independent and adequate funding…………………………….83 
                
5.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...…………...84 
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...85 
 
        6. Introduction………………………………………………………………………85 
             6.1 “Toothless” regulator……………………………………………………………85  
             6.2  ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC…………………………………….86  
             6.3  ICASA’s ineffective regulation of the SABC………………………………......87 
             6.4  Factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC…………………87 
             6.5  Ways to strengthen ICASA……………………………………………………..88 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………….......................90 
 
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would firstly like to thank my supervisor Professor Tawana Kupe for his guidance and 
support and for going the extra mile, I could not have wished for a better supervisor and 
mentor. Secondly, I would like to thank my parents and siblings for their patience and 
tremendous support. Last but not least, I would like to thank my Lord and Saviour for giving 
me the wisdom, favour and strength to complete this Dissertation. Thank you!!! 
 
 
 
8
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
This study investigates ICASA’s level of effectiveness in its regulation of the SABC so that it 
functions as public service broadcaster. Through critically analysing the actions or lack 
thereof ICASA has taken, in holding the SABC accountable to policy and regulation as well 
fulfilling their license conditions. It also seeks to investigate the factors that influence 
ICASA’s ability to effectively regulate the SABC. 
  
1.1 Motivation  
 
ICASA is the target of constant criticism and debate with regards to its performance and 
institutional independence. The major print media repeatedly raises questions about its 
inability to fulfil its role of an effective regulator. A leading media activist organisation, the 
Freedom of Expression Institute argues that there is growing evidence that ICASA 
councillors are doing the bidding of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), which 
raises questions about its independence. The Goedgedacht Forum for Social Reflection 
dialogue in February 2007, comprising of the Minister in the Presidency, leading media 
academics and leading media workers concluded that the SABC has not been transformed 
into a public service broadcaster and is sliding back into being a state broadcaster, whilst 
ICASA is doing very little to prevent this slide. Marcel Golding the Chief Executive Officer 
of E-TV in a paper presented in 2003 on “Privatisation” at the “Conference on Competition 
and Development” argues that “a lack of regulatory control over the SABC is a major 
concern” (Golding 2008). This study is therefore significant as it assesses ICASA’s 
effectiveness in performing its fundamental mandate regarding the public service broadcaster.  
The topic of this study is furthermore significant because evidence suggests that the SABC is 
a shadow of what a public service broadcaster should be, and ICASA is mandated with a 
crucial role regarding the SABC. Numerous organisations voice their concerns at the current 
state of the SABC as a public service broadcaster. A civil society coalition called Save Our 
SABC (SOS) was formed in June 2008 “to address the crisis at the SABC”. The Save Our 
SABC coalition represents key trade unions, non-governmental organisations, independent 
producer organisations and prominent academics.  
A study involving ICASA and the SABC is both appealing and relevant as it delves into their 
effectiveness as institutions. The effectiveness of institutions is crucial in achieving a healthy 
South African democracy. A situation where both ICASA and SABC do not perform their 
roles, critics argue, needs to be changed if South Africa is to foster a healthy democracy.   
 
Lastly, most studies tend to focus on either the public service broadcaster or the regulator and 
not the relationship between the two. Therefore, this study is unique in that it critically 
analyses the relationship between ICASA as a regulator and the SABC which is regulated by 
ICASA. This study adds to existing knowledge and research on effective independent 
regulation and a public service broadcaster, as critically important to serving the public 
interest and democracy.  
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1.2 Historical context  
 
Prior to 1993 the SABC was like all media in South Africa, it was regulated, owned and 
controlled by the state and used as a vital role in creating and supporting the apartheid 
structures (Teer- Tomaselli 2001; Berger 2001; Tomaselli 1994). The SABC was also used 
by the apartheid state in its efforts to combat anti-apartheid forces including the ANC in exile 
and other forces internally (Teer- Tomaselli 2001).   
 
From 1991 a process of restructuring of the SABC began, which was part of a prolonged 
campaign to “free the airwaves” (Horwitz 2001).  After various initiatives a new “vision and 
value” framework was created for the SABC, in the task of transforming the “state 
broadcaster” into a “public service broadcaster” (Teer- Tomaselli 2001). As the 
transformation of the South African political landscape took place, it was no longer an option 
for the SABC to be the voice of the apartheid government (Orgeret 2006). Further, because of 
democracy it was no longer desirable for the state to be a regulator (Orgeret 2006).  
 
In this context ICASA’s predecessor, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) was 
created before democracy in 1993 to ensure that the SABC plays an impartial role in the first 
democratic elections. The IBA was also created to regulate broadcasting activities in South 
Africa, in the public interest (Horwitz 2001). Amidst the regulator's first duties was to 
conduct a wide-ranging policy inquiry known as the Triple Inquiry, which concentrated on 
the viability of the public service broadcaster (Teer-Tomaselli 2004; Government 
Communication and Information System 2008). The Triple Inquiry Report laid out the 
regulator’s conclusions on these matters, one of its most important recommendations 
concerned the nature and funding of the public service broadcaster (Teer-Tomaselli 2004). 
The IBA was charged with the key role of repositioning the SABC into a public service 
broadcaster. The IBA Act stipulated that the IBA is required to monitor the public service 
broadcaster’s Charter (Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 1993). This Act enabled the 
IBA to more fully play a role in safeguarding the integrity of the broadcaster (Stiftung 2003). 
The IBA merged with the South African Telecommunications Authority (SATRA) in 2000 to 
become ICASA and regulate the telecommunications and broadcasting industries, and more 
recently postal services (ICASA Act 2000 as amended).    
 
1.3 The case against ICASA 
 
This study is relevant because it provides insight into ICASA’s regulation of the SABC, the 
SABC cannot become or exist as a public service broadcaster without effective regulation, 
which ensures that it maintains its independence and broadcasts in the public interest. 
ICASA’s mandate establishes that it occupies a key role through effective regulation. The 
SABC operates within the limits of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, its 
powers and functions, as well as its rights and obligations flow from the Broadcasting Act 
1999 as amended, its Editorial Charter, the licence conditions of each television and radio 
station, as well as regulations that are issued from time to time by ICASA. It is ICASA’s duty 
and responsibility to monitor and enforce compliance with the SABC Charter and the 
SABC’s television and radio licenses, inspect and review editorial policies, enforce the 
SABC’s Code of Practice as well as ensure compliance with the SABC’s Code of Conduct. 
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This study is also significant in that it provides insight into ICASA’s organisational 
weaknesses, which are constantly reported by the major print media. For example, the 
Financial Mail reported in September 2006 that the media and certain consumer groups view 
ICASA as a “toothless regulator” and question its effectiveness, credibility as well as 
legitimacy. There is also continuous debate about the extent or lack of ICASA’s 
independence from government, which are said to be a result of under-resourcing because of 
an inappropriate funding model, lack of accountability and an appointment process that is 
controlled by the ruling party and government. Some also point to an increased workload, 
which is beyond ICASA’s capacity, partly stemming from the merger of the IBA (the former 
broadcasting regulator) and SATRA (the former telecommunications regulator). Further, 
ICASA’s chair Paris Mashile has been quoted stipulating that the organisation is under 
resourced and inundated with “too much work”. ICASA itself contends that that it faces an 
exodus of top staff and is crippled by staff shortages in critical departments. Some legislators 
from both the ruling party and opposition have also been quoted stating that the organisation 
is plagued by financial irregularities which are attributed to lack of proper corporate 
governance. This study provides insight into ICASA’s organisational weaknesses and 
assesses the validity of these claims. ICASA cannot effectively regulate the SABC into a 
public service broadcaster if its inadequacies are not addressed.  
 
1.4 The case against the SABC 
 
The SABC’s fulfillment of its role as a public service broadcaster and its lack thereof is a 
topical and controversial issue. ICASA’s role in the SABC functioning as a public service 
broadcaster is fundamental, hence the pertinence of this study. A leading media activist 
organisation, the Freedom of Expression Institute has voiced concern that the SABC is 
becoming more of a state broadcaster than a public service broadcaster because of political 
interference, including interference in the selection of board members, and the undermining 
of its editorial and programming independence. There is also much concern expressed by 
academics, media activists and within the SABC itself regarding its commercial funding 
model, issues of poor governance, weak management as well as a perceived lack of 
accountability to the public.  
 
The major allegation with regard to the SABC’s editorial and programming independence is 
that it is a propaganda machine for the government and an extension of the ruling party. 
There are continuous controversies over its editorial practices and output. Its news and 
current affairs division is accused by Rhodes University academic Guy Berger, of being 
fearful of offending anyone in authority and that there is a culture of nervousness leading to 
news coverage being bland, dull and inadequate. The Freedom of Expression Institute 
commented for the largest circulation newspaper the Sunday Times in July 2007, that the 
main problem at the SABC is a pro status quo bias in reporting on the most contentious 
political issues of the day, in particular shielding the Thabo Mbeki Presidency from criticism. 
The SABC’s questionable “editorial independence” seems apparent in its the decision not to 
broadcast an Asikhulume interview with Jacob Zuma, the pulling of a song on Ukhozi FM 
supporting Zuma, the handling of the booing of the then Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka, the decision not to screen the controversial documentary on Thabo Mbeki as well as 
the “blacklisting” saga of political commentators for expressing views critical of government. 
Critics say these actions lead to a lack of diverse voices, in particular critical and oppositional 
views in news bulletins and current affairs programmes.  
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The major print media repeatedly reports on the SABC’s numerous controversies, including 
the Thabo Mbeki documentary withdrawals, the appointment of the new SABC board 
members by Thabo Mbeki, the new SABC board’s “vote of no confidence” from the ANC 
Members of Parliament, an internal report on alleged corruption, the “blacklisting” saga and 
the suspensions of two of the SABC’s Executive members. ICASA’s voice is yet to be heard 
about any of these SABC controversies. 
 
Finally, this study is relevant as it provides insight into ICASA’s contribution to the SABC 
functioning as a public service broadcaster or lack thereof. Critics of both ICASA and the 
SABC argue that it is the weakness of ICASA as a regulator which is principally responsible 
for the state the SABC is in, and the absence of true public service broadcasting. An example 
of this is the SABC’s astronomical advertising hikes, which was reported by Business Day in 
August 2007, wherein advertisers and those within the SABC’s commercial division claim 
that these are caused by the regulations set by ICASA. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
 
1. What actions has ICASA taken and not taken to ensure that the SABC performs its role as 
a public service broadcaster in the public interest? 
2. What factors enable or undermine ICASA’s ability to regulate the SABC effectively? 
3. In what ways can ICASA be strengthened to become more effective? 
 
1.6 Chapter organisation  
 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the study and outlined the research questions. 
The chapters that follow include, chapter 2 which is the theoretical framework and focuses on 
theories that inform the study. Chapter 3 discusses the research methods employed in this 
research. Chapter 4 presents the findings from a range of documents including, policy and 
regulatory documents, ICASA compliance reports, press reports from newspapers, 
magazines, and advocacy groups, the SABC Annual report 2007, the ICASA Annual report 
2007 as well as interviews. Chapter 5 is the analysis of the findings. The conclusion of the 
study is outlined by chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Theoretical Framework 
  
2.  Introduction 
 
This study employs three complementary theories, namely, critical political economy of the 
media, theories of regulation and lastly public service broadcasting. These theories provide 
the necessary framework to investigate ICASA’s effectiveness in regulating the SABC so that 
its plays its role as a public service broadcaster. The theories further provide essential insights 
in identifying and analysing the factors impeding ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC. 
These theories are complementary as they all recognise the importance of independent 
regulation and public media, in serving the public interest.  
 
Critical political economy of the media regards independent public media and independent 
regulation as important aspects, in serving the public interest and in cultivating an informed 
citizenry. Theories of regulation are based on the premise that regulation is an intrinsic aspect 
to fostering the public interest. Theories of public service broadcasting establish the public 
service broadcaster as the entity mandated to offer public service broadcasting.  Theories of 
public service broadcasting also outline the characteristics and practices a public service 
broadcaster should possess and demonstrate. The literature review is embedded within the 
theoretical framework. 
 
2.1 Research on ICASA and the SABC 
 
There is a lack of comprehensive studies relating to both these organisations, with regard to 
the regulation of the relevant mandate. Existing studies analyse these two organisations in 
isolation and lack in the study of the relationship between the two. In the South African and 
African context, the concepts of public service broadcasting as opposed to state broadcasting, 
independent regulation as well as an independent regulator’s role in promoting and 
safeguarding public service broadcasting are fairly new. These concepts stem from the advent 
of democratisation processes in the 1990’s. 
 
Some of the existing studies focus on aspects of regulation of public service broadcasting. 
Banda (2006) discusses the existing regulatory and policy models used for public service 
broadcasting in Africa, and argues that the SABC is characterized as falling under “state-
delegated regulation”. The other policy and regulatory models existing in Africa, according to 
Banda (2006) includes, reporting to media authorities and direct reporting to the state. Banda 
(2006) concludes that the value of a regulatory-cum-policy model lies in the extent to which 
it can promote or hinder the attaining of public service broadcasting principles.  
 
Research on ICASA has previously been conducted. Smith (2007) notes that amongst the 
many challenges hindering ICASA’s performance are, interference with its independence due 
to state involvement and ministerial influence, funding constraints, being a feeding ground 
for skills development, as well as “poaching” of its employees by the industry. Smith (2007) 
furthermore argues that ICASA is not adequately fulfilling its mandate with regards to 
ensuring accountability, transparency and access to information, as well as fully achieving its 
regulatory objectives. The lack of delivery of these aspects of ICASA’s mandate is according 
to Smith (2007), aggravated by its centralised decision making, apparent lack of clarity about 
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roles and responsibilities between council and management, as well as a lack of record 
keeping.  
 
Fokane and Duncan (2002) draw attention to ICASA’s problem of under funding, and argue 
that this problem was set in the days of ICASA’s predecessor, the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA). ICASA’s current problems, according to Fokane and Duncan (2002) have 
been inherited from the IBA, who continuously suffered budget cuts that lead to a cutting 
down of employment positions, reduction of departments and the closure of provincial 
offices. Fokane and Duncan (2002) furthermore add that the downsizing at ICASA ironically 
took place at a time when there was an increase in the number of broadcasters that needed to 
be monitored, thus placed further strain on the IBA’s resources. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted on the SABC. Masenyama (2006) argues that the 
SABC plays an important role in promoting a sense of national unity in South Africa, through 
diversity in its programming. Masenyama (2006) adds that hindering the SABC’s role is its 
hybrid model of broadcasting, which comprises of characteristics of both public and 
commercial broadcasting. Berger and Jjuuko (2007) present a similar argument, stating that 
the SABC is in many respects run as a commercial broadcaster, which produces implications 
for its programming, independence and public accountability. Eastman (2003) contends that 
the SABC’s over reliance on advertising is problematic and results in the goal to enlarge 
audiences, and thus the pressure to expand advertising sales, reduce programming costs and 
attract bigger audiences. Eastman (2003) adds that this goal directly counters the SABC’s 
mandate to serve multiple ethnic groups through local programming. This goal, according to, 
(Eastman 2003; Berger and Jjuuko 2007), also results in English language programming 
dominating programming and compromising the SABC’s broadcasting in all eleven official 
languages mandate. In an evaluation of SABC news, Roseborough and Bird (2007) argue that 
the SABC’S over reliance on advertising impacts on the SABC news by limiting the news 
airtime and news budget. 
 
Bird and Roseborough (2007) note the various challenges that the SABC faces, including 
perceptions of pro government bias in the SABC news, news items tending not to be critical 
of government, a lack of range and diversity of both voices and sources, the SABC’s alleged 
credibility of their board as well as the SABC’s funding mechanism. Fokane and Duncan 
(2002) state concern about the SABC’s independence, and argue that the SABC’s financial 
independence is compromised by the Minister of Communications’ control over the SABC’s 
finances. Fokane and Duncan (2002) add that the SABC’s editorial independence is 
compromised by a blurred line between editorial and management, which is leading to 
confusion and demoralisation within the SABC news room.  
 
This previous research conducted on ICASA and the SABC provide useful insight and 
background information for the study. This study seeks to move a step further by critically 
analysing how ICASA can be strengthened institutionally, so that it can become a more 
effective regulator and hence regulate the SABC more effectively. This study is centrally 
concerned with ICASA’s regulation of the SABC and determining the barriers to ICASA’s 
effective regulation of the SABC.  
 
It is important to note that in South Africa the independent regulator came into existence after 
the SABC. Prior to 1993 the SABC was like all media in South Africa, it was regulated, 
owned and controlled by the state and used as a vital tool in creating and supporting the 
apartheid structures, as a mouthpiece of the Nationalist Party regime (Teer- Tomaselli 2001; 
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Berger 2001; Tomaselli 1994; Media Development and Diversity Agency 2008). Independent 
regulation was established in 1993 through the inception of ICASA’s predecessor, the IBA.    
 
2.2 Critical political economy of the media  
 
The aspects of critical political economy of the media that are particularly useful to the study 
are its “critical” strand, strong emphasis on independent regulation and public ownership due 
to its importance to the creation of a participatory democracy, focus on analysing policy and 
regulatory practices of public service broadcasting, and its focus on analysing the 
consequences of institutional arrangements.  
 
2.2.1 “Critical” strand 
 
The “critical” strand of political economy of the media deals with the identification and 
analysis of structural constraints. This study adopts the “critical” strand of political economy 
of the media, which is “centrally concerned with questions of action and structure in an 
attempt to differentiate the real constraints that shape the lives and opportunities of real actors 
within the real world” (Golding and Murdock 2000:72). This approach enables the 
identification and analysis of the constraints that may be hindering ICASA’s effective 
regulation of the SABC. In addition, critical political economy of the media also permits an 
analysis of the nature and sources these constraints (Golding and Murdock 2000). This 
approach is also “critical” as it is interested in possibilities for improvement (Boyd-Barrett 
2002). The “critical” strand of political economy of the media therefore permits the 
identification and analysis of constraints that may be hindering ICASA’s effective regulation, 
followed by a consideration of possibilities for improvement.  
 
2.2.2 Participatory democracy  
 
Critical political economy of the media emphasises the importance of a participatory 
democracy and regards a healthy media system as an integral aspect to the creation of it. This 
approach particularly regards independent regulation and public media as important aspects 
in cultivating a participatory democracy. Critical political economy of the media is premised 
on the belief that democracy is predicated upon an informed citizenry, and an informed 
citizenry can only be produced by a healthy and vibrant media system (McChesney 1998). 
This theoretical approach considers an ideal communication system as a crucial aspect in 
contributing to the development of citizenship (Golding and Murdock 2000). Golding and 
Murdock (1989) notes that citizenship is the condition that allows people to become full 
members of society at every level, and a good society can be established through the 
extension of citizen rights (Golding and Murdock 2000). Critical political economy of the 
media contends that a communication space ideally should be a public cultural space that is 
open, diverse and accessible (Golding and Murdock 2000). These ideal notions are used as a 
basic yardstick to measure the performance of existing communication systems (Golding and 
Murdock 2000).  
 
Critical political economy of the media therefore is interested in engaging with concepts 
conceptually linked to a participatory democracy, such as moral questions of justice, equity 
and the public good (Mosco 1996; Boyd-Barrett 2002). This theory strongly defends 
democracy, equality and the public sphere in the face of powerful private interests (Mosco 
1996; Boyd-Barrett 2002). Critical political economy of the media regards public service 
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broadcasting as an important element in providing a public good within a communication 
system (Golding and Murdock 2000). Critical political economy of the media therefore views 
public ownership as imperative to a broadcasting system and is furthermore critical of 
commercially driven and privately owned media (McChesney 1998; Mosco 1996; Boyd-
Barrett 2002). This approach is highly critical of commercially driven media and advertising, 
because it is premised on the belief that commercially driven media influence the content and 
the democratic functioning of the media, in ways that undermine the development of an 
informed citizenry (McChesney 1998). An ideal communications space, according to this 
theoretical approach, can only be achieved through media policies and regulatory 
arrangements that make provision for an independent regulator (Golding and Murdock 2000).  
 
Therefore, one aspect of critical political economy of the media actively promotes the idea of 
public ownership of the media and independent regulation, and the importance of these two 
concepts to nurturing democracy. This approach’s view on the importance of the public good 
is intrinsic to this study as it provides insight into elements of what the public good is and 
how it should be functioning to serve democracy. The “public good” resonates with “public 
service broadcasting”, which resonates with the “public interest” and  this study centrally 
focuses on regulating public service broadcasting in the public interest.  
 
2.2.3 Policy and regulatory choices 
  
Critical political economy of the media accents the importance of policy and regulation in 
fostering the public interest and democracy. This approach regards policy and regulation as 
important aspects in serving the public interest and the creation of a participatory democracy 
(McChesney 1998). This aspect is useful to this study as it pays particular attention to 
regulating in the public interest.  
 
Critical political economy of the media also focuses on an analysis of policy and regulatory 
choices, and their affect on the media’s ability to serve the public interest and cultivate 
democracy. This theoretical approach is concerned with policy and regulatory choices and 
determining “the appropriate scope of public intervention” (Golding and Murdock 2000: 76). 
It also evaluates competing policies that are purposed to advance the public interest and 
enable the development of a media system that advances democracy (Golding and Murdock 
2000). This aspect of critical political economy of the media is appropriate to this study, 
which focuses on policy analysis and regulatory choices, in an attempt to identify the level of 
effectiveness of the regulator.  
 
This theoretical approach also analyses the regulations, which public service broadcasting 
operates within, and the consequences of it for the public good and democracy. Critical 
political economy of the media has a strong emphasis on analysing the regulatory systems 
that govern public service broadcasting, and the consequences of them for the public good 
and the health of democracy (Boyd-Barrett 2002). This facet of critical political economy of 
the media is intrinsic to this study, as it is centrally concerned with the level of effectiveness 
of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC.   
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2.2.4. Institutional arrangements 
Critical political economy of the media also focuses on an analysis of institutional 
arrangements to determine the consequences of them. Critical political economy of the media 
pays particular attention to media institutions and analyses institutional arrangements (Boyd-
Barrett 2002; Golding and Murdock 2000; McChesney 1998; McChesney 2000). This 
approach therefore, for instance links an analysis of media ownership and its broader social 
context, with the role of policy and regulation promoting or constraining editorial and 
programming independence (Boyd- Barrett 2002; Golding and Murdock 2000; McChesney 
1998; McChesney 2000). It also analyses institutional arrangements like funding, and how 
these arrangements affects the capacity of the media to serve its democratic functioning 
(Golding and Murdock 2000; McChesney 1998; McChesney 2000). This aspect of critical 
political economy of the media is useful to a study that focuses on two media institutions, 
ICASA and SABC. This aspect furthermore allows the study to identify which of ICASA’s 
institutional arrangements is hindering it from effectively regulating the SABC.  
 
2.3 Theories of regulation 
 
Independent regulation is a crucial concept to this study as it is vital in ensuring that the 
public interest is served. Theories of regulation are useful tools for analysing the performance 
of the regulator. Theories of regulation enable a critical assessment of a regulator’s 
effectiveness in regulating in the public interest. 
  
Theories of regulation are derived from specific sources and can be categorised under five 
ideal types, these categories of regulation offer understandings of regulation. Horwitz (1989) 
argues that theories of regulation spring from two main sources, welfare economics and 
political theory. Traditional theories of regulation, according to Horwitz (1989), are centred 
on a concept of the “public interest” which has its roots in welfare economics. Horwitz 
(1989) adds that the theories of regulation that have their roots in political theory are 
generally “private interest” theories. Horwitz (1989) also adds, the way in which the regulator 
operates once established rests upon its organisational behaviour and institutional constraints 
(Golding and Murdock 1997). This premise is particularly useful to this study that pays 
particular attention to assessing the effectiveness of ICASA’s regulatory behaviour, and 
identifying the organisational constraints to this effectiveness.  
 
Horwitz (1989) notes five ideal typical categories of regulation, namely the public interest, 
regulatory failure or “perverted” public interest, conspiracy, organisational behaviour and 
capitalist state theory. This study focuses on the theories pertaining to the regulation of 
broadcasting which are the public interest oriented theories (Golding and Murdock 1997). 
The theories of regulation most useful to this study are the public interest and “perverted” 
public interest theory as these two theoretical approaches both focus on assessing a 
regulator’s performance in relation to the public interest. The public interest theory and 
“perverted” public interest theory’s focus on the public interest is particularly useful to this 
study because the “public interest” resonates with and is conceptually linked to the notion of 
“public service broadcasting”. This study is centrally concerned with effective regulation of 
public service broadcasting.  
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2.3.1 Conceptualising the “public interest” 
 
It is important to explore this notion of the “public interest” before discussing the public 
interest and “perverted” public interest theories of regulation. The public interest is a concept 
that has been used to justify the need for media regulation. This concept of the public interest 
is pivotal in debates on regulation as media regulation has traditionally been justified by the 
argument that media regulation serves the public interest (Feintuck 2001: 57; Horwitz 1989; 
McQuail 2001: 4; Napoli 2001; Croteau and Hoynes 2003). 
 
Thus, it can be deduced that media regulation can serve the public interest. This notion that 
the media can serve the public interest signifies that the media can cultivate the general 
welfare of society and has a social responsibility role to play within society (McQuail 1999). 
The media serving the public interest includes the media possessing a vital role in cultivating 
an informed and healthy citizenry (Feintuck 2001; Golding 1990).  
 
The media contributes towards a healthy democracy by serving the public interest. The media 
plays a crucial role in providing the resources for an active citizenry by providing citizens 
with access to a diversity of information and perspectives in news and culture required to take 
part in civic life (Hoynes and Croteau 2001). It is important to note that with the emergence 
of commercialism, the concept of the consumer and citizen is increasingly defined as one in 
the same, resulting in the neglect of the public interest (Hoynes and Croteau 2001). However 
the consumer and citizen are not the same and are representative of different aspects of 
human life, consumers pursue private goals by buying various products (Hoynes and Croteau 
2001). Citizens on the other hand are connected to communities and participate in debates 
that constitute shared civic life; in a democratic society a fundamental assumption is that 
citizens are equal regardless of their consumer capabilities (Hoynes and Croteau 2001). This 
premise that media regulation can serve the public interest indicates that the regulator must 
ensure people are treated like citizens and not consumers, and ensure that the information that 
citizens require are accessible. A regulator that serves the public interest is also then obliged 
to ensure that the media does not just treat people like consumers, which would result in the 
neglect of people with low buying power and focus on the needs of people with high buying 
power. 
  
The media that are mandated to serve the public interest are not the same as other businesses 
in society. The media serving the public interest furthermore includes the media being 
accountable to the public because they are not the same as other businesses and institutions in 
society (Tleane and Duncan 2003; McQuail 1991). It should be noted that the concept of the 
public interest can be used for selfish reasons. Self serving governments often attempt to use 
this notion of the public interest as an ideological device intended to conceal unjustified 
regulatory ambitions that are in fact not in the interests of the public (McQuail 2001).  
 
The public interest is not only used to justify the need for media regulation, it is also used to 
guard public service broadcasting. The concept of the public interest also resonates with 
public service broadcasting because the public interest is often used to defend and maintain 
the system of public service broadcasting (Siune 1998).  
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2.3.2 Public interest regulatory theory of regulation 
 
The public interest theory of regulation arose historically from the need to protect individuals 
in the face of private interests. Public interest regulatory theory notes that regulation was 
established in response to the conflict between private corporations and the general welfare of 
society (Golding and Murdock 1997). Therefore, regulatory agencies were created to protect 
the interests of the public and their welfare. This approach contends that the creation of 
regulatory agencies was viewed as the tangible expression of the spirit of democratic reform 
(Golding and Murdock 1997). This approach therefore has its roots in regulatory agencies 
protecting the public interest in the face of private interests, and their creation was regarded 
as a personification of democracy.  
  
Historically, the public interest theory of regulation underwent two main phases; the early 
phase is the “Granger” period which refers to the anti-monopoly activism of the agrarian 
social movement, in which regulation protected the individual producer. The second phase of 
public interest theory of regulation, and the one that most informs this study is the 
“Progressive” phase wherein regulation sought to protect the consumer because of the 
“altered economic conditions created by the large corporations” (Golding and Murdock 1997: 
387). The efficiencies of the corporations created the modern mass consumer, thus the 
“Progressive” phase’s notion of the public interest regarded the regulator identifying with the 
interests of consumers (Golding and Murdock 1997). In the “Progressive” public interest 
theory the regulator sought to protect powerless consumers and ensure that the economy was 
fair (Golding and Murdock 1997). The main shift that the public interest theory of regulation 
underwent between these two main phases is regulation in the first phase protected the 
individual as producer, and in the second phase protected the individual as consumer 
(Golding and Murdock 1997). Therefore, public interest theory of regulation regards the 
creation of regulatory agencies as the “victorious result of the people’s struggle with private 
corporate interests” (Golding and Murdock 1997: 388). The regulatory agency serves general 
welfare by protecting consumers from corporate abuses.  
 
Public interest theory of regulation is used as the yardstick to measure and assess regulation 
with regards to the public interest being served (Golding and Murdock 1997). This approach 
is regarded as the “mammoth literature assessing regulatory failure” and is conceived as 
either a theoretical standard or as a historical fact of a regulatory agency’s birth (Golding and 
Murdock 1997: 389). This study uses the public interest theory of regulation as a theoretical 
standard to assess the regulator’s level of effectiveness with regards to the public interest. 
This approach is furthermore useful to this study as it focuses on regulating in the public 
interest.  
 
2.3.3 “Perverted” public interest theory of regulation 
 
Regulatory failure or “perverted” public interest theory analyses the behaviour of regulators 
that betray or pervert the public interest standard and is condemnatory of regulatory 
behaviour (Golding and Murdock 1997). The consequence of the perversion of the public 
interest is that regulation tends to serve the private interests of the industries under regulation 
at the expense of serving the public interest (Golding and Murdock 1997). This approach is 
based on the premise that the behaviour of regulators can betray or pervert the public interest 
standard, and is measured by various criteria such as democratic due process, economic 
efficiency or bureaucratic rationality (Golding and Murdock 1997). The “perverted” public 
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interest theory is useful to the study as it allows an assessment of whether or not the regulator 
is betraying the public interest.  
 
“Perverted” public interest theorists expose the failures of regulation followed by an 
explanation of why the perversion of the public interest occurred, the different explanations 
are often related to different political orientations (Golding and Murdock 1997). The main 
explanations for the prevalence of the prevalence of the public interest are explained through 
the use of Influence models, they propose that the regulated industry come to influence undue 
influence on the regulator (Golding and Murdock 1997). The Influence models are regarded 
as ideal types, hence some arguments do not fit neatly into a single category (Golding and 
Murdock 1997).  
 
The Influence models are “Instrumental”, “Structural” and “Capture’ explanations (Golding 
and Murdock 1997). It should be noted that the most frequently cited reason for the 
perversion of the public interest is “the over identification of the regulatory agency with the 
industry it regulates” (Golding and Murdock 1997: 389). A regulator over-identifying with 
the industry suggests that it could be seeing issues through the eyes of the regulated industry 
at the expense of the public interest. For example the regulator could pass a regulation as it 
would benefit the regulated industry meanwhile this could be to the detriment of the public 
interest.   
 
The “perverted” public interest theory is useful to the study as it enables an assessment of 
ICASA’s performance in its regulation of the SABC, in relation to the public interest. This 
approach furthermore allows the study to investigate any “public interest” regulatory failures 
of ICASA followed by an explanation of why the perversion of the public interest prevailed, 
using the Influence models. 
  
2.3.3.1 “Instrumental” explanation 
 
One of the Influence models used to explain why the perversion of the public interest 
prevailed is the “Instrumental” explanation which rests on the personal motivation and 
behaviour of individuals within a regulator. The “Instrumental” explanation attributes the 
perversion prevailing due to the specific orientation of key agency bureaucrats, like personal 
motivation and the behaviour of individuals within the regulator (Golding and Murdock 
1997). An example of this explanation includes the eventual venality of regulators, which 
derives from factors like bribes, future orientation of personnel seeking to safe guard their 
employment opportunities in the regulated industry. An example to illustrate this explanation 
is that individuals within a regulator could act according to personal motivation rather than in 
the public interest. Such as accepting a bribe from the regulated industry for their own 
financial gain or even towing a cautious line with members within the regulated industry due 
to seeking better job opportunities, thus they would not want to offend the regulated industry 
in case it would jeopardise an opportunity for better employment.  
 
Another characteristic stated in the “Instrumental” explanation is a regulator’s vulnerability 
to political pressures, like self serving congressman who may force the regulator to become 
compliant (Golding and Murdock 1997). For instance, a regulator could be uniquely 
vulnerable to political pressure from politicians that play a direct role at the regulator, thus 
the politician could pressurise the regulator to make a decision that is politically beneficial to 
the politicised figure, at the expense of the public interest. The regulator could possibly 
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succumb to the pressure from the politician out of fear, because of the influence and power 
that the politician possesses in government and in society.  
  
2.3.3.2 “Structural” analysis explanation 
 
Another Influence model is the “Structural” analysis explanation. The “Structural” analysis 
explanation attributes the prevalence of perversion of the public interest to the relationship 
between institutions that restrict and channel the options of the individuals who make 
decisions within those institutions (Golding and Murdock 1997). An example of the 
“Structural” analysis explanation is that industries can influence the selection of agency 
appointments through the political spoils system; the President for example can use the 
appointments to reward and retain the political support of important regulated industries 
(Golding and Murdock 1997). The agency appointments therefore are so tied in to the 
political spoils systems that the regulated industry can indirectly influence the composition of 
a regulatory agency (Golding and Murdock 1997). An illustration of this explanation is that 
the president or politicians involved in the appointment process of the regulator could appoint 
the people that the industry approves of, rather then which appointment would best serve the 
public interest because they desire the political support of the industry. The president or 
politicians as a result, would have appointed people that would favour the industry, and the 
industry would therefore have a strong influence on the decisions of the regulator through the 
people that have been appointed.  
 
Another example of the “Structural” analysis explanation is that regulated industries possess 
far greater resources than the regulator in terms of personnel, money and political influence 
(Golding and Murdock 1997). The regulator for instance, as a result, is at a disadvantage 
when arguing cases in administrative and judicial arenas, because the cases are so expensive 
that the party with the most resources can be expected to triumph in most instances (Golding 
and Murdock 1997). A poorly funded regulator is forced to depend on industry for technical 
information and expertise and on Congress for their budgets (Golding and Murdock 1997).  
Therefore, when the regulated industry possesses more money than the regulator it restricts 
the options of the individuals of the regulator, as it does not possess sufficient budget to 
produce its own technical information and win court cases, this results in an ineffective 
regulator. Also, if the regulated industry has more political influence, the individuals within 
the regulator could possibly operate in fear of offending the regulated industry as it could 
result in backlash from politicians or politicised figures.  
 
2.3.3.3 “Capture” explanation 
 
Another Influence model includes the “Capture” explanation, which draws from the 
“Instrumental” and “Structural” analysis explanations. “Capture” theory is based on the 
premise that regulators are captured or taken over by regulated industries (Golding and 
Murdock 1997). The “Capture” model contends that the implication of “Capture” taking 
place is that the regulator systematically favours the private interests of regulated parties and 
systematically ignores the public interest (Golding and Murdock 1997). The “Capture” model 
explains the perversion of the public interest existing due to the regulator being taken over or 
captured by the regulated industries, whilst the “Instrumental” and “Structural” analysis 
explanations assert that the regulated parties exercise influence by various means on 
regulatory agencies (Golding and Murdock 1997). Therefore, a “Captured” regulator does not 
pervert the public interest due to perhaps the venality of individuals within a regulator, 
appointments that favour the regulated industry or political pressure, but rather perverts the 
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public interest because the regulated industry has taken over the regulator. For example, the 
regulated industry directly affects the decisions of the regulator, at the expense of the public 
interest.  
 
Therefore, the perversion of the public interest can take place through “Instrumental”, 
“Structural” and “Capture” explanations. The “Instrumental” and “Structural” perversions 
can inevitably lead to “Capture” of the regulator taking place. An illustration of this, for 
example, is the industry could greatly impact the decisions of the regulator through those that 
have been appointed based on the President’s desire to please the industry and inevitably gain 
political support. This strong indirect influence of the industry, through these appointments, 
could lead to the regulator being taken over by the regulated industry, as the decisions are 
systematically favouring the interests of the industry rather than the public interest, thus the 
regulator becomes “Captured” due to “Structural” reasons. 
  
2.4 Characteristics of an independent regulator 
 
An independent regulator is in a “healthy” position to be effective and serve the public 
interest. A regulator that perverts the public interest could inevitably be “Captured”, and 
consequently function to serve the “private interests” of the regulated industry, at the expense 
of the public interest.  
 
A regulator must possess specific characteristics to achieve independence. These 
characteristics include guarantees of independence for the regulator, a participatory and 
transparent appointment process, suitably qualified personnel, public accountability, 
sufficient mandate and power, as well as adequate funding. These ideal characteristics 
specified for a regulator to be an independent, will be used as a yardstick to measure 
ICASA’s status as an independent regulator and whether any of these characteristics are 
hindering ICASA’s levels of effectiveness in regulating the SABC.  
  
2.4.1 Guarantees of independence 
 
An independent regulator should have guarantees of independence from the powerful 
interests in society. An independent regulator is required to be independent from the 
government, the ruling party and other political parties, as well as the media interests that it 
regulates (ARTICLE 19 2006). An independent regulator therefore is required to be 
institutionally located outside government ministries and have constitutional guarantees of 
independence (Kupe 2003). This institutional location ensures that the interest the regulator 
represents is that of the public (ARTICLE 19 2006). Therefore, an independent regulator 
must have its independence from powerful interests in society upheld in law to ensure that the 
regulator stands apart from these interests, this lessens the possibility of it being “Captured”. 
 
A regulator’s independence should not only be enshrined in law, but should be evident in all 
spheres of its influence. A regulator’s independence must also be upheld in reality because a 
regulator’s legitimacy depends on its ability to enjoy its independence (Hutchison 1999). 
Given the necessary ability to enjoy independence, a regulator is enabled to fulfil its mandate 
and be effective. 
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2.4.2 Participatory and transparent appointment process  
 
An independent regulator ideally has an appointment process that is characterised by public 
participation. An independent regulator appoints its members through a process that ensures 
maximum public participation, such as hosting public hearings which allows the public to 
directly participate in the appointment process (ARTICLE 19 2006). Public participation in 
the appointment process of the regulator can also be achieved through allowing the public to 
nominate suitable nominees (ARTICLE 19 2006). Therefore, an independent regulator’s 
appointment process typically involves the participation of the public, through for instance 
hosting public hearing and allowing the public to participate in the nomination of suitable 
candidates.  
 
The appointment process of an independent regulator should not be representative of political 
and economic interests. An independent regulator’s appointment process of members and 
systems removes all power what so ever from the ruling party and “excludes representation of 
political and economic interests” (ARTICLE 19 2006; Kupe 2003:6). Thus, its appointment 
process should not be controlled completely by the ruling party as this could lead to the 
appointments being purely political rather than in the public interest.   
 
Along with a participatory and independent appointment process, an independent regulator 
should also appoint its personnel, systems of governance and management structures in a 
manner that is open and transparent. The appointment process for members and systems of 
governance and management structures of an independent regulator is characterised by 
transparency and openness (Kupe 2003:6). Therefore, an independent regulator’s 
appointment process of its personnel, typically should involve the public as much as possible 
and not represent political and economic interests. In addition, an independent regulator’s 
appointment of its governance structures and management structures should be conducted in 
a manner that is open and transparent.  
 
2.4.3 Qualified and independent personnel with integrity 
 
An independent regulator ideally should have personnel that are suitably qualified to perform 
the duties that the regulator is tasked with. The membership of an independent regulator 
consists of people with proven expertise that are suitably qualified to provide the regulator 
with the necessary knowledge to effectively regulate the various industries (ARTICLE 19 
2006). The membership of an independent regulator are furthermore people with integrity 
that can be relied on and trusted, therefore those that have been convicted of a crime may not 
be employed at the regulator (ARTICLE 19 2006). Thus, the personnel at an independent 
regulator must be trustworthy and be people with moral integrity.  
 
The personnel employed at an independent regulator are also required to be independent from 
the government, political parties and the regulated industry so that the regulator’s 
independence is not compromised. A member of an independent regulator may not be an 
employee of government or public service, an official of a political party or an employee of a 
broadcasting or telecommunications company (ARTICLE 19 2006). The personnel of an 
independent regulator therefore should be people with the relevant expertise, independence 
and moral integrity.  
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2.4.4 Public accountability  
 
Public accountability is an essential requirement for an independent regulator. An 
independent regulator ought to be accountable to the public through putting in place 
accountability mechanisms, such as reporting to a specific body like the legislature, produce 
an annual report and consult regularly with the public and stakeholders on policy matters 
(ARTICLE 19 2006). Public accountability therefore ensures that people are aware of the 
details of the regulator’s objectives, personnel, decisions, performance, and organisational 
structure. A regulator’s accountability to the public also ensures that it is answerable to the 
public and cannot simply function “haphazardly” with a flagrant disregard for the public 
interest. 
 
An independent regulator’s accountability mechanisms must be characterised by openness 
transparency and independence. It is imperative that a regulator’s lines of accountability are 
transparent and do not undermine the regulator’s independence (Kupe 2003). An independent 
regulator’s accountability mechanisms therefore must not compromise its independence. An 
example of this is, perhaps the specific body the regulator is accountable to could attempt to 
assess the regulator according to selfish political and economic interests and not according to 
the public interest.  
 
2.4.5 Sufficient mandate and power 
 
An independent regulator is expected to possess sufficient mandate and power to regulate in 
the public interest. An independent regulator should be vested with the necessary mandate 
and powers to perform its job effectively (ARTICLE 19 2006). Sufficient mandate and power 
are crucial requirements in enabling an independent regulator to perform its duties effectively 
in the public interest. Regulatory bodies are crucial to democracy because it removes policy 
implementation away from the political arena, and views the public interest as supreme in 
decision making (Hutchison 1999). Thus, a regulator needs sufficient mandate and power to 
ensure that it is able to function independently from the powerful interests in society, and be 
driven in every aspect by the public interest.  
 
An independent regulator should also have adequate mandate and power so that it does not 
become dependent on other institutions to perform its duties effectively, like the presidents 
department, political associations and in particular the regulated industry (ARTICLE 19 
2006). Therefore a regulator that possesses sufficient mandate and power is enabled to 
perform effectively, serve the public interest and function independently from powerful 
interests.  A regulator that does not possess adequate mandate and power will be ineffective 
and unable to serve the public interest.  
 
2.4.6 Sufficient and independent funding 
 
An independent regulator is required to be assigned with adequate financial and human 
resources that will guarantee “credible, effective and efficient regulation” (Kupe 2003:6). An 
independent regulator is independently funded so that its independence is not compromised, 
as inadequate funding could expose the regulator to improper interference (Golding and 
Murdock 1997; ARTICLE 19 2006). It can be deduced that sufficient funding is the 
fundamental characteristic that empowers the regulator to perform independently, effectively 
and in the public interest. Sufficient funding provides the means necessary to obtain some of 
other vital characteristics required for a regulator to be independent, such as qualified and 
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independent personnel. If a regulator is sufficiently funded, it is enabled to appoint the best 
possible people required to perform its duties effectively. Insufficient funding has various 
negative implications, for instance the regulator could be forced to appoint employees that it 
is able to “afford” to remunerate rather than the required skilled staff complement. 
Insufficient funding could furthermore result in the regulator appointing fewer personnel than 
it actually needs due to financial constraints.  
 
Adequate funding is not only required so that the regulator is enabled to employ the best 
possible skilled manpower, but also to retain its current skilled employees and pay 
satisfactory salaries. A regulator that pays unsatisfactory salaries to its employees increases 
the chances of its members being “poached”, which could result in the loss of crucial skills at 
the regulator.  
 
The regulator is obligated by its mandate to specific regulatory roles, therefore adequate 
funding is required by the regulator to “flex its muscle”. Funding permits the regulator to 
monitor and enforce its regulations, through regulatory practices such as the conducting of 
visits to broadcasters, conducting of investigations, compiling of reports and monitoring of 
broadcasters. In order for a regulator to effectively enforce its regulations and thereby fulfil 
its mandate, the regulator is required to have efficient regulatory practices. A regulator can 
only attain efficient regulatory practices if it has adequate funding to do so.  
 
Therefore, an under funded regulator is handicapped to regulate effectively and in the public 
interest if it cannot afford the skilled people needed to perform its duties effectively, as well 
as the regulatory practices to monitor and inevitably enforce regulations. This results in a 
regulator not performing credibly, effectively and efficiently. An insufficiently funded 
regulator leads to an unsuccessful regulator who is not taken seriously, that would be 
perceived as “toothless”. 
  
2.5 Regulating a public service broadcaster  
 
An independent regulator with the characteristics of guarantees of independence, a 
participatory and transparent appointment process, suitably qualified personnel, public 
accountability, sufficient mandate and power, as well as adequate funding, would be in a 
“healthy” position to regulate a public service broadcaster in the public interest. These ideal 
indicators will be used as a yardstick to measure ICASA’s status as an independent regulator, 
and how it impacts on the levels of effectiveness in regulating the SABC. In order to assess 
whether ICASA is effective in regulating the SABC so that it functions as a public service 
broadcaster, it is imperative to conceptualise this notion of a public service broadcaster and 
the characteristics this type of broadcaster must possess.  
 
2.5.1 Public service broadcasting 
 
It should be noted that public service broadcasting is a form of broadcasting, whereas the 
public service broadcaster is the entity that performs it. Public service broadcasting was 
developed in Britain as a result of the first director of the BBC, John Reith’s desire for 
independent broadcasting from government, consequently “state broadcasting” became 
“public service broadcasting” (Hills 2003; Melody 1990; Keane 1991; Williams 2003; Banda 
2006). The original idea of public service broadcasting sought to inform citizens by its goal 
of democratizing culture and politics (Cardiff and Scannell 1987; McChesney 1999). Public 
service broadcasting, at its inception, aspired to make all citizens “more actively responsive 
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to and responsible for the nation’s culture and politics” (Cardiff and Scannell 1987: 158). 
Therefore, public service broadcasting is a form of broadcasting that emerged due to the 
desire for independent broadcasting and to enable citizens to participate in the processes of 
culture, policy and democracy. 
  
In contemporary times, public service broadcasting is understood as a form of broadcasting 
specifically aimed at promoting the public interest, therefore presents information as a social 
good and not a commodity (Eko 2000; Williams 2003). Subsequently, public service 
broadcasting stands in contradiction to commercial broadcasting that is carried out for profit 
(Eko 2000; Hiebert and Gibbens 2000; Dizard 2000). Public service broadcasting however is 
re-interpreted the world over to accommodate national specifications, for instance in South 
Africa it is associated with the task of “national unity and reconciliation” (Banda 2006). 
Public service broadcasting can be deduced as “broadcasting in the public interest”, hence a 
public broadcaster has a specific remit to broadcast material in the public interest (ARTICLE 
19 2006; Rumphorst 2003; Banda 2006). Hence, public service broadcasting in contemporary 
times refers to a type of broadcasting that specifically promotes the public interest and does 
not function solely for profit making, therefore considers information as a social good. A 
public service broadcaster is the entity that is mandated to perform public service 
broadcasting and therefore performs in the public interest.   
 
It is important to note that a public service broadcaster is not the same as a state broadcaster. 
A state broadcaster is directly under state authority and does not enjoy independence from 
political and bureaucratic interference (World Television Council 2000). A state broadcaster 
therefore, does not enjoy institutional independence, editorial and programming 
independence and is under the authority and ownership of the state.  
 
Unlike a state broadcaster, a public service broadcaster is not directly under state authority 
but is rather entrusted to an organisation. This entrusted organisation is required to act in the 
public interest and enjoy enough independence to prevent political and bureaucratic 
interference (World Television Council 2000). A public service broadcaster holds supreme 
the interest of the public, even at the expense of making a profit. This type of broadcaster is a 
national institution that is owned, regulated and run in the public interest even if it is not 
profitable to do so (Scannell 1997; Barwise and Gordon 2002).  
 
A public service broadcaster is the opposite of a state broadcaster due to the arms length 
relationship it is required to have with the state. This arms length relationship is the most 
important distinction between a state broadcaster and a public service broadcaster. An arms 
length relationship with the state means that is independent from that state and does not 
perform to serve selfish “political” interests, but rather to enhance the public interest. 
Therefore, a public service broadcaster is institutionally independent so it is protected against 
political interference, and is enabled to act in the interest of the public and not in the 
“political interests”. On the contrary, a state broadcaster serves selfish “political” interests.  
 
2.6 Characteristics of a public service broadcaster 
 
It is intrinsic to conceptualise this notion of a public service broadcaster and the 
characteristics this type of broadcaster must possess in order to assess ICASA’s level of 
effectiveness in regulating the SABC so that plays the role of a public service broadcaster. A 
public service broadcaster entails being an institution situated between a privately owned 
commercial broadcaster and a state controlled broadcaster (Hills 2003; Melody 1990; Keane 
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1991). A public service broadcaster subsequently possesses unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from state, commercial and community broadcasters.  
 
The characteristics of a public service broadcaster are useful to this study because it provides 
insight into exactly what being a public service broadcaster entails. The insight into the 
features of a public service broadcaster will assist in analysing ICASA’s effectiveness in 
regulating the SABC so that it functions as a public service broadcaster. The characteristics 
of this type of broadcaster will assist in revealing the status of the SABC as a public service 
broadcaster. The characteristics of the SABC that fall within ICASA’s regulatory jurisdiction 
are particularly useful to this study, because these characteristics will expose the regulatory 
failures of ICASA. A public service broadcaster is characterised by universality, accessibility 
in terms of footprint and language, diversity of and in programming, a distinct service, 
institutional independence, editorial and programming independence as well as public 
sources of funding. 
 
2.6.1 Universality and accessibility 
 
A public service broadcaster is obliged to offer a universal service which involves it offering 
a service that appeals to and addresses the entire nation (Doyle 2002; Gripsrud 2002). Thus, a 
public service broadcaster’s service is required to cater for and address every citizen.  
 
A public service broadcaster must also be accessible to every citizen, in terms of footprint 
and programming, regardless of a citizen’s financial status and geographical location (Berger 
and Jjuuko 2007; Scannell 1992; Curran and Seaton 199). Therefore, every citizen should be 
able to receive the public broadcaster’s service, and this service must cater for every citizen’s 
programming needs. Accessibility in terms of programming suggests that its programming is 
required to be accessible in terms of languages, diversity, common information, 
entertainment and cultural services (Scannell 1992; Curran and Seaton 1997). This obligation 
therefore insinuates that a public service broadcaster must not be discriminatory in the 
audiences it caters for, in terms of geographical location and programming.   
 
2.6.2 Diversity of and in programming 
 
This type of broadcaster is required to offer a diverse service to citizens. It is obligatory for a 
public service broadcaster to provide diversity of and in programming (Williams 2003; Doyle 
2002). A diversified service means that it should have a diversity of genres, the audiences 
targeted, as well as the subjects discussed (Berger and Jjuuko 2007; Gripsrud 2002). 
Therefore, a public service broadcaster is obliged to offer a diversity of genres, ensure that 
the needs of a diverse audience are catered for, and the topics presented should be diverse. 
Diversity ensures that all the needs of the public are catered for, including those of the 
minority and majority (Curran 1991; Doyle 2002: 11; McQuail 1991). Thus, it is fundamental 
that a public service broadcaster offer a diversified service as this will ensure that all the 
needs of the public are catered for, even the needs of the minority.  
 
2.6.3 Distinctiveness 
 
A public service broadcaster is required to have a service that is characterised by 
distinctiveness. A public service broadcaster must be distinct from commercially driven and 
privately owned broadcasters, in terms of quality and character of programming, so that the 
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public can readily identify their distinctiveness (Bird and Roseborough 2007; World 
Television Council 2000).  
 
Therefore, a public service broadcaster’s service should be considerably different from other 
types of broadcasters, in terms of the quality and character of its programming so that the 
public can easily identify what is different about it. A public service broadcaster should 
broadcast genres, topics and opinions that commercial broadcasters avoid (Bird and 
Roseborough 2007; World Television Council 2000). Therefore, it should cover genres, 
topics and opinions that other types of broadcaster do not broadcast.  
 
2.6.4 Independence 
 
A public service broadcaster is required to be institutionally independent from powerful 
interests in society (Eko 2000). Institutional independence protects a public service 
broadcaster from political and commercial interference and therefore allows editorial 
independence (ARTICLE 19 2002). Editorial independence enables a public service 
broadcaster to make editorial decisions free from interference that could prevent the 
fulfilment of its public service mandate (Curran 1991; McChesney 1999; Siune 2001; Eko 
2000). Therefore, institutional independence is an essential requirement as this will protect 
the broadcaster from undue interference, and enable editorial independence and the fulfilment 
the public service mandate. In South Africa, ICASA is vested with the role of guaranteeing 
the SABC’s institutional independence and keeping broadcasting services at arms length 
from government (Berger and Jjuuko 2007).  
 
A public service broadcaster’s institutional independence can be secured through having 
specific mechanisms in place, namely a transparent and participatory appointment process, 
public accountability mechanisms, as well as a funding model that heavily relies on public 
funding.  
 
A transparent and participatory appointment process means the appointments of its board of 
directors should be done so transparently and allow for the participation of the public 
(ARTICLE 19 2002; Curran 1991). A public service broadcaster must be accountable to the 
public. Accountability to the public can be ensured through an annual report, audited 
accounts to Parliament, direct public oversight, as well as an internal and external complaints 
mechanism (ARTICLE 19 2002). Lastly, the institutional independence of a public service 
broadcaster can be secured through it being funded predominantly from public sources 
(ARTICLE 19 2002). Therefore, institutional independence ensures that a public service 
broadcaster is protected from interference from the powerful interests in society, which 
allows it to enjoy editorial independence. Institutional independence can be secured through, 
an appointment process that is characterised by transparency and public participation, 
accountability to the public and predominant public funding.  
  
2.6.5 Public funding 
 
This type of broadcaster should be funded primarily by public funds. A public service 
broadcaster should be supported primarily by public funds for public purposes (Schudson 
2003; Croteau and Hoynes 2003; Scannell 1992). Public sources of funding can include, for 
example, license fees (Williams 2003). A public service broadcaster is essentially a non-
profit organisation and broadcasts even if it is unprofitable to do so, therefore it does not 
apply commercial principles as the main criteria in determining its programming, (Berger and 
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Jjuuko 2007; Schudson 2003; Barwise and Gordon 2002). This type of broadcaster must be 
funded predominantly by public sources to ensure that it operates for public purposes and not 
the just maximisation of profit. This means that a public service broadcaster must offer 
programming even in spite of its low commercial value.  
 
A primary reliance on public funds safeguards undue interference. A public service 
broadcaster is predominantly funded from public sources to safeguard its independence from 
the immense pressure of profit making (Williams 2003). It should be noted that a public 
service broadcaster is allowed to make commercial revenue however this must not interfere 
with its public service obligations (World Television Council 2000). An over reliance on 
advertising revenue may leave the public service broadcaster too open to the vagaries of the 
advertising market (Banda 2006). Pre-dominant public funding prevents the over reliance on 
commercial sources that would inevitably compromise the independence of the public service 
broadcaster, and leave it particularly vulnerable to commercial pressure from advertisers, and 
the need to maximise its profit.  
 
Public funding protects the public service broadcaster’s institutional and editorial 
independence, and enables it to satisfy a wide range of audience tastes rather than only those 
tastes that show the largest profit (Curran and Seaton 1997; World Television Council 2000). 
Therefore, a public service broadcaster that has a funding model characterised primarily by 
public funding is in a “healthy” position to deliver its public service mandate because it 
enjoys editorial independence. A public service broadcaster that does not overly rely on 
commercial funding is enabled to satisfy all citizens rather than just satisfy the citizens with 
the largest buying power.  
 
2.7 The importance of regulation to the democratic role of a public service broadcaster 
 
A public service broadcaster is vested with a pivotal democratic role, and a regulator plays an 
important part in ensuring that the broadcaster fulfils this role. A public service broadcaster 
requires regulation to guarantee its democratic role (Siune 1998). Therefore, a public service 
broadcaster cannot flourish and fulfil its democratic role without effective regulation, and 
requires protection from those trying to interfere in its independence.  
 
In many countries public service broadcasters are under the firm control of the authorities and 
act more as a mouthpiece of government than in the public interest (ARTICLE 19 2002). 
Garnham (1990) argues that in practice public service broadcasters like the BBC have not 
always executed their duties effectively by failing to represent a diversity of voices in society 
and rather servicing the interests of the rich and powerful (Williams 2003).Therefore, 
effective regulation is crucial for the attainment of a true public service broadcaster because 
in some countries it is used for selfish “political” purpose, and as a result requires protection. 
Effective regulation is also vital in ensuring that a public service broadcaster fulfils its 
democratic role, and ensure that the “elite’s interests” are not serviced at the expense of the 
public interest.  
 
It is important to discuss this notion of the democratic role of a public service broadcaster. A 
public service broadcaster’s democratic role, involves the provision of a cultural space where 
all citizens are welcome and considered equals (Curran and Seaton 1997; World Television 
Council 2000). Public service broadcasters address viewers as citizens, whether as a platform 
for political debate or a means of ensuring democratic accountability (Williams 2003). This 
type of broadcaster significantly contributes to democracy by building an informed citizenry 
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and providing a cultural space that treats people equally. A public service broadcasters 
democratic role also involves, providing a platform for “perspectives, ideas and cultural 
presentations that are largely unheard of in commercial media” (Hoynes and Croteau 2001: 
227). A public service broadcaster is uniquely situated to contribute to democracy by 
providing an alternative to a commercial broadcaster (Curran and Seaton 1997; Bechan 
1999). This type of broadcaster offers quality programming that will inevitably supply 
information to citizens that will allow them to participate fully in their societies (Banda 2006; 
Fourie). A public service broadcaster is obligated to enlarge public dialogue so that citizens 
are appropriately educated and entertained, to exercise their rights and obligations as citizens 
(Hoynes and Croteau 2001: 227; Curran and Seaton 1997; Bechan 1999). Therefore, this type 
of broadcaster must provide citizens with information that are important in ensuring their 
participation in a healthy democracy. Therefore, the fulfilment of the public service 
broadcaster’s democratic role is crucial to citizens receiving the information needed to take 
part in democracy.    
 
2.8 The regulator’s role in the survival of public service broadcasters 
  
Regulation of public service broadcasters is especially needed in this age, where their 
survival is hanging in the balance; therefore the mandate of an independent regulator, in 
relation to a public service broadcaster continues to exist. Public service broadcasters the 
world over are declining, with their survival hanging in the balance (Burgelman 1997; 
McChesney 1999). Their survival is hanging in the balance, because there are constant threats 
and problems posed in achieving this concept of a public service broadcaster. Public service 
broadcasters are all facing the same major challenges, they inevitably have to adapt to the 
changing environment or become irrelevant (Eko 2000). The media landscape is continuously 
changing, causing the public interest to be under threat, whilst broadcasting monopolies are 
continuously developing. In the face of these threats and problems posed, the regulator is 
substantially important in protecting the public service broadcaster. In South Africa the 
ICASA regulates the whole broadcasting system and among these tasks is regulating the 
SABC, it is vested with fundamental duties in respect of the SABC. These threats and 
problems posed include state threats, elite appointments and the expansion of new 
commercial and technological media. 
 
Amongst the threats that public service broadcasters are faced with, are the exercise of state 
power, while it attempts to maintain its editorial and cultural independence (McChesney 
1999; Tomaselli 1994). In many nations public broadcasters have not been able to escape the 
control of the state or dominant political forces (McChesney 1999). The exercise of state 
power that attempts to erode a public service broadcaster’s editorial independence threatens 
its ability to function as a true public service broadcaster.    
 
Another problem facing public service broadcasters is the concentration of power in the 
hands of elite, because the appointment system draws people from a privileged background 
(Tomaselli 1994). An appointment process that draws people from an elite background means 
that the broadcaster could possibly function from the elite’s perspective, at the expense and 
neglect of the public interest. A neglect of the public interest results in the non-fulfilment of 
its public service obligations.  
 
Public service broadcasters the world over are also facing threats and problems due to the 
expansion of new commercial and technological media, this expansion is having detrimental 
effects on its practices. New commercial and technological media forms are challenging the 
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previous dominance of public service media (Scannell 1997; McChesney 1998). New media 
technologies have changed viewing habits and encouraged the rise of market values; 
consequently there is difficulty in sustaining the traditional principles of public service 
broadcasters (Tomaselli 1994). The erosion of these traditional principles includes 
eliminating the ideal of balance and producing fewer educational programmes (Tomaselli 
1994). Public service broadcasters and their unique practices are under threat because of new 
commercial and technological media giving rise to market values. As a result audiences are 
now accustomed to new viewing habits, and no longer find the public broadcaster’s 
traditional programming as appealing.  
 
The rapid expansion of private national and trans-national channels has influenced 
programme schedules of public service broadcasters. This influence is evident in the style of 
programming, commercial funding, more emphasis on personalities in programming, 
sensational news, current affairs becomes infotainment and drama becomes soap opera (Siune 
and Hulten 1998). This increasing inclination of public service broadcasters towards 
operating commercially is inevitably resulting in public service broadcasters competing with 
commercial media (Siune and Hulten 1998). Public service broadcaster’s programming 
schedules have been influenced by private national and trans-national media, resulting in the 
neglect of the traditional principles of public service broadcasters, to accommodate new 
programme schedules. The public service broadcaster as a result no longer adequately 
upholds the traditional principles of public service broadcasters, and even competes with 
commercial media. The expansion of new commercial and technological media is also 
resulting in limited diversity of opinion and choice to make way for “commercially driven” 
programmes.  
 
Regulation is essential wherever there is a threat of market dominance and a threat to 
diversity of opinion and choice (Steemers 1999). Therefore, with the advent of new 
technological and commercial media, regulation is vital in ensuring that the traditional 
principles of public service broadcasters are upheld and not neglected.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter was centrally concerned with the theoretical frameworks used in the study. In 
doing so it highlighted which aspects of critical political economy of the media, theories of 
regulation and public service broadcasting theory are used in the study. Critical political 
economy’s “critical” strand, beliefs in participatory democracy, focus on policy and 
regulatory choices and institutional arrangements were discussed. Public interest and 
perverted public interest theory of regulation, as well as the Influence models were also 
discussed. The characteristics of independent regulator and a public service broadcaster were 
outlined. Lastly, a discussion of the regulator’s importance to a public service broadcaster’s 
democratic role and survival were undertaken.     
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                                                Chapter 3 
 
Methods  
  
3. Introduction 
 
This study is fundamentally concerned with the levels of effectiveness in ICASA executing 
its mandate in regulating the SABC so that it performs its role as a public service broadcaster, 
and the factors that constrain ICASA from achieving the expected levels of effectiveness. 
This study adopts document analysis and qualitative interviews as complementary 
methodological approaches.  
  
3.1 Document analysis 
 
Document analysis is a method “for locating, identifying, retrieving and analyzing documents 
for their relevance, significance and meaning” (Altheide 1996: 2). Some examples of 
documents used to study institutions are annual reports, official enquiries and court cases 
relating to the institutions activities, documents written by journalists, researchers, 
commentators, competitors and critics of the institution (Bertrand and Hughes 2005; Deacon 
et al 1999). Document analysis enabled this study to retrieve from the documents, the key 
issues that concerned the study.   
 
The documents used in this study include, policy and regulatory documents, ICASA’s 
monitoring documents, a range of press reports, the Freedom of Expression Institute’s press 
reports, ICASA Annual Report 2007 and the SABC Annual Report 2007. 
 
3.1.1 Policy and regulatory documents 
  
In the policy and regulatory documents I focused particular attention to issues involving, the 
characteristics the SABC should possess to function as a public service broadcaster, 
ICASA’S regulatory role and mandate with regard to the SABC, as well as ICASA’s 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The policy documents analyzed were Acts of Parliament, namely the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority Act 1993, the Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended, the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa Act 2000 as amended and the Electronic 
Communications Act 2005. The regulatory documents analyzed were regulations produced by 
ICASA, including the SABC’s eighteen television and radio licenses, the South African 
music content regulations, South African television content regulations and local content 
regulations.  
 
3.1.2 ICASA’s monitoring documents on the SABC 
The monitoring documents analyzed include, ICASA’s Monitoring Report on SABC 
television services March 2006 to March 2007, as well as compliance and programming 
reports compiled by ICASA regarding the SABC. 
 
The monitoring documents produced by ICASA were analyzed as they revealed how and 
which areas ICASA actually monitors the SABC on. I perused for information pertaining to 
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the areas of the SABC that ICASA is mandated to regulate, and the issues that regarded the 
characteristics that the SABC should possess as a public service broadcaster.  
 
3.1.3 A range of press reports  
 
A range of press reports were analyzed, specifically from the Mail and Guardian online, 
Empire, Maverick and Media magazine. The press reports gathered were specifically during 
the period 1 January 2006 to 30 August 2008. These publications were chosen because of 
their high quality and dedicated coverage regarding the SABC and ICASA. The Mail and 
Guardian online is South Africa's oldest quality news source on the web and has offered 
extensive coverage of the SABC’s performance as a public service broadcaster, the SABC’s 
controversies, ICASA’s institutional arrangements and critiques of ICASA’s performance. 
The Media magazine focuses specifically on, in depth media issues and has provided high 
level analysis and coverage of the SABC’s performance as a public service broadcaster, the 
SABC’s controversies, ICASA’s institutional arrangements and critiques of ICASA’s 
performance. The Empire is a quality “Media, Arts and Culture” magazine and the Maverick 
is a quality “Business” magazine, both have dedicated coverage on the SABC. The Empire 
magazine conducted an interview with the people that ended up on the SABC’s “blacklist”. 
The “SABC’s news service” was Empire magazine’s cover page feature in March 2007.  
 
In these magazines and newspaper I read thoroughly for issues concerning critiques of the 
SABC functioning as a public service broadcaster, controversies that involved the SABC, 
controversies regarding ICASA, critiques and praises of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC, 
ICASA’s performance, ICASA’s institutional arrangements like independence, appointment 
process, personnel, public accountability, mandate and power, as well as funding. 
 
3.1.4 The Freedom of Expression Institute’s online website 
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute’s online website was chosen for the study because this 
media advocacy group plays a pro-active role in advocating for the SABC to function as a 
public service broadcaster. The Freedom of Expression Institute has been involved in holding 
pickets and marches to the SABC’s headquarters to demand that it plays its role as a public 
service broadcaster. This organisation has also submitted a complaint to ICASA calling on 
the regulator to enforce the SABC’s license conditions and take the necessary steps so that 
the SABC functions as a public service broadcaster. I perused for issues on their website that 
involved the SABC’s controversies, the SABC’s failure to function as a public service 
broadcaster as well as critiques and praises of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC and ICASA’s 
institutional weaknesses.  
 
3.1.5 The ICASA Annual Report 2007 and the SABC Annual Report 2007 
 
The ICASA Annual Report 2007 contains information about ICASA’s vision, strategic 
objectives, performance, complaints handled, court cases, regulatory activities and projects, 
interactions with the SABC, regulation of the SABC, monitoring reports produced, 
monitoring visits conducted, financial statements, details pertaining to human resources as 
well as its challenges and constraints. I read thoroughly for the information that involved 
ICASA’s regulation of the SABC, the challenges it faces, any issues involving the SABC, its 
general performance and its institutional arrangements like independence, appointment 
process, personnel, public accountability, mandate and power, as well as funding.  
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The SABC annual Report 2007 includes information regarding its vision, mission, functions 
and duties, performance assessments, initiatives, the challenges it faces in functioning as a 
public service broadcaster, programming, performance of each of its radio and television 
services, delivery on its license conditions and quota’s set by ICASA as well as annual 
financial statements. I perused for issues involving the areas that ICASA is mandated to 
regulate, ICASA’s regulation of the SABC including license conditions and quotas, its 
performance of the characteristics it should possess to function as a public service 
broadcaster like universality, accessibility, diversity, distinctiveness, institutional 
independence, editorial independence, public accountability, appointment process and 
funding.  
 
3.2 Qualitative interviews 
 
This study employed qualitative interviews. The primary strength of interviewing is its ability 
to obtain multiple perspectives on a given topic (Newcomb 1991). Interviews allow the 
researcher to pursue their questions and to probe at length (Kitzinger 2004). The strength of 
interviews is that it allows the interviewer and interviewee to “explore and negotiate the 
particular topic” (O’Sullivan 2003: 80). Interviews are used in the study of organisations and 
institutional procedures (Jankowsi and Wester 1991; Tuchman 1991). Interviews enabled this 
study to probe the informants and explore their views regarding the level of effectiveness of 
ICASA’s regulation of the SABC and the hindrances to ICASA’s effectiveness. The 
interviews conducted for this study took the form of an open ended discussion and used an 
interview guide.  
 
Qualitative interviews are referred to as, in depth or unstructured interviews (Jankowsi and 
Wester 1991). Unstructured interviews are likened to an informal conversation (Bertrand and 
Hughes 2005). An in depth interview is considered as an extended conversation and a kind of 
probe that has the advantage of collecting an immense amount of information that other 
forms of research may not reveal (Berger 1991). Qualitative interviews were useful for this 
study and enabled the collection of, in depth perspectives from the informants, which took the 
form of a conversation. The use of this methodological approach resulted in the retrieval of 
an immense amount of information from the informants. The Qualitative interviews 
conducted also facilitated an in depth understanding of the key issues, based on the 
informants’ knowledge and perspectives.  
 
Qualitative interviewing is a form of interpersonal communication where the interviewer and 
respondent negotiate an understanding of the topic at hand (Jensen 1991). Qualitative 
interviews possess the strength of generating highly individual responses and building 
information naturally (Bertrand and Hughes 2005). Qualitative interviews enabled the study 
to retrieve spontaneous information from the informants that were not restricted to the 
answering of specific questions.  
 
The research tool used for the qualitative interviews conducted in this study was an interview 
guide. An interview guide outlines areas for discussion, so that the interview becomes an 
open ended conversation (Silverman 2004; Terre Blanche et al 2006). The interview guide is 
not a questionnaire, which asks questions in a predetermined order, that are straightforward to 
answer and offers a choice of predetermined responses (Gunter 2000; Davies and Mosdell 
2006; O’Sullivan 2003 et al). Appendices A, B, C and D were the interview guides used in 
the study and were employed as the instruments to interview the relevant informants. These 
interview guides outlined broad areas for discussion.  
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There were four different interview guides used for the study, depending on who the 
informant was. Appendix A was used for past IBA councilors, past ICASA councilors, media 
organisation representatives, media analysts and journalists. These informants were Nadia 
Bulbulia, Kevin Bloom, Johann Koster, Libby Lloyd, Kate Skinner and Anton Harber. The 
questions posed in Appendix A, include their respective views on, the nature of ICASA and 
the SABC’s relationship, ICASA’s effectiveness in regulating the SABC, ICASA’s role in 
the SABC’s controversies, suggestions on how ICASA can improve its regulation of the 
SABC, possible factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation, as well as in what ways 
ICASA can be strengthened.  
  
Appendix B was used for the informant from the SABC, namely Phumelele Ntombela-
Nzimande. The questions asked in Appendix B include the nature of ICASA and the SABC’s 
relationship and the level of interaction of them, ICASA’s effectiveness in regulating the 
SABC, ICASA’s role in the SABC’s controversies, suggestions on how ICASA can improve 
its regulation of the SABC, possible factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation, as well 
as in what ways ICASA can be strengthened.  
 
Appendix C was used for the informant from ICASA’s Monitoring and Compliance Unit, 
namely Sean Rankin. The questions posed to him include, the nature of ICASA and the 
SABC’s relationship and the level of interaction of them, the regulatory practices ICASA 
employs in regulating the SABC, the roles of ICASA’s Monitoring and Compliance Unit, the 
challenges ICASA faces in regulating the SABC, ICASA’s role and view on the SABC’s 
controversies, suggestions on how ICASA can improve its regulation of the SABC, ICASA’s 
view on the SABC’s delivery of its license conditions and its status as a public service 
broadcaster, possible factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation, the Minister of 
Communication’s role in the regulation of the SABC, as well as in what ways ICASA can be 
strengthened. 
 
Appendix D was employed for ICASA councilor and chairperson of the Broadcasting 
Complaints Committee of South Africa (BCCSA), Kobus Van Rooyen. This interview guide 
regarded his views on, the regulatory practices ICASA employs in regulating the SABC and 
who steers this process, the Ministers of Communication’s role in the regulation of the 
SABC, ICASA and the BCCSA’s view on the SABC’s status as a public service broadcaster, 
the nature of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship and their level of interaction, the 
challenges ICASA faces in regulating the SABC, ICASA’s role and view on the SABC’s 
controversies, suggestions on how ICASA can improve its regulation of the SABC, ICASA’s 
view on the SABC’s delivery of its license conditions, the Freedom of Expression Institute’s 
complaint to ICASA, possible factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation as well as, in 
what ways ICASA can be strengthened. 
 
Multiple informants were interviewed for the study. The use of multiple informants can 
increase information and broaden a point of view (Newcomb 1991). The informants used in 
the study and their credentials are:  
 
· Sean Rankin - One of the longest standing members at IBA/ICASA who has been 
employed at the regulator for thirteen years and has been assigned different duties 
during his long employment. These duties include working as a former council 
advisor for the IBA, a former co-chairperson’s advisor, ten years at council level as an 
advisor, and involved in the licensing processes in 1996 during which the six SABC 
stations were sold off. He is currently an ICASA Compliance Officer, and is therefore 
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directly involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance of the SABC’s license 
conditions.   
 
· Kobus Van Rooyen - A current ICASA councillor, member of ICASA’s Complaints 
and Compliance Committee (CCC) and chairperson of the Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission of South Africa (BCCSA). As a member of ICASA’s (CCC) he played a 
prominent role at the hearing of the Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint to 
ICASA regarding the SABC’s “blacklisting” saga. The (BCCSA) is an independent 
organisation which deals with complaints against television and radio broadcasters 
whom signed a Broadcasting Code of Conduct. The SABC is a member of the 
BCCSA. 
 
· Phumelele Ntombela-Nzimande - The SABC’s Chief People Officer (CPO) and 
former head of the SABC’s Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit. Phumelele was 
previously employed as a Deputy Director General at the Department of 
Communications where she was involved in Strategic Policy Co-ordination and Inter-
Governmental relations. The SABC’s Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit liaises with 
ICASA on behalf of the SABC, and submits reports, recordings and the relevant 
information to ICASA, and ensures that the SABC fulfils its license conditions and 
other regulations prescribed by ICASA.  
 
· Nadia Bulbulia - A former IBA/ICASA councillor and current SABC board member. 
She was one of the ICASA’s councillors that played a prominent role in developing 
the SABC’s new license conditions that took effect in 2004.  
 
· Libby Lloyd- A former IBA/ICASA councillor and former Chief Executive Officer of 
the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA), and is currently conducting 
research on the SABC.  
 
· Johann Koster - Executive Director of the National Association of Broadcasters 
(NAB) and former head of ICASA’s Monitoring and Complaints Unit between 1998-
2002. The (NAB) is the leading representative of broadcasters in South Africa, the 
SABC is a member of the (NAB), thus represents the interests of the public service 
broadcaster. As head of ICASA’s Monitoring and Complaints Unit he was involved in 
developing most of the broadcasting policy that ICASA implemented in South Africa.  
 
· Kate Skinner- Co-ordinator of the Save Our SABC (SOS) coalition. The SOS coalition 
was formed in June 2008 as a response to the “crisis” facing the SABC; it represents 
key trade unions, non-governmental organisations, independent producer 
organisations and prominent academics. At its inception the (SOS) resolved to draft a 
position paper outlining the crisis and some immediate solutions, draft 
recommendations on an SABC Act, call on the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Communications to exercise its constitutionally mandated oversight role effectively, 
follow-up on the Freedom of Expression Institutes “blacklisting” complaint to ICASA 
and initiate the formation of a civil society coalition to campaign for the strengthening 
of public broadcasting (Save Our SABC 2008). 
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· Kevin Bloom- A journalist, who is a former joint editor of Empire magazine, former 
editor-at-large of its sister magazine Maverick, and founding editor of the Media 
magazine. The Media magazine focuses specifically on, in depth media issues and has 
dedicated much coverage to ICASA and the SABC. The Empire magazine has 
provided coverage on the SABC, Kevin Bloom interviewed the people on the SABC’s 
“blacklist” on behalf of the magazine. The “SABC news services” made the Empire 
magazine’s cover page feature in March 2007. The Maverick magazine has provided 
coverage on the SABC.  
 
· Anton Harber- Caxton Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at Wits University, 
former head of Kagiso Broadcasting and a Business Day columnist. Anton has 
devoted a number of his columns in the Business Day to the topic of the SABC.  
 
In conducting interviews a researcher may audio record and then transcribe (O’Sullivan 
2003). All interviews conducted for the study were face to face and voice recorded, and then 
transcribed. All interviews conducted for this study were an absolute joy to conduct as every 
interviewee was tremendously accommodating and co-operative, and none of the 
interviewees’ placed a time constraint on the interview. As such a tremendous amount of 
information and perspectives on the topic of the study were gathered. It is important to note 
that all interviewees’ voiced had a great deal on the key issues of the study, which is 
suggestive that people have a tremendous interest in the topic of the study.   
 
3.3 Limitations to the study  
 
There were numerous opportunities presented to interview additional people, however it was 
felt that these people would not add any new perspectives to the topic of the study as their 
expertise, knowledge and background were similar to the informants already interviewed. 
 
The SABC and ICASA’s Annual Reports 2008 could not be used in the study because when 
these documents were eventually issued, it was too late to analyze and include them in the 
study, which was already at a mature stage of completion. So instead the SABC Annual 
Report 2007 and ICASA Annual Report 2007 were used.  
 
The Chief Executive Officer of the SABC Dali Mpofu was not interviewed; he was however 
telephonically requested for an interview. However, in light of the topic of the study he 
telephonically recommended that Phumelele Ntombela-Nzimande be interviewed instead as 
she could provide the best answers and perspective on the topic of the study, on behalf of the 
SABC.  
 
The Chief Executive Officer of ICASA was not interviewed because it was felt that Sean 
Rankin, one of IBA/ICASA’s longest standing members provided knowledgeable 
perspectives on the issues of the study due to his long period of employment at the regulator. 
Sean Rankin has sound institutional memory due to his employment at the regulator for 
thirteen years, and undertaking different duties at IBA/ICASA. He provided highly 
informative perspectives on the issues of the study, thus it was felt that it was not necessary to 
interview the Chief Executive Officer of ICASA.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodological approaches employed in the study, namely 
document analysis and qualitative interviews. It also outlined which documents were 
analysed, why they were chosen for the study and how the documents were analysed. The 
chapter also focused on the informants used in the study, their credentials and the nature of 
the questions posed to them, and lastly explored limitations to the study.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
 
Chapter 4 
 
Findings 
4. Introduction 
 
This study is centrally concerned with the level of effectiveness of ICASA’s regulation of the 
SABC, as well as determining the factors that are hindering ICASA from regulating the 
SABC more effectively.  
 
The aim of the research questions is three pronged in that it firstly seeks to determine the 
actions and lack thereof by ICASA in ensuring that the SABC performs its role as public 
service broadcaster in the public interest. Secondly, the factors that enables and hinders 
ICASA’s level of effectiveness in regulating the SABC. Thirdly, determining the ways in 
which ICASA can be strengthened so that it can be more effective.  
 
4.1 Findings structure 
 
The findings presented results from information that is gathered from two different types of 
sources, namely documents and interviews. The documents include policy documents, the 
SABC’s television and radio licenses, ICASA monitoring reports, press reports, reports from 
advocacy groups, the SABC Annual Report 2007 and the ICASA Annual Report 2007. 
Interviews are conducted with significant informants.  
 
The findings from the policies and SABC’s television and radio license are firstly presented 
and outline ICASA’s ideal organisational structure as well as ICASA’s ideal regulatory role 
with regards to the SABC. The policy documents and SABC television and radio license 
include: 
 
· The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
· The Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 1993  
· The Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended 
· The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 2000 as amended  
· The Electronic Communications Act 2005  
· The SABC’s eighteen television and radio licenses  
 
The remaining findings are then presented according to themes determined from the 
emanating nature of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship. The themes are as follows:  
 
· Co-operative relationship 
· Tense relationship 
· Troubled relationship 
· Confrontational relationship 
· Silent relationship 
· ICASA’s organisational weaknesses 
The last theme entitled “ICASA’s organisational weaknesses” deals solely with ICASA as an 
organisation, in an attempt to uncover the possible factors hindering ICASA’s effective 
regulation of the SABC. 
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4.2 ICASA’s regulation of the SABC  
 
A number of policies and Acts which include the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 
1993, Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended, the Independent Communications Authority of 
South Africa Act 2000 as amended and the Electronic Communications Act 2005 outline and 
give mandate to ICASA with regards to the regulation of the SABC.  
  
The IBA Act 1993 obligated ICASA’s predecessor, the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
(IBA), at its inception to protect the integrity and viability of public broadcasting services. 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended later dissolved the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
(IBA) and South African Telecommunications Authority (SATRA), and established ICASA. 
The function of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the South African 
Telecommunications Authority’s (SATRA) were transferred to ICASA. The ICASA Act 2000 
as amended established ICASA as an independent authority to (amongst others) “regulate 
broadcasting in the public interest”.  
 
The Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended stipulates that ICASA is mandated with the crucial 
role of monitoring and enforcing compliance to the SABC Charter, by the SABC. The 
Electronic Communications Act 2005 says that ICASA is also obligated to protect the 
integrity and viability of the SABC and ensure that it services specific needs. The Electronic 
Communications Act 2005 furthermore states that in its regulation of the SABC, ICASA must 
not unduly interfere in the commercial activities of the SABC.   
 
ICASA performs these tasks by monitoring of the SABC television and radio licenses. From 
time to time ICASA also issues regulatory documents that the SABC is required to adhere to. 
These regulatory documents include the South African music content regulations, the South 
African television content regulations and local content quotas. ICASA has also issued a 
Broadcasting code of conduct for broadcasters.  
 
The SABC operates within a specific regulatory environment, in which it is answerable to 
ICASA. The SABC is also answerable to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South 
Africa (BCCSA) with regards to complaints on content as outlined in the Broadcasting Code 
of Conduct. ICASA however does have jurisdiction to investigate those complaints of alleged 
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the SABC licenses (ICASA Monitoring 
Report on SABC Television services March 2006- March 2007). The SABC is furthermore 
accountable to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) regarding complaints on 
advertisements aired (SABC 2008). The SABC is also a member of the National Association 
of Broadcasters (NAB).  
 
The SABC has organisational legislations in place to ensure that the public service 
broadcaster complies with its mandate. This organisational legislation includes, an editorial 
code of practice, editorial polices, code of ethics and a governance framework (SABC 2008). 
The SABC has a Policy and Regulatory Department as part of its Public and Regulatory 
Affairs division. The SABC Policy and Regulatory Department communicates with the 
industry and regulators on behalf of the SABC (SABC 2008).  
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4.3 An effective regulator  
 
In order for ICASA to effectively regulate the SABC, it must be independent. ICASA’s 
independence can be achieved by possessing specific institutional requirements. This section 
outlines ICASA’s ideal institutional obligations.    
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended outlines the ideal characteristics that ICASA is required to 
possess. These are: 
 
· Guarantees of independence 
· Participatory and transparent appointment process  
· Appointment on merit 
· Public accountability mechanisms 
· Mandate and power  
· Funding  
 
4.3.1 Guarantees of independence  
 
ICASA’s institutional independence is secured by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996, Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended and ICASA Act 2000 as amended. These 
documents all specify that ICASA is to function without political, government, state and 
commercial interference. The ICASA Act 2000 as amended additionally requires ICASA to be 
impartial and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.  
 
4.3.2 Participatory and transparent appointment process  
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended establishes the required nature of ICASA’s appointment 
process. Appointments to ICASA’s council ideally should be through a participatory and 
transparent process. The Minister of Communications plays a prominent role in ICASA’s 
appointment process. The Minister of Communications is required to make recommendations 
from a list of suitable candidates agreed upon by the National Assembly. If the National 
Assembly is not satisfied by the recommendations made by the Minister of Communications, 
the National Assembly may ask the Minister to review the recommendations. It is upon the 
National Assembly’s approval of the Minister’s recommendations, that the ICASA’s council 
is officially appointed.  
 
4.3.3 Appointment on merit 
 
ICASA’s personnel are required to be appointed on merit, the council and personnel are 
obliged to uphold certain values and requirements. The ICASA Act 2000 as amended outlines 
the criteria, qualification and disqualification for appointments of ICASA’s personnel. 
ICASA councilors are required to be committed to the values of freedom of expression, 
openness and accountability. It is also mandatory that, when viewed collectively ICASA’s 
personnel must be representative of a broad cross section of South Africa, possessing the 
relevant expertise and experience in the relevant fields.    
 
Specific people are disqualified from appointment on the ICASA council, such as, if one is 
the holder of any other remunerated position under the State, been convicted of a crime, has a 
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family member with financial interests in the relevant industries. An ICASA councilor may 
be removed from office for reasons including, misconduct and inability to perform the duties 
of office efficiently.  
 
4.3.4 Public accountability mechanisms 
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended and the Electronic Communications Act 2005 establishes 
that ICASA is required to possess certain accountability mechanisms. The Minister of 
Communications plays a prominent role in the accountability of ICASA. ICASA is required 
to compile an Annual report that must be submitted to the Minister of Communications. The 
ICASA council is also obligated to supply the Minister of Communications with information 
as may be required, regarding the activities of the regulator.  
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended and the Electronic Communications Act 2005 establishes 
the areas that ICASA is accountable to the Minister of Communications on. The Minister of 
Communications sets the ICASA councilor’s performance targets, evaluates their 
performances and also determines their performance bonuses. The Minister of 
Communications additionally has the power to suspend a councilor, upon adoption and based 
on the National Assembly.  
 
4.3.5 Mandate and power  
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended and the Electronic Communications Act 2005 outlines 
ICASA’s mandate and power with regard to the SABC. ICASA has the power to grant, 
develop, renew, amend, transfer, revoke, suspend, cancel and enforce the license conditions. 
ICASA, according to the Electronic Communications Act 2005, is also required to develop 
necessary regulations. The ICASA Act 2000 as amended stipulates that ICASA has the power 
to obtain from any licensee any information pertaining to licenses, to conduct research, 
undertake inquiries within its jurisdiction, investigate and adjudicate complaints received. 
The Electronic Communications Act 2005 states that ICASA has the power to demand from a 
licensee a recording of any programme broadcast.  
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended assigns ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee 
(CCC) with a specific mandate and power. The (CCC) is obligated to adjudicate complaints 
pertaining to alleged non-compliance of licenses. It is also required to hear (if appropriate), 
investigate, and make a finding on all matters and complaints referred to it on allegations of 
non-compliance. The (CCC), upon making a finding, is required to recommend to the ICASA 
council the necessary action to be taken against a licensee. The ICASA council then makes a 
decision regarding the action to be taken by the regulator. These actions can include warning 
a licensee to desist from any further contravention, pay a fine or take specific steps. If a 
licensee has repeatedly been found guilty of material violations, ICASA may amend or 
revoke the license, or prohibit the licensee from providing the licensed service for a period 
not exceeding thirty days.  
 
The ICASA Act 2000 as amended stipulates that ICASA is required to have suitably qualified 
inspectors to monitor compliance of license conditions, investigate and evaluate any alleged 
non-compliance. The inspector is necessitated to refer all non-compliance matters to 
ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC). The inspector also has the power 
to enter, search and seize the licensee’s premises on the authority of a warrant and may 
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inspect any document. ICASA has the power to pass a maximum fine of up to two hundred 
and fifty thousand rand for broadcasters, in the event of an offense, such as non compliance 
with license conditions or non co-operation with an inspector. 
 
4.3.6 Funding  
 
ICASA is financed from money allocated by Parliament, according to the ICASA Act 2000 as 
amended the regulator may also receive money in any other manner, agreed upon between 
the Minister of Communications and Minister of Finance and on the approval by cabinet.  
 
The Minister of Communications and Minister of Finance additionally are mandated to make 
the necessary decisions with regard to the remuneration and benefits of the councilors. All 
revenue that ICASA collects is required, as per the Act, to be paid into the National Revenue 
Fund.  
 
4.4 The scope of ICASA’s mandate with regard to the SABC  
 
ICASA regulates the SABC on various focus areas. This section explores the areas in which 
ICASA is obligated to regulate the SABC on. ICASA plays a crucial role in ensuring that the 
SABC functions as a public service broadcaster. The regulator is required to monitor and 
enforce compliance with the SABC Charter and the SABC’s eighteen television and radio 
licenses. In addition to this, ICASA also monitors the regulations that it issues from time to 
time. These regulations include the South African music content regulations, South African 
television content regulations and local content regulations.  
    
4.4.1 The SABC Charter 
 
ICASA is required to monitor and enforce compliance with the SABC Charter (Broadcasting 
Act 1999 as amended). The SABC Charter upholds specific principles, including universality, 
accessibility, diversity and editorial independence.  
 
The conditions contained in the SABC Charter include, providing in South Africa’s official 
languages a wide range of programming that reflects a diversity of South African attitudes, 
opinions, ideas and values. The SABC is further obligated to offer a variety of news, 
information and analysis from a South African point of view as well as display South African 
talent in educational and entertainment programmes. It is also stipulated, in terms of the 
SABC Charter, that the SABC whilst pursuing its objectives and exercising its powers, must 
enjoy freedom of expression, creative and programming independence.  
 
4.4.2 The SABC’s television and radio licenses 
 
ICASA is required to monitor and enforce compliance with the SABC’s eighteen television 
and radio licenses. ICASA issued the licenses with prescribed conditions. The licenses 
contain similar conditions for all the SABC licenses, whilst there are other conditions that are 
differentiated according to the specific service. The differentiated conditions include the 
types of predominant language and music format and the amount of official languages.  
 
The similar conditions for all eighteen of the SABC’s television and radio licenses include 
specifications on which areas ICASA must regulate and have jurisdiction over. The areas that 
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ICASA must regulate and have jurisdiction over include ensuring that the SABC offers a 
public service that fulfils specific requirements, and adheres to certain programming and 
news requirements. ICASA’s areas of regulation of the SABC also include advertisements 
and subsidising of revenue. The SABC is further obligated to furnish the regulator with 
specific information. Greater detail of these specifications follows below.    
 
ICASA’s public service conditions regard it ensuring that the SABC provides a public service 
that upholds the principles of universality, accessibility in terms of language, local content as 
well as news and public affairs’ programming that maintains editorial and programming 
independence (SABC television and radio licenses).  
 
The programming and news specifications stipulate that ICASA is required to ensure that the 
SABC’s programming upholds the principles of universal service, local content and diversity 
in terms of religion, children, the disabled, gender and age (SABC television and radio 
licenses). The regulator is further obliged to make certain that the SABC’s news, information 
and current affairs programming has balanced coverage and is independent from 
governmental, commercial or other interferences (SABC television and radio licenses). 
 
With regards to advertising, ICASA must ensure that the SABC does not broadcast more than 
an average of ten minutes and an excess of twelve minutes of advertisements per hour. It is 
also stipulated that the SABC may draw revenues from advertising, sponsorships, grants, 
donations and license fees (SABC television and radio licenses).  
 
The SABC is required to furnish ICASA with specific information pertaining to company 
documents, programming, advertisements and complaints. The company documents include 
the details of any member of the SABC board who is removed from office, the SABC’s 
memorandum and articles of association, and judgments awarded in a court of law against the 
SABC. The SABC must confer ICASA with its annual financial statements and any other 
related financial information required. Programming documents that the SABC is required to 
submit to ICASA must show the extent of the different genres, South African television 
content or music content, and the use of official languages. Advertising documents that the 
SABC is obligated to submit to the regulator include, the extent of advertisements broadcast 
in every hour. The SABC must additionally submit to ICASA a written report on complaints 
received and the manner in which the SABC addressed each complaint. 
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4.5 ICASA and the SABC’s relationship 
 
This section presents the findings gathered from ICASA’s regulation reports, the SABC 
Annual Report 2007, the ICASA Annual Report 2007 and the interviews conducted. This 
section further presents finding gathered from magazines, newspapers and media advocacy 
groups that have significant coverage of broadcasting and regulatory issues in particular the 
Media, the Maverick, the Empire, the Mail and Guardian online and the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s website. The press reports gathered from these magazines, newspapers 
and media advocacy groups cover the period January 2006 to August 2008.  
 
These particular findings are presented according to themes derived from the emanating 
nature of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship. The themes are co-operative, tense, troubled, 
confrontational and silent relationship. 
 
4.6 Co-operative relationship 
 
According to interviews conducted with ICASA Compliance Officer: Sean Rankin and 
SABC Chief People Officer/former head of the SABC Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit, 
Phumelele Ntombela- Nzimande, it can be established that one dimension of ICASA and the 
SABC’s relationship is a working and amicable one. It is a working and amicable relationship 
because each organisation perform certain duties, so that ICASA can fulfill its regulatory 
role. Therefore, it can be derived that one dimension of the regulator and the SABC’s 
relationship is a co-operative one. This particular theme focuses on ICASA and the SABC’s 
co-operative relationship, and the respective roles that ICASA and the SABC plays so that 
ICASA fulfils its regulatory mandate.  
 
Rankin states that at the compliance and ordinary license level ICASA interacts with the 
SABC’s Regulatory Affairs Department. He contends that ICASA requests the recorded 
programs from the SABC so that the necessary information is obtained for monitoring and 
compliance. Rankin posits that when ICASA finds a breach to the SABC’s licenses, the 
SABC is informed of it in writing. If the SABC rectifies the breach timeously then ICASA 
makes a record of it and does not escalate it further. In the event of the SABC not responding 
and rectifying the breach, the ICASA Compliance Officer refers the SABC to the Complaints 
and Compliance Committee (CCC) for sanction. In the event of a breach ICASA may also 
suggest to the SABC to apply to amend their license, if for instance the SABC indicates that 
they lack sufficient local drama to air on television. ICASA, according to Rankin, ensures 
that on every occasion of non compliance to the SABC license, a follow up is conducted. The 
SABC, says Rankin, have been co-operative in rectifying every breach ICASA has brought to 
their attention. ICASA therefore has never had to escalate the SABC to the Complaints and 
Compliance Committee (CCC) for non compliance of the SABC licenses. Rankin contends 
that the SABC and ICASA have on occasion met and discussed the possible transgressions 
and non-compliance which resulted in the SABC having rectified the breach. Hence it can be 
deduced that the existing protocol, lines of communication and collaboration between ICASA 
and the SABC result in a working, co-operative relationship to a certain degree.  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande sheds light on ICASA and the SABC’s working relationship from the 
SABC’s perspective. Ntombela-Nzimande contends that “the SABC is co-operative because 
they believe it is in their interest to co-operate”. The SABC’s Policy and Regulatory Affairs 
Department interacts with ICASA administratively and submits regular quarterly reports to 
ICASA with regards to its compliance with language, content and other requirements. The 
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person at the operational level of broadcasting at ICASA has a working relationship with the 
general manager of the SABC Regulatory Department. There is also a strategic interaction 
between ICASA and the SABC that occurs at the Group Executive level, on engagements 
such as regulations for elections, television political promotions and issues of funding.  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande furthermore contends that the SABC from time to time does identify 
issues to engage ICASA on. The SABC then uses their stakeholder framework to brief 
ICASA, on issues of new developments and strategy. Ntombela-Nzimande furthermore states 
that ICASA pro-actively invites comments from operators and interested parties on issues 
such as election regulation. When the SABC indicates to ICASA that they were unable meet 
a language quota for instance, ICASA does not take it kindly, and requires the SABC to 
demonstrate progressive movement towards rectification. Ntombela-Nzimande contends that 
ICASA is effective at an administrative level.   
 
In an attempt to provide information on the process that ICASA’s undertakes in regulating 
the SABC and thus fulfilling its regulatory role, Rankin contends that ICASA monitors and 
ensures compliance of the SABC licenses through its focus on quantitative measurement of 
the different genres, music, talk, news, local content, programming, languages and other 
relevant areas. Rankin furthermore states that ICASA also monitors areas such as the number 
of news bulletins per day, news sources, its universality and diversity. The regulator 
additionally monitors the SABC’s Black Economic Empowerment and gender of its 
personnel to determine if it is reflective of the demographics of the country. According to 
Rankin, ICASA also makes a note of the advertising by the SABC. Previously the regulator 
did focus on the SABC’s funding and its impact on their capacity to produce programming. 
Currently, the regulator briefly takes into consideration funding when compiling a report on 
the SABC.  
 
Rankin furthermore outlines the other aspects of regulatory practices that ICASA undertakes 
in monitoring the SABC. The ICASA Monitoring and Compliance Unit steers the entire 
process of monitoring the SABC. The actual monitoring is conducted by the ICASA 
Compliance Officers. The monitoring with regards to SABC’s radio, commercial and 
community broadcasters is divided among eight permanent Compliance Officers. There are 
also eight part time Compliance Officers employed on a six month contract, which are 
dedicated to monitoring SABC television. All permanent Compliance Officers possess a 
computer and a TV card installed to monitor television and radio compliance. ICASA’s 
monitoring units are equipped with sound and stereo. The part time Monitoring Officers use 
DVD’s and PVR’s for monitoring SABC television.  
 
It is also important to note that ICASA’s regulations prescribed in the SABC’s license 
conditions seem to have a positive effect on the SABC’s public service mandate. Table 1 
below highlights the impacts of ICASA’s regulations on the SABC’s local content, language, 
news and public service value, and is based on figures obtained from the SABC’s Annual 
Report 2007. 
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Table 1-The impact of the SABC’s license conditions ascribed by ICASA 
 
Local  content Language News Public interest 
value 
Spend on foreign 
content declined to 
17% of total spend 
as a result of revised 
local content 
mandate 
The SABC’s public 
broadcasting services 
TV channels 
language delivery is 
between 70% and 
80%. 
  
Between 40 and 50 
hours of 
programming a week 
is broadcast in 
languages other than 
English.  
As a result of the 
new ICASA 
regulations, news 
began broadcasting 
36 additional radio 
current affairs 
programmes from the 
beginning of the 
2006. 
 
The new license 
conditions led to 
substantially more 
public interest value 
being delivered to 
the audiences of the 
SABC’s platforms 
Since the year 2004  
SABC 1 increased 
its local content 
delivery by 15.94%, 
SABC2 by 7.07% 
and SABC3 by 
2.29%  
In prime time 
between 60% and 
70% of programming 
is in languages other 
than English. 
  
Up to 80% of local 
programmes now 
utilise languages 
other than English. 
 
  
The SABC public 
broadcasting 
Services TV 
channels deliver 
between 70% and 
80% local content in 
prime time and 
across the 
performance period 
More languages are 
being incorporated 
into the daily Kids 
News programmes on 
SABC1 and the 
launch of Yilungelo 
Lakho. 
 
  
Between the years 
2006 and 2007 the 
SABC content 
enterprise division 
has seen a 
significant increase 
in output. Driven 
mainly by increased 
local content quotas 
and new license 
conditions.  
   
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.. 
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The SABC 
formalised and 
increased its 
engagement with 
the independent 
production sector, 
resulting in more 
local content, as per 
the ICASA 
guidelines, and 
greater economic 
benefits for the 
independent 
producers. 
   
 
 
4.7 Unsatisfactory regulation of the SABC 
 
In as much as it is derived from the above mentioned sources that the relationship between 
ICASA and SABC is co-operative and a working one to a certain extent, several 
interviewees’ however expressed that ICASA’s regulation of the SABC is unsatisfactory and 
ineffective, and attributed this gap to specific factors. These factors are discussed under the 
following heading:   
 
· Enforcement 
· Independence  
· Legislation 
· Resources 
 
4.7.1 Enforcement 
 
Several interviewees’ express that ICASA’s regulation of the SABC is unsatisfactory due to 
the inadequate enforcement of regulations. Johann Koster, Executive Director of the National 
Association of Broadcasters/former head of ICASA’s Monitoring and Complaints Unit, 
contends that ICASA have reasonable regulations in place however the problem lies in the 
lack of enforcement. Former IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd, states that ICASA’s major 
issue regarding its regulation is consistently monitoring the SABC and holding them to 
account for breaches. Wits University Professor of journalism Anton Harber argues that “it 
seems that ICASA has shown itself to be ‘toothless’ in enforcing its license conditions and 
regulations”.  
 
Koster furthermore states that communication plays a major role in enforcement and ICASA 
has never been strong on communication. Koster highlights an example of a lack of 
communication from ICASA, as a regulator, in not having a ten year plan or blueprint of 
broadcasting in ten years. Koster further adds that type of information would be beneficial 
and desired by the SABC.  
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4.7.2 Independence 
 
A number of interviewees’ attribute ICASA’s lack of independence as among the reasons for 
its unsatisfactory regulation of the SABC. Harber contends that the three way 
relationship/process between the Minister of Communications, ICASA and the SABC results 
in the problematic regulation of the SABC. Koster contends that ICASA’s independence is 
questionable because the regulator reports to “politically motivated people whom are running 
the country”. Lloyd also states that ICASA’s level of independence is questionable and “one 
gets the sense that ICASA is scared of taking a positions that is seen as opposing 
government”. Lloyd posits that ICASA’s fear of the government is evident in its lack of a 
submission on the latest amendment Broadcasting Bill concerning the SABC removal 
clauses.  
 
Harber furthermore argues that ICASA’s passivity and failure to take an independent stance 
has allowed the Minister of Communications to play a greater role at the SABC than she 
should. Harber cites an example of ICASA’s passivity, as located in the SABC’s shareholders 
compact. He adds that ICASA is expected to have assessed the compact to determine any 
conflict with the Act. The SABC Annual Report 2007 alludes to the details of this 
shareholder compact that Harber notes. The SABC’s shareholder compact establishes that the 
SABC board is accountable to the Minister of Communications in terms of the SABC’s 
Corporate Plan which sets out the SABC’s key performance areas.  
 
4.7.3 Legislation  
 
Libby Lloyd, former IBA/ICASA, attributes legislation as the reason for ICASA’s ineffective 
regulation of the SABC. Lloyd contends that ICASA’s regulation of the SABC is 
unsatisfactory due to the vagueness of the SABC’s Charter and license conditions, some of 
which ICASA cannot actually monitor the SABC on. Such as broad statements on 
universality, diversity, children’s programming and so on. 
 
4.7.4 Resources 
 
A significant number of interviewees’ cite a lack of sufficient resources as one of the 
contributing factors for the ineffective regulating of the SABC by ICASA. Rankin, states that 
the lack of sufficient funding and human resources is a huge impediment to the regulator 
effectively regulating the SABC. Consequently this constraint results in ICASA having to 
contract part time SABC Monitors only on a six months basis. The availability of sufficient 
funds would enable ICASA to employ the Monitors permanently, which is likely to increase 
its effectiveness in its regulatory function. Rankin further adds that budgetary constraints 
have forestalled the acquiring of new monitoring units, which would result in better 
monitoring equipment, hence a more effective delivery of the regulatory function. Executive 
Director of the National Association of Broadcasters/former head of ICASA’s Monitoring 
and Complaints Unit Johann Koster, and Journalist Kevin Bloom, also agree that ICASA 
lacks sufficient resources and capacity required in its monitoring and enforcement arm.  
 
Former IBA/ICASA councilor and current SABC board member Nadia Bulbulia states that 
the monitoring of the new SABC licenses should be a “stand alone department”. 
Unfortunately, the regulator does not possess the necessary resources for the establishment of 
this ideal department. Former IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd contends that ICASA has 
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inadequate monitoring capacity (staff members and skill) for the monitoring of all the 
broadcasters countrywide and around the clock. Lloyd further adds that ICASA needs to 
deviate from “rigid annual monitoring of the SABC” to issues such as diversity of news 
across all broadcasters. Lloyd also posits that ICASA’s “Monitoring Report on SABC TV 
services 2006” that was challenged by the SABC on the basis of methodology, shows that 
ICASA’s capacity to be able to monitor the SABC needs to be addressed.  
 
ICASA’s Annual Report 2007 fails to mention the number of public visits conducted by 
ICASA, but does mention that it conducted sixty four visits in total to commercial and 
community stations. The ICASA Annual Report 2007 also shows that ICASA produced the 
least amount of reports on the SABC, as compared to the community and private 
broadcasters. It also documents that ICASA produced forty reports on community 
broadcasters, eleven reports on private broadcasters and nine reports on the SABC. ICASA 
Compliance Officer Sean Rankin ascribes this neglect to a human resource problem.  
 
4.8 Tense relationship 
 
Interviews with ICASA Compliance Officer Sean Rankin and Chief People Officer/former 
head of the SABC Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit, Phumelele Ntombela- Nzimande, 
present another dimension of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship, one that is stressed and 
tense.  
 
Rankin is of the opinion that ICASA and the SABC’s relationship is not an ideal one of 
which he attributes to the SABC’s Policy and Regulatory Department being populated with 
ex IBA/ICASA employees. Rankin adds that these ex IBA/ICASA employees are familiar 
with how the regulator functions, and are at an advantage of frustrating or manipulating the 
process required by the regulator.  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande would like the regulator to take a more aggressive stand in the 
regulating of the broadcasting industry, especially with regard to private operators when 
needed or else “this is going to eat away the role of the public service broadcaster”. ICASA 
and the SABC’s relationship can also be described as stressed and not the ideal at times in 
that not everyone at the SABC completely agree on the type of method ICASA uses to 
regulate the public service broadcaster. This at times produces a very antagonistic climate 
that yields much tension. Ntombela-Nzimande would like ICASA not to be so prescriptive in 
terms of quantitative measurement of quotas, because it restricts the SABC’s creativity. She 
adds that ICASA should rather find a way of quantifying through other means perhaps 
allowing a trade off, provided the SABC demonstrates the fulfillment of other developmental 
imperatives.  
 
4.9 Troubled relationship 
 
Another dimension of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship that emanates from the interviews 
can be described as problematic and troubled. Interviews held for the study with past 
IBA/ICASA and current ICASA councilors reveal that the SABC has an antagonistic 
relationship with the regulator.  
 
Sean Rankin who is an ICASA Compliance Officer contends that the SABC has an “arms 
length” relationship with ICASA, in the sense that the SABC does not respect ICASA as the 
regulator. Rankin furthermore states that on the contrary ICASA has a respectful relationship 
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with E-TV and MNET. Rankin posits that one of the major areas of challenge to the regulator 
in its regulation of the SABC is sustaining a co-operative and respectful working relationship.  
 
ICASA and the SABC’s relationship are also identified as problematic to a certain degree in 
that the SABC is not consistently co-operative with ICASA. Rankin states that in order for 
ICASA to obtain information with regard to a compliance report or visits to a SABC station, 
the regulator is required to first liaise with the SABC Policy and Regulatory Department. 
This line of communication and protocol sometimes results in much delay and frustration.  
Rankin recalls an instance when he could not visit the SABC’s Good Hope FM because he 
did not obtain a response from the SABC with regards to a request to visit the station. Rankin 
states that ICASA does not have such problems with other broadcasters in terms of visits and 
inspections and further emphasises that they are co-operative.  
 
A number of interviews also reveal that ICASA and the SABC’s troubled relationship can be 
traced back to the days of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). Nadia Bulbulia, 
former IBA/ICASA councilor and current SABC board member, states that at the time of the 
Triple Enquiry there was a very “untenable relationship” between the IBA and SABC. 
Bulbulia argues that at that time the SABC did not honour the IBA as the regulator who had 
the power to oversee the SABC’s delivery of its mandate. Bulbulia contends that “there was 
no clear recognition by the SABC that they were in fact regulated by the IBA”. Former 
IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd, argues that there was a “conflicting relationship” 
between the IBA and the SABC. Lloyd states that the IBA did not give rise to this conflicting 
relationship but it was the SABC that argued very strongly that “they did not have to deal 
with the IBA because they accounted to Parliament not the regulator”. Rankin argues that 
ICASA and the SABC’s present antagonistic relationship stems from historical roots. Rankin 
states that when the IBA was formed it attempted to implement certain policies in terms of 
the IBA Act of which the SABC was not in favour of. 
 
4.10 Confrontational relationship 
 
Interviews held for the study bring forth another significant relationship that exists between 
ICASA and the SABC, namely, a confrontational relationship. Conflicting views by ICASA 
and SABC often results in direct confrontational arguments. Rankin states that the initial 
argument between the regulator and SABC can be tracked back to 1996/1997 when ICASA 
questioned the SABC about their advertising spend. Rankin contends that this confrontation 
involved the then ICASA co-chairperson De Klerk and SABC Chief Executive Officer 
Sisulu. Their fallout made the front cover of the Financial Mail.  
 
Interviewee Ntombela-Nzimande discloses occurrences that allude to the confrontational 
relationship. Ntombela-Nzimande states that although ICASA welcomes consultation from 
the SABC, the regulator does not consistently agree with all the issues tabled. The emerging 
deliberations often result in serious confrontational dialogues. The communication of 
feedback by the SABC on regulations put out by ICASA is often confrontational in nature. 
Some of the issues that have resulted in a confrontation include, for instance, the stance of 
ICASA putting the SABC in difficulty by not promulgating sports of national importance and 
the SABC as a result cannot compete with private operators for sports rights in an open 
market. She argues that the SABC has confronted ICASA on prescribing hours and minutes 
on language quotas, as it hinders the SABC’s creativity. Ntombela-Nzimande adds that 
another area of contention that lends itself to confrontation by the two organisations is the 
unreasonable targets that ICASA set. She further adds that ICASA is unreasonable in 
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expecting more public service mandate on television, which is the source of most of its 
revenue. The SABC is forced to make a great effort to sell every minute so that it is able to 
deliver on its mandate.  
 
ICASA and the SABC also engage in many a confrontation with regard to regulatory 
practices, in particular methodology employed by the regulator. Rankin states that the SABC 
has previously questioned the methodology used for monitoring and compliance reports. The 
SABC objected to ICASA’s “Monitoring Report on SABC TV services 2006” (ICASA 
Monitoring Report 2006). Rankin contends that the SABC questioned the methodology, 
accuracy, and content of this report, as well as ICASA’s ability to fully monitor the SABC 
whilst monitoring other broadcasters. Rankin argues that due to the SABC objection to this 
report, ICASA has, since two years ago, employed eight part time Monitoring Officers on a 
six month basis. These part time Monitoring Officers only monitor SABC television so that 
there can be no questions of methodology. Rankin claims that the SABC also questions 
ICASA’s methodology used for the programming reports because the public service 
broadcaster is not fulfilling its mandate regarding women, children’s and religious 
programmes. Rankin argues that the SABC often challenges and questions the methodology 
used by ICASA, especially regarding the SABC television reports. Rankin also claims that 
the SABC challenges ICASA when certain issues are highlighted with regard to delivery of 
their mandate as a public service broadcaster. 
 
4.11 Silent relationship 
 
It can be derived from the interviews held that another dimension of the nature of relationship 
between ICASA and the SABC is one of “silence”. Interviewees’ state ICASA is not vocal 
with regard to the SABC’s controversies nor does it take the necessary action. Interviewees’ 
also expressed their dissatisfaction with ICASA for this “silence”. This section focuses on the 
developments of the SABC’s numerous controversies and the actions the interviewees’ state 
ICASA should be executing amidst the SABC’s controversies.  
 
The SABC controversies that are discussed include: 
 
· The SABC’s commercial funding model 
· Political independence 
· Editorial timidity 
· Internal report into alleged corruption 
· The “blacklisting” saga 
· The Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint 
· The suspensions 
· Calls for the SABC board to step down 
 
4.11.1 The SABC’s commercial funding model 
 
Sources such as the SABC Annual report 2007, interviews held and a substantial number of 
press reports suggest that the SABC’s commercial funding is a contentious and topical issue 
yet ICASA shows no substantial involvement with this issue. Interviewees express that 
ICASA should be playing a more participatory role in this controversial issue of the SABC’s 
commercial funding model.  
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Press reports, the SABC Annual Report 2007 and interviewees’ held for this study outline the 
problematic nature of the SABC’s commercial funding model. In June 2005 the Mail and 
Guardian online stated that private and community broadcasters say that they face unfair 
competition from the SABC regarding advertising revenue. In November 2006 the Media 
magazine argued that the SABC has an “iron grip” in television advertising spend. In March 
2007 the Media magazine re-iterated that the SABC owns a great amount of the television 
advertising pie. In October 2007 the Media magazine stated that the SABC relies heavily on 
advertising and as a result the SABC is also vulnerable to its threats.  In February 2008 Steyn 
Speed who is a communications coordinator for the ANC commented for the Media 
magazine that the SABC will struggle to meet its public mandate responsibilities because of 
over reliance on advertising revenue. The Media magazine reported in February 2008 that 
private and community broadcaster harbor resentment for the SABC because the SABC has 
the biggest slice of the advertising revenue pie. The SABC’s Chief Executive Officer Dali 
Mpofu says in the SABC’s Annual report 2007 “The over-reliance of the SABC on 
commercial funding in relation to other sources is in my view the single most important issue 
facing the corporation and all those who care for a true public service broadcaster which is 
accountable to the public and neither inherently susceptible to commercial nor state power”. 
Former IBA/ICASA councilor and current SABC board member Nadia Bulbulia, contends 
that the SABC’s major challenge continues to be its commercial funding model. Koster 
argues that functioning within the commercial model results in a compromise of political and 
commercial independence.  
 
A significant number of interviewees’ called on ICASA to play a more pro-active role in the 
SABC’s funding model. Ntombela-Nzimande argues that ICASA has a responsibility to 
represent the interests of the SABC and lobby government to increase the contribution from 
the fiscus. Ntombela-Nzimande states that the SABC’s invites ICASA to meetings pertaining 
to the SABC’s funding model. Lloyd asserts that ICASA should be playing a more pro-active 
role in the SABC’s funding model. Wits University Professor of Journalism Anton Harber 
contends that “ICASA stays out of the SABC’s funding model, when in fact it should be 
setting the ground rules”. Harber adds that ICASA should take an independent view on 
SABC’s funding model, such as hold public hearings and invite government to attend.  
 
4.11.2 Political independence  
 
The SABC political independence is continually questioned and attacked in the public 
domain. Amidst these allegations, ICASA does not take any action. The SABC’s political 
independence has been questioned through accusations of censorship, comparisons to the 
apartheid government and alleged pro-Thabo Mbeki coverage.  
 
The major print media, including the Maverick magazine of November 2006; the Media 
magazine of October 2007 and February 2008; the Mail and Guardian online in December 
2007 and August 2008, have reported on the SABC’s alleged pro-Mbeki coverage. Alleged 
pro-Mbeki coverage during the succession battle came under fire from the independent 
media, opposition parties and pro-Jacob Zuma supporters. Many voiced their disapproval for 
the alleged pro-Mbeki coverage, including the Youth Communist league who said the 
coverage was “the abuse of public resources to campaign for re-election”. The Democratic 
Alliance was among those that objected to the coverage, stating that Mbeki’s use of the 
SABC to reach delegates “confirmed that the public service broadcaster is a party organ”. 
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The South African Communist party and COSATU said that the pro-Mbeki coverage “is a 
blatant abuse of resources of public broadcaster to support a faction in the ANC”.  
 
In February 2008 the Empire magazine reported that people had lost faith in the SABC and 
perceived it as an “Mbeki mouthpiece”. Jane Duncan, Executive Director of the Freedom of 
Expression Institute argues in February 2008 in the Media magazine, that an independent 
SABC is needed which can report without fear or favour and rises above the leadership 
battles in the ruling party.  
 
The Mail and Guardian online reported in July 2008 that the SABC’s political independence 
has been incrementally undermined to the point where “the disputes of the ruling ANC party 
form the backdrop to the weekly soap opera pitting the SABC board against its 
management”. The Media magazine in July 2008 states that the SABC is captive to political 
elites for editorial and programming guidance and the dominant frame in its reportage on 
politics is pro-Mbeki. Anton Harber, Wits University professor of Journalism, argues in the 
Media magazine of July 2008 that the SABC’s news and current affairs has deteriorated.  
On the contrary, in July 2008 the Mail and Guardian online reported on research undertaken 
by the Media Monitoring Project entitled “Meeting Their Mandates?” which found that 
“there is no clear and systematic political bias by the SABC news"? The Media Monitoring 
Project’s research found that SABC news contained only a single source cited per story, 
resulting in limited diversity, balance and counter-opinion.  
4.11.3 Editorial timidity 
 
ICASA is also “silent” amidst the escalating accusations regarding the SABC’s editorial 
timidity. The major print media constantly level various allegations against the SABC’s 
editorial credibility due to the occurrence of certain incidents, including the booing of the 
then Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka, halting of the circumcision series Unthunzi Wentaba 
and the many withdrawals of the Thabo Mbeki documentary. These incidents sparked vast 
media outcry.    
 
In June 2006 the Mail and Guardian online reported that the alleged lack of the SABC’s 
coverage of the booing of the then deputy president Mlambo Ngcuka was biased. The Media 
magazine in May 2007 reported on the halting of the circumcision series Unthunzi Wentaba, 
following opposition to stop its screening. The Media magazine in May 2007 stated that the 
halting of the circumcision series Unthunzi Wentaba meant that peoples “rights to 
information had been trampled upon by an unprincipled broadcaster who crumbled under 
pressure”.  
The many withdrawals of the Thabo Mbeki documentary lead to much media outcry. The 
documentary’s eventual screening in October 2007, lead to the Media magazine nominating 
the SABC November 2007 “Not the Medium of the Month”, stating that the SABC should 
not “have bothered to screen the documentary”. In June 2007 the Freedom of Expression 
Institute reported that the cancellations of the Thabo Mbeki documentary raised fears that the 
withdrawal was a result of fear of damaging the SABC’s relations with the Presidency. The 
Mail and Guardian online and Business Day in June 2006 reported accusations against the 
SABC of “self censorship” and that its editorial credibility was in free fall due to the 
withdrawal of the documentary. The Mail and Guardian online in July 2007 reported that the 
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SABC said cancellations of the documentary were due to "internal approval processes not 
correctly being followed". The Freedom of Expression Institute in June 2007 reported that the 
SABC stated that the documentary was “incurably defamatory” of the President and could 
insinuate Mbeki's involvement in the Chris Hani assassination.  
The many withdrawals of the Thabo Mbeki documentary sparked uproar from the Freedom 
of Expression Institute in June 2007, which called the withdrawal a “farcical situation” and  
“yet another indication of the chaos inside the broadcaster”. The Freedom of Expression 
Institute also states in June 2007 that the SABC are “too easily withdrawing controversial 
programmes at the eleventh hour without public accountability”. The Freedom of Expression 
Institute was pro-active in advocating for the screening of this documentary, through 
marches, pickets and demonstrations held outside various SABC offices.  
The Freedom of Expression Institute in June 2007 also damned the SABC for editorial 
timidity, saying that the SABC need to desist from withdrawing programmes at the last 
minute, because it “opens broadcasters up to editorial pressure and compromises their 
editorial independence”. The Freedom of Expression Institute in June 2007 reported that the 
withdrawals of the Thabo Mbeki documentary, the circumcision drama Emthunzini WeNtaba 
and rescheduling of an After 9 programme show that the SABC “lacks the courage of its 
convictions when it is faced with controversy over its more adventurous commissioned 
products”. Jane Duncan, Executive Director of the Freedom of Expression Institute in June 
2007 says that the SABC is increasingly editorially timid with respect to the most 
controversial political issues of the day, “which points an extreme editorial timidity at best 
and self-censorship at worst”.  
4.11.4 Internal report into alleged corruption 
ICASA failed at taking any action in the SABC controversy pertaining to an internal report 
into alleged corruption. The details of an explosive report that contained damming allegations 
against the SABC, and the public service broadcaster’s attempt to stop the details of it 
reaching the public domain, captured media attention.  
 
The Mail and Guardian online; Sunday Time and Business Day in July 2007 reported on the 
Pretoria High Court interdicting the Mail and Guardian from publishing details of an SABC 
internal report. The internal report contained allegations of financial irregularity and violation 
of the Public Finance Management Act. The interdict order against the Mail and Guardian 
was dismissed with costs in the Pretoria High Court. Among the factors for dismissal was the 
fact that the report relates to how taxpayers’ money was invested and “the newspapers have a 
duty to disseminate news relating to allegations of corruption in public entities.”  
 
The Media magazine in December 2007 reported that the SABC did not suspend legal head 
Mafika Sihlali who had been accused in the internal report, of defrauding the SABC of at 
least 1.8 million rand. Legal opinion in the report did recommend that the SABC suspend and 
lays criminal charges against Sihlali.   
 
4.11.5 The “blacklisting” saga 
 
Amidst the controversy around the SABC’s alleged “blacklist” ICASA remained silent. The 
“blacklisting” saga received such a great amount of attention that a quote from the 
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“blacklisting” saga ranked first on the Media magazine’s “quotable quotes to illustrate the 
highlights and lowlights of the media in 2007”.  
 
All the major print media including the Mail and Guardian online, Business Day, Sowetan, 
Empire, Maverick and the Media as well as media advocacy group the Freedom of 
Expression Institute in 2006, 2007 and 2008 all reported that the SABC was accused of 
operating a politically motivated “blacklist” to exclude controversial commentators. The 
commentators were considered to be outspoken and generally critical of President Thabo 
Mbeki. This alleged “blacklist” sparked a barrage of criticism from the media. The SABC at 
the time denied the existence of the blacklist and claimed they issued guidelines to use 
commentators and spoke of issues of “quality” and certain voices being “ill informed”. The 
SABC’s stance was contradicted by SAFM presenter John Perlman, who confronted the 
SABC spokesperson on air, confirming the existence of a “blacklist”; other journalists also 
confirmed the existence of the “blacklist”. Many publicly queried the SABC on the 
“blacklisting” issue, including COSATU and the Democratic Alliance.  
 
John Perlman was then accused of “bringing the SABC into disrepute” by contradicting its 
official spokesperson. Later the Sisulu Commissions of Enquiry commissioned by the SABC 
said that Perlman’s position “was in conformity with the factual situation" and had correctly 
chosen to confront it. The Sisulu Commission of Enquiry was prompted by Perlman’s on air 
admission. In an interview with the Media magazine John Perlman voiced his concern at the 
“abuse of the public broadcaster for narrow and ultimately self serving goals”.  
 
The Sisulu Commission of Enquiry found that there was a practice of “blacklisting” at the 
SABC and “an atmosphere of fear and distrust”. The Sisulu Commission of Enquiry found 
SABC Group Executive of news and current affairs Snuki Zikalala guilty of banning certain 
commentators and that “these actions had resulted in a form of exclusion that is not 
sustainable”. The Sisulu Commission also expressed concern at a "phenomenon of self-
censorship" at the SABC. The Sisulu Commission advised the SABC board to “take close 
cognisance of the concerns about the management style of Zikalala” as outlined in the report. 
Despite the Sisulu Commissions findings the SABC Chief Executive Officer and SABC 
board expressed full confidence in Zikalala and trashed the findings of the Sisulu 
Commission.  
 
The SABC then failed to release the Commission’s full report despite the Commission’s view 
that the report should be released to the public. The Mail and Guardian online published the 
full report where after the SABC went to court to obtain an interdict against the website, 
however failed to do so. Among the SABC’s explanations cited was that it could lead to legal 
action from those named in the report, this caused much media uproar. Wits University 
Professor of Journalism Anton Harber argued in the public domain that “the SABC’s excuse 
was feeble and their actions amounted to a cover up”. Executive Director of the Freedom of 
Expression Institute Jane Duncan also argued in the public domain that “the SABC was 
violating its commitment to transparency”.  
 
Many others expressed outrage at the SABC’s failure to release the report, including the 
Freedom of Expression Institute who said the SABC must release the report in full because 
the SABC summaries “are confusing, garbled, and even downright contradictory”. The 
Freedom of Expression Institute filed an information request with the SABC, on the basis of 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act.  
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4.11.6 The Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint 
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute submitted a complaint to ICASA, which was the closest 
the regulator came to playing a role in any of the SABC’s recent controversies. The details 
referred to, are taken from the Freedom of Expression Institute’s website. 
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute submitted a complaint to ICASA, following the 
occurrence of specific incidents. The Freedom of Expression Institute’s “communication 
rights campaign and social movements” staged numerous pickets along with the involvement 
of other organisations; at the SABC’s headquarter in 2006 and 2007. A memorandum of 
grievances was handed to SABC management during these pickets, and highlighted areas 
where the SABC was not fulfilling its mandate as a public service broadcaster. These 
grievances include the SABC being a fully-fledged mouthpiece of government, the Thabo 
Mbeki documentary, allegations of censorship, a lack of service delivery to poor communities 
and the SABC not publishing the findings of the Sisulu Commission.  One of the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s pickets drew attention to the fact that the current SABC Board is not fit 
to run the public service broadcaster. The SABC’s lack of response to the memorandum to 
the initial picket in November 2006 and the inability of the SABC to address the Sisulu 
Commission’s report's findings prompted the Freedom of Expression Institute to lay a 
complaint to ICASA.  
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute also instigated a petition calling on ICASA to enforce 
the SABC’s license conditions and to take appropriate action against the SABC. The details 
of the Freedom of Expression Institute complaint to ICASA are: 
 
· The SABC violated its founding statute, the Broadcasting Act eleven times, its license 
conditions five times and the South African Constitution three times in the recent past.  
· The FXI waited for the SABC to implement the Commission's findings however it 
appeared to be the SABC's lack of appropriate response, especially its failure to act 
decisively against the person responsible for the “blacklisting" of political 
commentators, the Managing Director of News and Current Affairs, Dr. Snuki 
Zikalala. 
· By excluding certain commentators, Zikalala's actions have violated the Broadcasting 
Act's requirement for its public services to “provide significant news and current 
affairs programming which meets the highest standards of journalism, as well as fair 
and unbiased coverage, impartiality, balance, and independence from government, 
commercial and other interests”. 
· Further, by limiting the diversity of opinion that the public is accessible to, the SABC 
has violated the provision of its licence conditions that requires it to “provide a 
reasonable opportunity for the public to receive a variety of points of view on matters 
of public concern”.  
· Zikalala's conduct in giving express or inferred instructions to exclude certain 
political commentators is also not aligned to the highest standards of journalistic 
professionalism, as required in terms of the Broadcasting Act and its license 
conditions.   
ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) dismissed an application by the 
Freedom of Expression Institute to subpoena the transcript of the record of proceedings of the 
Sisulu Commission. ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) ordered that 
the Sisulu Commission’s report and recordings be inadmissible in future proceedings at ICASA. 
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This meant that the Freedom of Expression Institute was required to provide new evidence to 
ICASA. During the hearing the SABC stated that they had rejected some of the Sisulu report 
on the grounds of flawed methodology. The SABC in a statement afterwards said "This was 
an internal inquiry for internal consumption only and its leakage was mischievous, illegal and 
intended only for commercial gain”. The Freedom of Expression Institute was disappointed at 
ICASA’s ruling. The Freedom of Expression Institute’s attorney Simon Delaney said "I feel 
disappointed and disempowered, not simply as a member of the FXI, but as a viewer, listener 
and as a citizen to whom ICASA is accountable".   
4.11.7 The suspensions 
The suspension of the SABC’s Group Executive of news and current affairs Snuki Zikalala 
followed by the SABC’s Group Chief Executive Officer Dali Mpofu captured the attention of 
the major print media. Amidst this controversy ICASA failed to take any action. The major 
print media, including the Mail and Guardian online; Business Day; Empire magazine and 
media advocacy group the Freedom of Expression Institute in May 2008 all reported on this 
SABC controversy. Dali Mpofu initially suspended Snuki Zikalala, which was followed by 
the SABC board then suspending Mpofu. The SABC board resolved to conduct an 
investigation into serious allegations about Mpofu, including failure to abide and implement 
decisions of the board and that Mpofu’s actions against Zikalala had not been recognized by 
the board. 
 
Mpofu was then suspended three times by the SABC board. The Johannesburg high court 
overturned the first two suspensions. Dali Mpofu’s first suspension was ruled by the 
Johannesburg High Court as unlawful, because the meeting did not follow the correct legal 
procedures. The Judge said that SABC chairperson Khanyi Mkhonza had handled the entire 
matter poorly and her behaviour fell short of a director who should act “independently, 
openly, with integrity and honesty”. Meanwhile Snuki Zikalala had lodged a case with the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and his suspension was 
eventually lifted. 
  
The suspensions were referred to in the public domain as a “shake up at the SABC” and that 
the “daggers are out”. Many expressed concern at the suspensions, including the South 
African Communist Party who stated that the suspensions might divert the SABC focus on 
building itself as a credible broadcaster. The Empire magazine reported in June 2008 that the 
media was “grinding out horror stories faster than the public could devour them” in the 
SABC’s suspension controversy.  
 
Various other parties also voiced their concerns at the SABC’s suspensions, including the 
Minister of Communications. The Minister of Communications assured that “All will be done 
on the Minister's part to ensure the ability of the SABC to deliver its mandate" and ensure 
that its image does not "suffer further damage". Various entities and political parties 
commented on the SABC’s suspensions, including the Democratic Alliance, South Africa 
Communist Party, African Christian Democratic party, ANC Youth League and United 
Democratic Movement. The Freedom Front Plus said that the SABC’s suspensions had 
“seriously affected the credibility of the organisation”. Wits University Professor of 
Journalism Anton Harber argues in July 2008 in the Media magazine that the SABC’s 
suspensions was reduced “to cannibalism where the Parliament, the board, the Executive and 
Head of news are all trying to eat at each other”.  
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4.11.8 Calls for the SABC board to step down 
There were numerous calls for the SABC board to step down however amidst this debacle, 
ICASA was “silent”. The major print media, including the Mail and Guardian online, 
reported on this SABC controversy that unfolded in June 2008. There was a wrangle between 
the Parliamentary Committee on Communications which had passed a vote of no confidence 
in the SABC board, and President Thabo Mbeki refusing to budge in terms of dismissing the 
board members. Parliament sought to dismiss the existing SABC board. Members of 
Parliament tabled a Bill in order to give them the authority to dismiss the SABC board. 
Parliament even held hearings to facilitate a change of law that would see the SABC board 
fired.  
 
The Empire magazine in June 2008 called this controversy the “SABC falling apart at the 
seams rather publicly” in referring to the “no confidence” vote in the SABC board by the 
Parliamentary Committee on Communications. The SABC Executive then called on the 
SABC board to step down immediately because the SABC board “does not have the moral 
authority to continue to lead the SABC”. SABC staff members signed a petition which called 
for the removal of the SABC board from office. The SABC board responded and condemned 
seven members of the broadcaster's Executive for signing a petition calling for it to resign.  
 
4.12 Interviewees’ calls for ICASA to take action 
 
Many interviewees’ called on ICASA to take relevant action in the SABC’s controversies and 
expressed despondency at the regulator’s lack thereof. Sean Rankin, an ICASA Compliance 
Officer and one of the longest standing members at the IBA/ICASA, sheds light on the reason 
for ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC’s controversies. Rankin posits that the regulator is not 
overtly concerned with the SABC’s controversies because it is “none of ICASA’s business”. 
He adds that ICASA can only become directly involved if the matter is related to a license 
contravention. He argues that ICASA’s domain is to follow up on the failure of the SABC to 
submit information, to the highest level of management if necessary.  
 
Rankin further states that ICASA tends to steer away from the SABC’s “internal politics” as 
the SABC is “in a sense a politically charged body because of the appointments of the SABC 
board”. Rankin also contends that allegations against the SABC in the public domain are 
noted in ICASA’s Compliance function and put in the Annual report. Rankin states that 
ICASA also notes the newspaper reports and the number of complaints and judgments at the 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa, against the SABC.  Kate Skinner 
states that the Freedom of Expression Institute accused ICASA of “deadly silence” and 
neglecting their duty amidst the SABC’s suspensions controversy. ICASA chairperson Paris 
Mashile responded to the Freedom of Expression Institute’s accusation by stating that it is an 
internal matter and the regulator wishes the SABC well in resolving it.  
 
A significant number of interviewees also express discontent at ICASA’s “silence” and lack 
of action in the SABC’s controversies. The SABC’s Chief People Officer and former Head of 
the Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit Phumelela Ntombela-Nzimande, argues that it should 
be “ICASA’s business” when there are “squabbles” in the public domain regarding the 
SABC. She says that when the SABC controversies occur, the public service broadcaster 
receives complaints from the interested public and questions from Parliament, but receives no 
concern from ICASA.  
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Ntombela-Nzimande asserts that ICASA should be pro-active and not wait for a complaint 
from citizens (i.e. the FXI complaint) to assume involvement. She argues that ICASA is not a 
dynamic regulator as “it becomes very technocratic about its oversight role at times”. 
Ntombela-Nzimande furthermore states that the present ICASA council has adopted a “hands 
off approach” in some of the key strategic interactions the regulator should be involved in. 
She furthermore argues that ICASA should, amidst the SABC controversies, consult with the 
SABC as to whether the media reports are correct and if needed issue penalties. ICASA 
should make the public aware that the regulator has engaged the SABC and provide feedback 
on the outcome. Ntombela-Nzimande states that she “does not like the regulator’s silence” 
and that ICASA is losing credibility as an authority because of its silence. 
 
A significant amount of interviewees also called on ICASA to take action in the SABC’s 
controversies. Anton Harber, Wits University Professor of Journalism, contends that ICASA 
should be holding the SABC to account on all the controversies, particularly the Thabo 
Mbeki documentary and Sisulu Commission. He adds that ICASA should be in the forefront 
of questioning the SABC. Executive Director of the National Association of 
Broadcasters/former Head of ICASA’s Monitoring and Complaints Unit Johann Koster, 
states that it is problematic for ICASA to not make “its voice heard in the SABC issues”.  
 
Other interviewees’ also expressed annoyance at ICASA’s lack of action in the SABC’s 
controversies. Kate Skinner co-coordinator of the Save Our SABC (SABC) coalition concurs 
with the SABC’s Sisulu Commission that ICASA should be ideally investigating the Sisulu 
report itself. Skinner posits that ICASA should essentially examine the Sisulu Commission 
report and then undertake ongoing monitoring of it. Skinner states that ICASA should be 
undertaking pro-active investigation to ascertain whether the SABC are in adherence to their 
license conditions. 
Skinner also provides her perspective on the Freedom of Expression’s Institute’s complaint to 
ICASA. Skinner contends that ICASA has “literally ducked and dived” and it is “outrageous” 
that the Freedom of Expression Institute is conducting the investigation that should in fact be 
undertaken by ICASA. Skinner states that at ICASA’s hearing of the Freedom of 
Expression’s Institute’s complaint, the regulator seemed to possess a kind of fear in holding 
the SABC to account. Skinner argues that if ICASA were pro-active in ensuring that the 
SABC fulfill it mandate, the Freedom of Expression Institute could have used the Sisulu 
Commission as evidence. Skinner states that the Sisulu Commission was thorough in its 
investigation and fair in its findings. Skinner states that the Save Our SABC (SOS) coalition is 
of the view that throughout the “blacklisting” crisis ICASA had a “deafening silence”. 
Skinner contends that ICASA should be holding the SABC to account on its Charter and 
license conditions.  
Many interviewees’ also expressed dissatisfaction at ICASA’s ruling in the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s complaint. Wits University Professor of Journalism Anton Harber 
contends that in the Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint, ICASA should have acted 
against the SABC, however were like “putty and did not assert their authority”. Harber argues 
also that the “SABC looks big and powerful and ICASA looks small” when it should be the 
other way around. Libby Lloyd who is a former IBA/ICASA councilor, states that the 
Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint shows that ICASA seems to be narrowly 
defining its role by proclaiming it can only judge the SABC on issues of what is broadcast.  
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ICASA councilor and member of ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) 
Kobus Van Rooyen, provides another perspective on ICASA’s ruling in the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s complaint. Van Rooyen argues that it is unfair to take one enquiry and 
accept it as truth. Van Rooyen states that ICASA is willing to investigate but first requires a 
Prima fascia case from the Freedom of Expression Institute to show (if any) the effects on the 
public. Rooyen furthermore states that the Act stipulates that the Complaints and Compliance 
Committee (CCC) does “enquire” however there are different meanings to the word 
“enquire”. Rooyen states that the Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) has chosen 
the meaning of “enquire “which is the softest and which moves the furthest away from the 
perception that the Committee is prosecuting.   
 
Ntombela-Nzimande argues that ideally amidst the SABC’s suspension controversy, ICASA 
should have held a meeting to remind the SABC management and board of their 
responsibility. She contends ICASA in this meeting ideally should have ensured that the 
SABC remain focused on its mandate. Ntombela-Nzimande adds “it is absolutely shocking 
that ICASA had not facilitated/co-coordinated this meeting when they have every right as the 
regulator to do so”. Rankin, an ICASA Compliance Officer contends that ICASA is 
concerned with the conflict between board and management and does take note of it. 
Ntombela-Nzimande states that ICASA should have taken action in the SABC’s suspension 
controversy as it regards ICASA’s key responsibilities, the sustainability and mandate of the 
SABC. Ntombela-Nzimande further argues that the sustainability of the SABC relies on the 
quality of the SABC board’s strategic guidance, in order to remain focused on their mandate. 
Lloyd argues that many expected ICASA to host a meeting with the SABC amidst the 
SABC’s suspensions controversy, to ensure that the suspensions are not adversely affecting 
the public service broadcaster and its business plan.  
 
Some interviewees’ expressed the view that ICASA is narrowly defining its role regarding 
the SABC when in fact it should be proceeding with specific action. Former IBA/ICASA 
councilor Libby Lloyd, argues that ICASA should have made submissions on the 
Broadcasting Amendment Bill as one of the proposed clauses for the dissolution of the entire 
SABC board, is if the board has not complied with the SABC Charter. Lloyd states that 
ICASA is the only body that can monitor compliance of the Charter hence the regulator 
should have expressed its view as to the feasibility of the clause. Koster re-iterates this 
argument and contends that ICASA ought to have submitted a strong presentation to 
Parliament with regards to amendment of the Broadcasting Act and its attempts to facilitate 
changes in the SABC board. Skinner argues that in the issue of the numerous calls for the 
SABC board to step down, the only institution taking an initiative is Parliament through 
controversial Bills. Skinner adds that Parliament is taking some sort of action unlike ICASA.   
 
Lloyd further posits that ICASA seems to be narrowly defining its role regarding the SABC. 
This was evident when ICASA dismissed a complaint submitted about the SABC running an 
“odd” competition. Lloyd states that ICASA dismissed the complaint on the basis that it was 
aired outside the performance period and that ICASA have no role on broadcasts outside the 
performance period. Lloyd states that at the same time the BBC was held by its regulator for 
a similar issue on competition, and fined a large amount.  
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Numerous interviewees’ pointed out the possible reasons for ICASA’s “silence” and 
unsatisfactory action. This section undertakes a discussion of possible reasons for ICASA’s 
“silence” based on the interviews held for the study. These reasons include ICASA’s: 
 
· Resources and capacity 
· Appointments 
· Legislation 
· Fear and lack of will  
 
4.12.1 Resources and capacity 
Numerous interviewees’ attribute ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC’s controversies to ICASA 
not being sufficiently capacitated and resourced, such as the co-coordinator of the Save Our 
SABC (SOS) coalition Kate Skinner.  Skinner argues that the Minister of Communications 
has stated that salaries in the industry are very high and it is difficult to retain ICASA 
councilors. Harber argues that ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC debacles is an issue of 
resources, because ICASA is inundated with work. Harber also states that ICASA is 
“swamped” with work and “if they can ignore a problem they will”, which is a kind of an 
“enforced passivity”. 
  
Ntombela-Nzimande states that ICASA has capacity challenges because the dynamic 
leadership that was once at ICASA does not exist anymore. She adds that when she was a 
Deputy Director General at the Department of Communications during former ICASA 
Chairperson Mandla Langer’s period in office, ICASA was rigorous. One had to prepare the 
Minister to engage with the regulator because ICASA did not “take kindly to anything that 
erodes their independence and authority”, for example, a policy directive.  
 
4.12.2 Appointments 
 
Some interviewees attribute ICASA’s “silence” to the regulator’s appointment of councilors. 
Harber contends that ICASA is not appointing people who are asserting an active role at the 
SABC. Skinner argues that many lay claim that a number of ICASA’s appointments are 
political. 
 
4.12.2 Legislation 
Other interviews held for this study attribute ICASA’s “silence” to legislative factors. Lloyd 
point outs that it is not certain what the ICASA could have done in the SABC debacles 
because the SABC Charter is so vague. Lloyd states that the law is not clear enough which 
allows ICASA to “slip and slide and dodge its responsibilities”. Journalist Kevin Bloom 
states that it is very difficult for an independent regulator because legally it does not have the 
mandate to sort out what is essentiality an internal problem. On the contrary, Ntombela-
Nzimande argues that ICASA does not appreciate the legal “teeth” it has to address the 
SABC’s issues.  
 
4.12.3 Fear and lack of will 
Interviewees’ suggest that ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC’s controversies can be attributed 
to “fear” by the regulator to assume involvement. Koster states that perhaps ICASA is 
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“fearful” and hesitant to assume involvement as the regulator does not “want to be seen as 
interfering in the internal processes of the SABC”. Skinner contends that despite ICASA’s 
under funding, the regulator lacks political will because regulators the world over possess 
much less resources than ICASA and yet are more proactive. 
 
4.13 ICASA’s institutional weaknesses  
Press reports, numerous interviewees’ and the ICASA’s Annual report 2007 suggest that 
ICASA has organisational weaknesses. The organisational problems cited are discussed 
under the following headings:   
· Independence 
· Appointment process 
· Expertise and staff “poaching” 
· Public accountability 
· Mandate and power 
· Resources and capacity 
ICASA’s organisational weaknesses could be hindering its effective regulation of the SABC 
and other duties.  
4.13.1 Independence 
 
Many interviewees’ express that ICASA is not “enjoying” its independence in reality. Koster, 
Lloyd and Rankin all highlight ICASA’s lack of independence, due to the Minister of 
Communications’ prominent role in its performance agreements, finances and decisions. 
Koster argues that ICASA can be strengthened by attaining a more independently perceived 
council because it is problematic to allow the Minister of Communications to appoint, 
evaluate and fire personnel.  Koster adds that the Minister of Communications’ prominent 
role at ICASA could result in ICASA not executing its regulatory functions in the “public 
interest” and rather in the “Ministers interest”. He further adds that ICASA should rather 
report to Parliament and not to a specific Minister. Lloyd also stipulates that the performance 
agreement with the Minister is problematic as this could possibly lead to councilors operating 
in fear of lower performance bonuses. 
 
Lloyd however states that currently one senses that ICASA is “taking a cautious line rather 
than limiting their independence’. Lloyd argues that ICASA is “appeasing both the 
broadcasters and government and the public is getting neglected in it all”. Lloyd argues that 
when Mandla Langer was chairperson of ICASA, the regulator executed numerous strong 
positions and had public fights with the Minister over positions; however ICASA is not 
presently doing this.   
 
Bulbulia argues that the Department of Communications sometimes attempts to take over 
ICASA’s role. Bulbulia asserts that ICASA reports to the Department of Communications, 
however, “often the Department of Communications wants to do ICASA’s job for them”. 
Nadia Bulbulia states that in many instances the Department Of Communications 
overstepped the parameter of their role by attempting to assume the implementation task of 
the regulator.  
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Rankin states that ICASA’s independence is questionable due to funding. Rankin states that 
ICASA is independent from other interests because it has a very strict code of conduct at 
council and compliance level. Lloyd asserts that ICASA’s financial independence needs to be 
upheld in reality otherwise “ICASA is perpetually positioning itself for their budget to be cut 
if they do anything unpopular”. Lloyd argues that “ICASA should have access to funds in 
court cases in order to be able to take up and set case law on telecommunications rather than 
opt out of fighting with big operators”.  
 
4.13.2 Appointment process 
 
Press reports and numerous interviewees’ suggest that ICASA’s appointment process is 
“politicized” and not independent. The Mail and Guardian in July 2006 argues that the 
Minister of Communications role in ICASA’s appointment process and her power to 
"performance manage" the councilors, all amounts to “a reduction in the autonomy of ICASA”. 
Rankin states that ICASA’s appointment process could mean that the politically correct 
candidates are the ones appointed. Koster states that the problem regarding ICASA’s 
appointment process is that Parliament amounts to a multi-party environment and “inevitably 
there is going be horse-trading”. Harber states that ICASA needs a system that appoints the 
“best people for the job: and this is not achieved through potential for political parties horse-
trading”. Lloyd argues that the independence of ICASA is limited by the ICASA Act 2000 as 
amended and there needs to be some discussion as to whether or not Parliament is the most 
suitable appointing body because this lends itself to horse trading between political parties. 
Lloyd further states, there needs to be a change in policy regarding ICASA’s appointment 
procedure because Parliament needs to play a stronger oversight role. Rankin however argues 
that the senior appointments at ICASA are increasingly based purely on merit. 
  
4.13.3 Expertise and staff “poaching”  
 
Press reports, numerous interviewees’ and the ICASA Annual Report 2007 all express that 
ICASA does not possess adequately skilled people and has a problem with staff “poaching”. 
Van Rooyen confirms that ICASA’s best personnel are constantly “poached” and that ICASA 
requires more funding for retention of personnel. Rankin also makes reference to ICASA’s 
problem of retaining personnel, due to “poaching”. Bulbulia states that unfortunately, high-
quality employees with sound institutional memory at ICASA tend to rapidly move to other 
jobs. Lisa Thornton, a communications lawyer argues in April 2006, in the Mail and 
Guardian online that ICASA serves as a training ground for talent that is often “poached by 
cash-flush industry giants such as MTN and Vodacom”. The ICASA Annual Report 2007 
also confirms that ICASA’s is experiencing challenges with “poaching”. 
Press reports, the ICASA Annual Report 2007 and interviews also suggest that ICASA does 
not have the necessary skills it requires. A communication lawyer Lisa Thornton argues in 
April 2006 in the Mail and Guardian online that "ICASA is 100% incapable of regulating 
pricing because it simply doesn’t have the knowledge or the staff”. ICASA’s under skilled 
membership is even recognised by the regulator itself, the ICASA Annual Report 2007 
affirms that ICASA has “human capital challenges”. Bulbulia argues that ICASA require 
more skills. Lloyd argues that ICASA needs a lot more skills such as economic analysis, so 
that it is be equipped “to really question SABC on where they are spending their money”. 
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4.13.4 Public accountability 
 
ICASA is not adequately accountable to the public due to its inefficient website. The July 
2007 issue of The Media magazine nominated the ICASA’s website as “Not the medium of 
the month” as the magazine received several complaints. The magazine argues that ICASA’s 
website does not include much information on certain hearings, the broadcasting licensing 
process and press releases. The magazine states that ICASA’s website “should be the local 
hub of information related to broadcasting regulatory issues but instead it is only a source of 
frustration”, it should be used as damage control whilst many people have lost faith in the 
authority”.  
 
4.13.5 Mandate and Power 
 
Interviews held for the study suggest that ICASA’s mandate and power is not clear regarding 
the SABC and in general, whilst other interviewees’ express that the regulator does in fact 
have sufficient mandate and power.  
 
Lloyd states that ICASA has “strong” mandate and power however it is whether or not the 
regulator chooses “to narrowly or broadly interpret it”.  Ntombela-Nzimande contends that 
ICASA does have strong mandate and power however the regulator “does not realise the 
sharpness of teeth they have, they do not bite even when they have teeth”. Rankin argues that 
ICASA has enough mandate and power. Koster contends that ICASA has “quite a strong arm 
and can punch a lot of people if they need to”. Koster furthermore states that using this strong 
arm depends on enforcement and communication. Sometimes ICASA “does not 
communicate well enough and their resources in terms enforcement is problematic”. Van 
Rooyen states that ICASA definitely has sufficient mandate and power however “the relevant 
Act is inherently tricky to apply”.  
 
Lloyd suggests that all of ICASA’s legislation needs clarification so that there are no 
loopholes that “either ICASA, the industry or the Minister can exploit”. Bloom states that 
ICASA in general needs its “teeth” back, and is now a “toothless” regulator, which was not 
the case some years ago.  
 
Van Rooyen however contends that ICASA has “teething problems” because it has huge 
tasks with the new law. Van Rooyen argues that ICASA does have the “teeth” and are able to 
impose a maximum fine of a million rand a day; however this will only be imposed in 
exceptional circumstances. Van Rooyen states that it is obvious that ICASA need “teeth” but 
would rather “make proper regulations which are fair in themselves”. Van Rooyen further 
argues that if there is intentional malice then one can show “teeth”, but “one must be careful 
when dealing with ordinary actions and accepting there was malice”.  
 
4.13.6 Resources and Capacity 
 
Press reports, the ICASA Annual report 2007 and the majority of interviewees’ highlights 
that ICASA is under funded and under capacitated. Rankin states that ICASA is under 
resourced and is the reason for its lengthy time frame in completing the licenses conversion 
process. Rankin adds that under resourcing has damaged ICASA’s work for instance, “up 
until two years ago there was not sufficient funding so travelling, visiting and monitoring 
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were restricted”. Koster states that in certain areas ICASA is adequately funded however its 
enforcement, communication and research areas are not allocated sufficient funds.  
Skinner states that ICASA’s “funding and capacity has been cut to a point where it cannot 
fulfill its mandate in any ideal way”. Harber argues that ICASA has a huge task and requires 
“much better resources to hire really skilled people”. Ntombela-Nzimande stipulates that 
ICASA needs to be adequately structured and resourced so that it is able to give justice to 
every industry that it oversees. Bulbulia asserts that ICASA requires adequate funding and 
skills. Harber argues “ICASA does not have enough power because they are not given 
sufficient resources to be able to exercise their power”. Harber contends that “the suspicion is 
that they have deliberately starved ICASA of resources in order to weaken its authority”.  
Numerous press reports highlight ICASA’s problem of being under funded and under-
capacitated. In October 2006 the Mail and Guardian online said that “there is a need for 
increased funding at ICASA. Nadia Bulbulia in December 2006 for the Media magazine 
argues that there is an “ongoing battle about concerning resourcing at ICASA” and this issue 
is recognised publicly by all players, including government, Parliament, the industry and the 
regulator itself. Bulbulia also argues in the Media magazine in December 2006 that a lack of 
funding to upgrade ICASA’s monitoring equipment had an impact on ICASA’s delivery thus 
the regulator is unable to fully monitor the SABC’s license conditions. The Mail and 
Guardian online in April 2006 reported Lisa Thornton a Communications lawyer’s argument 
that “ICASA will battle to face off the legal challenges because of its capacity challenges”. 
The ICASA Annual Report 2007 confirms that ICASA is under funded and under 
capacitated, and determines the repercussions of this constraint. It shows that projects like the 
investigation into allegations of billing malpractices by Telkom and the investigation into the 
availability of telecom’s services at public schools were at risk due to a lack of human 
capital, the latter project was “canned” for this reason. ICASA’s Annual Report 2007 also 
confirms the lack of budget in 2006 to conclude the “draft Service Charter guidelines for 
End-user Subscribers”. This Annual Report also states that a lack of capacity in the Finance 
Section at ICASA led to “non- compliance with policies and procedures as well as poor 
monitoring and supervisory controls [which] resulted in material errors in financial 
statements”. 
 
4.14 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has presented the findings from information that is gathered from policy 
documents, the SABC’s television and radio licenses, ICASA monitoring reports, press 
reports, reports from advocacy groups, the SABC Annual report 2007 and the ICASA Annual 
report 2007 as well as interviews. The Chapter presented the findings according to the 
derived themes of ICASA’s ideal organisational structure, ICASA’s mandate regarding the 
SABC, the emanating nature of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship as well as ICASA’s 
organisational weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66
 
 
                                                         Chapter 5 
   
Analysis 
5. Introduction 
  
The various dimensions of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship, as well as ICASA’s 
organisational “troubles” can be explained by a combination of complementary theories, 
critical political economy of the media, theories of regulation as well as public service 
broadcasting. These theories provide an appropriate framework for explaining the level of 
effectiveness of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC, and the constraints hindering ICASA from 
regulating the SABC effectively so that it functions as public service broadcaster. 
 
Critical political economy of the media explains that institutional issues like media 
ownership, the role of policy and regulation, editorial and programming independence and 
funding can constrain an institution and hinder the media’s democratic role. Theories of 
regulation, specifically the public interest theory, clarify that ideally a regulator is obliged to 
serve the public interest. The “perverted” public interest theory of regulation asserts that a 
regulator is capable of perverting the public interest in serving the private interests of the 
industries under regulation. The “perverted” public interest theory explains that the 
perversion of the public interest can occur because of “Instrumental”, “Structural” and 
“Capture” reasons.  
 
An independent regulator is in a “healthy” position to effectively regulate in the public 
interest. The characteristics required for a regulator to be independent are, that its 
independence be guaranteed by law, have a participatory and transparent appointment 
process, adequately skilled membership, sufficient mandate and power, accountability, as 
well as adequate funding. Theories of public service broadcasting outline the typical feature 
of a public service broadcaster and its unique characteristics, which serve as useful guiding 
principles in exposing the regulatory failures of ICASA’s to ensure the SABC’s plays its role 
as a public service broadcaster.  
 
5.1 Public interest enhancing regulations and practices 
 
Among the many dimensions of ICASA’s regulation, the following dimension does to a 
certain degree foster the functioning of the SABC as a public service broadcaster. This is 
evident in the SABC’s license conditions that ICASA issued and the areas that ICASA 
monitors the SABC daily on. These license conditions and monitoring uphold certain of the 
characteristics required for a public service broadcaster.  
 
The theoretical framework signifies that it is important that a public service broadcaster 
offers a universal service, is accessible in footprint and programming, diversity of and in 
programming which includes catering for the needs of the minority (McChesney 1999; 
Curran and Seaton 1997; Scannell 1992). Certain of the characteristics are upheld in the 
SABC’s license conditions. The SABC license conditions obligates the SABC’s services to 
be accessible in all the official languages, reflect the diverse culture of South Africa, offer 
services to woman, children and the disabled, as well as provide a substantial amount of local 
content. Therefore, the SABC’s license conditions dictate the SABC to cater for the minority 
of the disabled, offer a diversity of programming, as well as be universal and accessible.  
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The targeted areas that ICASA monitors the SABC daily on, also upholds these 
characteristics that are required for a public service broadcaster. An ICASA Compliance 
Officer, Sean Rankin, contends that ICASA regulates the SABC, through quantitative 
measurement of genres, languages, local content, woman and children’s programming, 
disabled and educational programming, universality and diversity. These areas are in 
alignment with certain of the theoretical framework’s characteristics for a public service 
broadcaster which include that it should be universal, accessible in terms of language, be 
assessable in terms of footprint and programming, offer a diversity of genres and cater for the 
minority (McChesney 1999; Curran and Seaton 1997; Scannell 1992; Curran 199).  
 
ICASA furthermore safeguards the SABC’s public service broadcaster characteristics, by 
enforcing compliance to the SABC license conditions. ICASA Compliance Officer Rankin 
argues that ICASA’s Monitoring and Compliance Unit consistently follows up on any 
occurrence of non-compliance to the SABC license conditions. This affirms that ICASA does 
not just enshrine these directives in the license conditions but make the necessary effort to 
enforce compliance thereto, hence upholding certain of the public service broadcaster 
characteristics as set out in the theoretical framework. This is further alluded to by Chief 
People Officer and former Head of the SABC Policy and Regulatory Affairs Unit Phumelele 
Ntombela-Nzimande. She contends that ICASA does not take kindly to the SABC not 
meeting its quotas, and even insists on a plan of action from the SABC of its intended process 
to rectify it. Ntombela-Nzimande further validates Rankin’s argument, when she also states 
that “the regulator even requests a plan of action to rectify a breach of the SABC’s license 
conditions”. Hence it can be concluded that ICASA’s interventions is safeguarding certain of 
the important public service broadcaster characteristics and thus upholding the standard of the 
public broadcasting theory.   
 
The license conditions are increasing the SABC’s public service value. The SABC Annual 
Report 2007 states that the SABC license conditions issued by ICASA have resulted in “more 
public interest value being delivered to the audiences of the SABC’s platforms”. The SABC 
Annual Report 2007 adds that the SABC’s license conditions have resulted in a decrease in 
the SABC’s foreign content spend, an increase in local content, greater economic benefits for 
independent producers due to local content guidelines, increase in languages other than 
English and an increase in radio current affairs. The SABC license conditions issued by the 
regulator are, according to the SABC, increasing the “public service” value of the SABC. 
Therefore ICASA is contributing towards safeguarding the SABC’s crucial components 
required for a public service broadcaster and hence the public service benefits of such a 
broadcaster. 
 
Subsequently, ICASA is thus contributing to safeguarding the democratic role of the SABC, 
by contributing towards its “public service” value. The theoretical framework highlights that 
a public service broadcaster has an important democratic role and as such requires regulation 
to protect this role (Siune 1998). The public interest theory of regulation best explains the 
value to of ICASA’s regulations, in its expression that a regulator serves the public interest 
when it serves democracy. ICASA is serving democracy by contributing towards the SABC 
functioning in the public interest and therefore as a public service broadcaster, through the 
SABC license conditions, monitoring and enforcement of it. Therefore, ICASA is to some 
degree effective in these regulatory practices it employs. The above mentioned interviewees’ 
statements, Annual report, as well as ICASA’s quantitative measurement, against theoretical 
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standards, makes its conclusive  that, ICASA to a certain level contributes to the SABC 
functioning as a public service broadcaster. 
 
5.2 Problematic regulatory practices 
 
The regulatory practices that ICASA employs to monitor the SABC, however, is in some 
aspects are problematic. ICASA Compliance Officer Sean Rankin states that the SABC is 
adequately fulfilling its license conditions. Rankin adds that the SABC has never been 
referred to ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) for a breach of license. 
Rankin’s statements shows that the regulatory practices that ICASA employs is problematic 
in the sense that ICASA reports that the SABC is fulfilling its role, however there still exists 
contrary views to this. However there is evidence to suggest that the SABC is in some aspects 
is not functioning as a public service broadcaster; this is suggestive that there is a gap in its 
regulatory practice.  
 
One of the SABC’s license conditions is the requirement for the SABC to provide news that 
is unbiased, is editorially independent and meets the highest standards of journalism. Many of 
the SABC controversies that have surfaced in the public domain highly question the editorial 
credibility and editorial independence of the SABC news. The major print media and media 
advocacy organisation the Freedom of Expression Institute, accused the SABC of editorial 
timidity and self censorship due to its continual withdrawal of the Thabo Mbeki 
documentary. In the SABC’s “blacklisting” controversy the SABC was accused of operating 
a politically motivated blacklist to exclude controversial commentators, this saga severely 
tarnished the editorial credibility and questioned the political independence of the SABC. 
There have also been numerous accusations leveled against the SABC’s political 
independence, due to its alleged pro-Mbeki coverage in the SABC news. The SABC have 
also been accused of being editorially timid due to its non coverage of the former Deputy 
President being booed at an ANC rally, and the halting of the circumcision series Unthunzi 
Wentaba. These SABC controversies all show that the SABC’s editorial independence and 
credibility is highly questionable.  
 
ICASA is mandated to ensure that the SABC offers news that is editorially independent and 
unbiased; however, this escalating evidence suggests that the SABC’s editorial credibility is 
severely tarnished. Nevertheless, the SABC, according to ICASA, is adequately fulfilling its 
license conditions and has never been charged with a breach of license. This is in discord 
with one view of the SABC’s image as a public service broadcaster that “people lost faith in 
the SABC and knew it was not independent and became an Mbeki mouthpiece” (Empire 
magazine in February 2008). It is obvious, that there is a major problem with ICASA’s 
regulatory practices. ICASA still concludes that the SABC has not breached its license 
condition requirement for editorially independent and unbiased news, yet there is growing 
evidence that suggests that the SABC is very far from producing editorially independent 
news and programming.  
 
Many interviewees are of the argument that the regulatory practices that ICASA employs are 
problematic. Ntombela-Nzimande, former IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd and co-
coordinator of the Save Our SABC (SABC) coalition Kate Skinner, suggest that ICASA’s 
regulatory practices are unsatisfactory and ineffective. Ntombela-Nzimande argues that 
ICASA’s precise hour and minute monitoring is restricting the SABC and hindering its 
ability to be creative. Lloyd and Skinner argue that ICASA is not actually conducting in 
depth monitoring of the SABC, and should rather be focusing on issues such as diversity.  
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Interviews held for this study present controversial views on the effectiveness of ICASA’s 
regulatory practices. Some interviews suggest that ICASA’s regulatory practices are 
hindering the creativity of the SABC and are not pro-actively monitoring the SABC. It is not 
surprising that ICASA’s regulatory practices, when assessed against these relevant sources, 
could be seen as “ineffective”. Critical political economy of the media is based on the 
premise that a regulatory system that governs a public service broadcaster can have 
consequences on the public good and the health of democracy (Boyd-Barrett 2002). The 
SABC’s controversies and interviews confirm that ICASA’s regulatory practices perhaps are 
not the most efficient way to effectively regulate the SABC, so that it plays the role of a 
public service broadcaster.  
 
An example of a negative consequence of ICASA’s ineffective regulatory practices is the 
SABC’s editorial independence and credibility being in free fall. ICASA’s regulatory 
practices are not promoting the SABC’s editorial and programming independence.  This can 
be concluded from critical political economy of the media’s argument that the role of policy 
and regulation can constrain editorial and programming independence (Boyd- Barrett 2002; 
Golding and Murdock 2000; McChesney 2000). 
 
Editorial and programming independence is an important requirement for the SABC, the 
theoretical framework indicates that editorial and programming independence is a crucial 
component required for a public service broadcaster (Curran 1991; McChesney 1999; Siune 
2001; Eko 2000). ICASA’s failure to effectively regulate this crucial aspect of the SABC 
results in a gap to democracy and is in discord with the SABC’s important democratic role, 
which regulation should protect (Siune 1998).  
 
5.3 Antagonistic relationship 
 
While one dimension of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship is co-operative, there is 
nevertheless another dimension, amongst others, that can be categorized as antagonistic. An 
ICASA Compliance Officer and one of the longest standing members at the IBA/ICASA 
Sean Rankin, argues that the biggest challenge for the regulator in its regulation of the SABC 
is that although there exists a co-operate relationship to a certain level, it still needs to ensure  
an all round co-operative and respectful relationship. Rankin argues that the SABC has an 
“arms length” relationship with ICASA. The “Structural” explanation best explains the 
problematic nature of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship. It is not surprising that ICASA 
and the SABC’s relationship is cited by Rankin as the regulator’s key challenge in its 
regulation of the SABC. This rationale by Rankin can be supported by the “Structural” 
analysis which explains that the relationship between institutions can be an impediment to an 
institution’s effectiveness (Golding and Murdock 1997). The “Structural” explanation is thus 
a significant benchmark in concluding that this relationship is a barrier and a major challenge 
to effective regulating by ICASA.  
 
ICASA’s ability to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with the SABC’s license 
conditions is hindered by the rigid protocol that exists in the lines of communication. Rankin 
recalls an occasion when he could not visit a SABC radio station because the SABC did not 
respond to his request to visit a SABC radio station. ICASA’s Compliance Officers are 
required to liaise with the SABC’s Policy and Regulatory Affairs Department for the 
necessary permission to visit any of the SABC stations. Rankin adds that this process 
frustrates the task of the Compliance Officers. Rankin’s argument thus brings to the fore 
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another adverse factor that impacts on the level of effectiveness in ICASA’s regulating of the 
SABC, thus affirming the regulator’s ineffectiveness.  
 
When one institution is not co-operative with the other, their relationship becomes strained. 
The “Structural” explanation best explains this aspect of ICASA and the SABC’s 
relationship. This approach is premised on the belief that the relationship between institutions 
that restrict the options of individuals within those institutions, can lead to the perversion of 
the public interest (Golding and Murdock 1997). The SABC is restricting the ability of 
ICASA Compliance Officers to fully monitor it by not fully co-operating with the regulator. 
When one organisation is not co-operative with the other it breeds antagonism. The 
“Structural” explanation is evident in ICASA’s regulation of the SABC; their strained 
relationship is cited, by Rankin, as an obstacle to ICASA effectively regulating the SABC. 
Thus, the SABC’s is not fully co-operative with ICASA regarding the regulatory visits it 
needs to conduct, which is restricting the ability of ICASA Compliance Officers to fully 
monitor the SABC.  
 
This antagonistic relationship is a serious obstacle to ICASA effectively regulating the 
SABC, because it is cited by Rankin as the main challenge to the regulator’s regarding its 
mandate of the SABC. The “Structural” reason best explains the consequences of this aspect 
of their relationship; this theoretical approach contends that relationships can pervert the 
public interest. In ICASA’s case it is directly affecting its ability to fully regulate the SABC, 
ICASA and the SABC’ relationship is highly problematic and not the “norm” between a 
regulator and regulated industry, because Rankin argues that ICASA gains respect from other 
broadcasters and do not have trouble conducting monitoring visiting to them. Rankin 
contends that ICASA gains respect form E-TV and MNET and has an incredibly good 
relationship with them. Rankin adds that ICASA has no problems with other broadcasters, 
and are co-operative in terms of visits and inspections. Thus, the SABC’s and ICASA’s 
antagonistic relationship, specifically the SABC not always being co-operative with ICASA, 
is undermining its ability to effectively monitor and ensure compliance with the SABC 
license conditions. The public interest therefore, is perverted due to the relationship between 
these two institutions.  
 
5.4 The SABC’s problematic commercial funding model  
 
The SABC has a commercially driven funding model of which ICASA has not played a pro-
active role. The SABC is funded primarily by commercial sources (SABC Annual Report 
2007). In fact, press reports, interviews and the SABC Annual Report 2007 all express that 
the SABC’s commercial funding model is a problematic factor that inhibit the functioning of 
the SABC as a public service broadcaster. Interviewees, among them SABC board member 
and former IBA/ICASA councilor Nadia Bulbulia, highlight the SABC’s problematic funding 
model, she argues that the SABC’s commercial funding model is its biggest problem. The 
SABC’s Chief Executive Officer Dali Mpofu posits that the SABC’s over reliance on 
commercial funding in relation to other sources is “in my view the single most important 
issue facing the corporation and all those who care for a true public service broadcaster which 
is accountable to the public and neither inherently susceptible to commercial nor state power” 
(The SABC Annual Report 2007). The SABC’s funding model is such a topical issue that it 
is identified by its Chief Executive Officer, as a huge impediment to the SABC’s playing the 
role of a public service broadcaster and functioning free from state and commercial 
interference.  
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The SABC’s commercial funding model is a barrier to it playing its role of a public service 
broadcaster. Theories of public service broadcasting best explain the problematic nature of 
the SABC’s commercial funding model in which the theoretical framework indicates that a 
commercial funding model produces commercially driven content, interferes with the public 
service broadcaster’s editorial independence, and will predominantly cater for people with the 
highest buying power (Schudson 2003; McChesney 1999). A commercial funding model also 
treats people like consumers rather than citizens which lead to the neglect of the public 
interest (Hoynes and Croteau 2001). This has adverse implications for the health of 
democracy, because democracy requires a well informed citizenry, and a public service 
broadcaster should address all like citizens and provide them with the information that is 
needed to take part in civic life (Cardiff and Scannell 1987). Therefore, the SABC’s 
commercial funding model is a huge impediment to the intended the role of a public service 
broadcaster, as it propels it to inevitably produce profit driven programming and be highly 
vulnerable to commercial interference. It can be concluded that the SABC’s commercial 
funding model leads to the neglect of the development of a healthy citizenry, by producing 
profit-driven programming at the expense of producing vital information needed for a healthy 
citizenry. This consequently derails the SABC’s arm, hence impeding delivery of its public 
service mandate. The failure of ICASA effectively playing a pro-active role in this funding 
model, to certain a degree, contributes to this impediment.  
 
Numerous entities call on the government to increase funding so that the SABC does not 
have to rely on commercial sources of funding. The SABC Annual Report 2007 indicates that 
the SABC has been engaging Parliament and the Minister of Communications on its funding 
model. Amidst these countless debates, ICASA is “invisible”. Rankin argues that when 
ICASA’s Compliance Officers compile a report on the SABC’s programming they do take 
into consideration how the SABC’s funding affects its ability and lack thereof to produce 
programming. Ntombela-Nzimande states that the SABC invites ICASA on a panel to 
express their views on the SABC’s funding model.  Rankin and Ntombela-Nzimande’s 
statements affirm that ICASA is not pro-actively involved in the SABC’s funding model; the 
regulator just takes into consideration how the SABC’s funding affects its programming. The 
SABC’s initiative in inviting ICASA is a reflection of its lack of initiative in the SABC’s 
funding model.  
 
In terms of ICASA’s mandate regarding the SABC’s funding, it may request the SABC’s 
financial statements and also set quotas for advertising, for example, an existing quota 
demands that advertising may not exceed twelve minutes in an hour (SABC television and 
Radio licenses). Although ICASA does not have mandate with regard to the SABC’s funding 
model, the SABC’s funding model does indirectly affect the regulator’s jurisdiction of the 
SABC’s universality, accessibility, diversity of and in programming and editorial 
independence (SABC television and radio licenses; SABC Charter). The theoretical 
framework establishes that the funding of a public service broadcaster affects the ability of 
the broadcaster to deliver these key characteristics (Curran and Seaton 1997; World 
Television Council 2000). Hence, the SABC’s commercial funding model inhibits the SABC 
in delivering its public service mandate and therefore necessitates that ICASA undertake a 
pro-active role in the SABC’s funding model. 
 
Interviewees agree with this argument that ICASA should be taking a more pro-active role in 
the SABC’s funding model. Ntombela-Nzimande argues that ICASA has a responsibility to 
argue with the SABC to the fiscus, to increase government contribution to the SABC. Wits 
University Professor of Journalism Anton Harber contends that ICASA essentially should be 
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setting the ground rules for the SABC’s funding model and stating what type of public 
service broadcaster they would like to see, and the impact of the funding model on the 
industry as a whole. Harber adds that ICASA should take the independent view in the 
SABC’s funding model and host public hearings where government can attend. Former 
IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd argues that ICASA should be taking a more pro active 
role in the SABC’s funding model. Thus, interviews held for this study affirm dissatisfaction 
at ICASA’s absence of a pro-active role in the SABC’s funding model.   
 
The consequences of the SABC’s commercially driven programming, is best explained by 
critical political economy of the media. Critical political economy of the media states that 
commercially driven media influence the content and the democratic functioning of the media 
in ways that undermine the development of an informed citizenry (McChesney 1998). It can 
therefore be concluded that ICASA’s lack of pro-activeness in the SABC’s commercial 
funding model is not serving the public interest and not cultivating a healthy democracy. 
Furthermore, the regulator is not making any attempts what so ever to protect the South 
African public from the “commercial nature” of the SABC, and is thus responsible for not 
upholding the public interest. Thus, one dimension of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC can 
be characterized by a lack of initiative pro-activeness in the SABC’s problematic commercial 
funding model. Consequently ICASA is in effect passively promoting the SABC’s 
commercial impediment.   
 
5.5 “Silent” regulation 
One of the other dimensions of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC can be characterized as 
silent. The regulator is voiceless and fails to take any action in the SABC’s many 
controversies, some of which include the “blacklisting” saga, the Freedom of Expression 
Institute’s complaint, the suspensions of SABC Group Executive of News and Current 
Affairs Snuki Zikalala and SABC’s Chief Executive Officer Dali Mpofu and calls for the 
SABC board to step down. 
 
Many interviewees voice dissatisfaction at ICASA’s silence in the SABC’s controversies, and 
call on ICASA to take specific action. This section highlights the interviewees’ perspectives 
on ICASA’s “silence”, ICASA’s view on the controversies, and also presents an analytical 
perspective on ICASA’s regulatory practice of “silence”.  
 
5.5.1 The “blacklisting” saga and the Freedom of Expression’s Institute’s complaint 
In 2008 the Freedom of Expression Institute submitted a complaint to ICASA, the 
organisation called on the regulator to enforce the SABC’s license conditions because of its 
“silence” amidst the “blacklisting” saga. In the “blacklisting” saga the SABC’s was accused 
of operating a politically motivated “blacklist” to exclude controversial commentators. The 
commentators were considered to be outspoken and generally critical of President Thabo 
Mbeki. The SABC initially denied the existence of the “blacklist” and appointed the Sisulu 
Commission of Enquiry to investigate the allegations. The Sisulu Commission of Enquiry 
confirmed the existence of a “blacklist”; however the SABC failed to address the findings of 
the Commission, and also refused to release the Commission’s full report. In the complaint 
the Freedom of Expression Institute accused the SABC of violating its license conditions and 
the Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended because of the SABC’s exclusionary list.  
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ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) held a hearing to address the 
Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint. The CCC turned down the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s request to subpoena the Sisulu Commission’s report into investigations 
of “blacklisting”. The Freedom of Expression Institute requested the subpoena because the 
SABC refused to release the Sisulu Commission’s final report. The CCC also ruled that the 
Sisulu Commission may not be referred to in future proceedings at ICASA. The Freedom of 
Expression Institute was asked by the CCC to show proof that an exclusionary list impacted 
on the content that the public received, because ICASA will only judge the SABC on what is 
actually broadcast. This is indicative of ICASA not showing enough “teeth” to hold the 
SABC accountable to the findings of the Sisulu report. It is a form of passivity to not take any 
action to eliminate irregularities of editorial and programming independence at the SABC.   
Many interviewees expressed dissatisfaction at ICASA’s ruling in the Freedom of Expression 
Institute’s complaint. Skinner states that at the hearing, it seems that ICASA possessed a kind 
of fear in holding the SABC to account. Harber contends that ICASA was unable to act 
against the SABC and “was like putty and did not assert their authority”. Harber adds that the 
“SABC looks big and powerful and ICASA looks small” when in fact it should be other way 
around. Lloyd states that the Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint shows that ICASA 
seems to be narrowly defining its role by stating it can only judge the SABC on what is 
actually broadcast. Ntombela-Nzimande argues that ICASA should be pro-active and not wait 
for a complaint from citizens to get involved.  
Skinner posits that on the issue of the SABC’s Sisulu Commission, ICASA should be 
investigating the Sisulu report itself. Skinner adds that ICASA should be undertaking pro-
active investigating to ascertain whether the SABC are fulfilling their license conditions. 
Skinner furthermore argues that the Save Our SABC (SOS) coalition is of the view that 
throughout the “blacklisting” crisis, there was “deafening silence” from ICASA, when it 
should be holding the SABC to account on the Charter and license conditions. The 
interviewees therefore, affirm that ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC’s “blacklisting” 
controversy, and its ruling on the Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint, results in it 
ineffectively regulating the SABC.   
 
5.5.2 The suspensions 
 
In 2008, the SABC’s Group Executive of News and Current affairs Snuki Zikalala and the 
SABC’s Group Chief Executive Officer Dali Mpofu were suspended. A Johannesburg High 
Court Judge ruled that the SABC’s chairperson Khanyi Mkhonza, had handled the meeting in 
which Dali Mpofu was suspended, in a manner that fell short of a Director who is supposed to act 
“independently, openly, with integrity and honesty”. Amidst this controversy ICASA failed to 
make its voice heard. Interviewees express unhappiness at ICASA’s “silence” and offer 
suggestions on what the regulator should have done amidst this controversy. ICASA’s failure 
to make its presence known in this controversy, is suggestive that it has a ”don’t care a damn 
attitude” even if the SABC strategic component is in strife and could have adverse effects on 
its overall delivery as a public service broadcaster.  
 
In this controversy members of the SABC board, Executive and management publicly turned 
on one another. Ntombela-Nzimande argues that when there are “squabbles” in the public 
domain involving the SABC it should be “ICASA’s business”. Ntombela-Nzimande adds that 
amidst the SABC’s suspension controversy, ICASA should have stepped in and asked the 
SABC if the newspaper reports are correct, and if ICASA should have penalized the SABC if 
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necessary. Ntombela-Nzimande adds that ICASA should have also reminded the SABC 
management and board of their responsibility to the public and to stay focused on their 
mandate. She adds that she “does not like the regulator’s silence” and that ICASA is losing 
credibility as an authority because of its “silence”. Libby Lloyd, who is a former IBA/ICASA 
councilor, argues that ICASA should have held a meeting with the SABC, to ensure that the 
suspensions are not adversely affecting its business plan. Therefore, interviewees support that 
ICASA’s “silence” is contributing to the ineffective regulation of the SABC. 
 
5.5.3 Calls for the SABC board to step down 
 
A significant number of calls emerged for the SABC board to step down, this controversy 
unfolded in June 2008. There was a wrangle between the Parliamentary Committee on 
Communications which had passed a vote of no confidence in the SABC board, and President 
Thabo Mbeki who refused to budge in terms of dismissing the board members. Parliament 
wanted to dissolve the existing SABC board, while the President and Minister backed the 
body. Members of Parliament tabled a Bill to give them the authority to dissolve the SABC 
board. Parliament even held hearings into a change of law that would see the SABC board 
dissolved. The SABC Executive also called on the SABC board to step down immediately 
because in their view the SABC board “does not have the moral authority to continue to lead 
the SABC”. SABC staff members signed a petition calling for the removal of the SABC 
board from office. The SABC board responded and condemned the Executive members that 
signed the petition. In this controversy, Members of Parliament, the former President Thabo 
Mbeki, the SABC Executive and the SABC board were involved in a huge “public spat”. If 
an organisation’s board and Executive have a public disagreement of this nature, it will 
inevitably distract them from the organisation’s mandate and divide the organisation into 
different factions. The board and the Executive are the most important personnel of an 
organisation, due to the importance of their decision making. An organisation that has its 
most important personnel involved in a “public spat” is inevitably going to result in chaos 
amidst the organisation. Amidst this “public spat” ICASA was “silent” which is indicative of 
its refusal to take a stand and use their authority to attempt to correct the situation. This is 
also suggestive of a waste of authority and “teeth”, ICASA is thereby allowing the adverse 
factors to prevail.  
  
Interviewees expressed that ICASA should have been involved in the proposed Broadcasting 
Amendment Bill that sought to facilitate changes in the SABC board. Lloyd argues that 
ICASA should have made submissions on the Broadcasting Amendment Bill however “they 
totally stayed out of it”. Koster re-iterates this argument and contends that ICASA should 
have submitted a strong presentation when Parliament sought to amend the Broadcasting Act. 
Skinner argues that on the issue of the SABC board, the only institution taking an initiative is 
Parliament by passing out controversial bills. Skinner adds that Parliament is taking some sort 
of initiative unlike ICASA who remains “silent”. Therefore, interviewees support the view 
that ICASA should have assumed involvement in this controversy and not remained “silent”.  
        
5.5.4 ICASA’s regulatory practice of silence   
 
ICASA has a regulatory practice of “silence”; its view is that that the SABC controversies do 
not fall within its mandate. ICASA Compliance Officer Sean Rankin argues that the SABC 
controversies only concern the regulator if it is a license contravention otherwise it is “none 
of ICASA’s business”. Rankin furthermore states that any allegations about the SABC are 
noted in ICASA’s Compliance function. Rankin’s statement is problematic because it shows 
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that ICASA is limiting its regulatory functions role to just measuring compliance with the 
quotas, as outlined in the SABC’s license conditions. Rankin’s statement also shows that 
ICASA is not willing to get pro-actively involved in the SABC’s controversies, thus the 
regulator is narrowly defining its role.  
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute accused ICASA of having a “deadly silence” and 
neglecting their duty, amidst the SABC’s suspensions controversy. ICASA’s Chairperson 
Paris Mashile responded to these accusations saying it is an internal matter and they wish the 
SABC well in resolving it. Paris Mashile’s statement confirms that ICASA is not willing to 
play a pro-active role in the SABC’s controversies, even of it could have a detrimental affect 
on the SABC’s performance. The SABC’s suspensions controversy was a significant issue 
that could have affected the “health” of the SABC. The Minister of Communications along 
with many of the opposition parties publicly expressed great concern at the suspensions. 
Executive Director of the National Association of Broadcasters and former Head of ICASA’s 
Monitoring and Complaints Unit, Johann Koster argues that the problem with ICASA is that 
it does not make its voice heard in the SABC’s controversies. ICASA refuses to take any 
action in the SABC controversies and also does not express its views when the controversy 
emerges. This shows that ICASA has a regulator practice that can be characterized as 
“silence”.  
 
ICASA does not fulfill its regulatory mandate to a certain degree because of its regulatory 
practice of “silence”. ICASA is mandated to protect the integrity and viability of the SABC, 
and ensure that it is editorially independent. Although Rankin states that the SABC’s 
controversies are none of “the regulator’s business” unless it is a violation of license 
condition, many of the SABC debacles do involve the SABC’s license conditions. The 
“blacklisting” saga does concern the license condition that requires the SABC news to be 
editorially independent and meet the highest standards of journalism. The “blacklisting” saga 
birthed accusations against the SABC of self-censorship and a lack of freedom to enjoy 
journalistic creativity. The Sisulu Commission of Enquiry, appointed by the SABC to 
investigate the allegations of “blacklisting”, found that there was a "phenomenon of self-
censorship" and that Snuki Zikalala used a form of exclusion that was not sustainable. The 
suspensions of the SABC’s two Executives could have affected the business performance and 
financial “health” of the SABC. The SABC’s business performance and financial “health” do 
fall within the ICASA’s mandate to “protect the viability of the SABC” (Electronic 
Communications Act 2005). 
 
The SABC’s controversies also concern ICASA’s mandate to “protect the integrity of the 
SABC” (Electronic Communications Act 2005). The SABC’s numerous debacles have 
severely damaged the image of the public service broadcaster, one view is that it is an 
“Mbeki mouthpiece” (Empire in Feb 2008).  ICASA could have been pro-active and taken its 
own steps to assess the truthfulness of some of these accusations, such as conduct its own 
investigation. The Media Monitoring Project conducted research on the SABC’s news, it 
found that not there was no political bias, however it identified that the use of a single source 
per story resulted in limited diversity and balance (Mail and Guardian online in Aug 2008). 
The research conducted by the Media Monitoring Project makes findings on issues that 
ICASA are mandated to regulate, so one questions why ICASA has never made important 
findings similar to this. It is clear that ICASA is not pro-actively and effectively regulating 
the SABC.  
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The public interest theory of regulation is useful is explaining this “silent” dimension of 
ICASA’s regulation of the SABC. This approach states that regulators are created to 
essentially protect democracy (Golding and Murdock 1997). Some of the SABC’s debacles 
affect one of the SABC’s important public service broadcaster characteristics, namely its 
obligation to be editorially independent (Curran 1991; McChesney 1999). In spite of this, 
ICASA is not pro-active in protecting the SABC’s editorial and programming independence, 
and remains “silent”. ICASA’s “silence” therefore is not contributing towards the protection 
of the SABC’s democratic role (Siune 1998). The integrity of the SABC continues to be “in 
total free fall”. Therefore, ICASA’s regulatory practice of “silence” in the SABC’s 
controversies is hindering ICASA from effectively regulating the SABC so that it plays the 
role of a public service broadcaster. 
 
5.6 “Troubled” regulator 
 
ICASA’s institutional weaknesses have contributed its formation of a “troubled” regulator 
and hence a weakening in its ability to effectively regulate the SABC. The “perverted” public 
interest theory of regulation provides essential insight in identifying and explicating the 
factors that distort the public interest, and thus undermining the regulator’s ability to be 
effective. This approach exposes the failures of regulation and gives reasons why it occurred, 
through the use of Influence models, namely “Instrumental”, “Structural” and “Capture’ 
explanations (Golding and Murdock 1997).  
 
The characteristics located in this theory for an independent regulator are used as the 
yardstick to measure ICASA’s level of institutional strength and expose the hindrances to its 
effectiveness. The theoretical framework’s standards for an effective regulator include the 
following, it must be independent from powerful interests in society, have a participatory and 
transparent appointment process, adequately skilled personnel, public accountability 
mechanisms and adequate funding. In measuring ICASA’s institutional standards against that 
of the “perverted” public interest theory, it falls short in that it lacks independence, has a 
“politicized” appointment process, inadequately skilled membership, “politicized” and 
inefficient accountability mechanisms as well as insufficient funding. Hence, a “troubled” 
and ineffective regulator.  
 
5.6.1 Lack of independence 
An independent regulator should be independent from government ministries, so that it is 
able to enjoy its independence in reality (Kupe 2003). ICASA does not enjoy independence 
from government ministries because it is accountable to Minister of Communications and 
Minister of Finance, both of whom are political appointees. The finances must be decided by 
these Ministers (ICASA Act 2000 as amended). The consequences of the problematic nature 
of ICASA’s independence can best be affirmed by the “Instrumental” explanation wherein it 
indicates that a perversion of the public interest may arise due to “Instrumental” reasons of 
regulators being uniquely vulnerable to political pressures (Golding and Murdock 1997). 
ICASA is especially vulnerable to political pressure from the Minister of Communications 
because s/he is vested with crucial roles in the council’s appointment, performance 
agreements, performance bonuses, firing of employees and finances matters. ICASA 
councillors are also accountable to the Minister of Communications with regards to their 
performance and determining their performance bonuses.  
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The Ministers crucial roles at ICASA are not in conformity with the theoretical framework 
that requires an independent regulator to be independent from government ministries. On the 
contrary, the Minister of Communications is given an immense amount of power at ICASA. 
Since, the Minister of Communications, can set performance targets, determine councillor’s 
performance bonuses, evaluate councillors, have the final say in the appointment of 
councillors, it is unrealistic for ICASA to be able to enjoy its independence. An independent 
regulator must be able to enjoy its independence in reality (Hutchison 1999). This 
institutional weakness at ICASA, of not being able to enjoy its independence in reality, could 
be undermining effective regulation.  
  
The problematic nature of ICASA’s independence is a topical issue. The majority of 
interviewees and many press articles suggest that ICASA’s independence is in fact eroded 
due to the Minister of Communications role at the regulator. The Minister’s involvement in 
these areas are said to compromise ICASA’s independence because, she is a political 
appointee and yet performs key roles at ICASA. The Mail and Guardian online argues that 
the Minister’s role in the appointment process and her power to "performance manage" the 
Councillors, all amounts to “a reduction in the autonomy of ICASA” (July 2006). These 
sources also point to ICASA’s institutional weakness in that it suffers a lack of independence, 
affirming an inability to regulate effectively.   
 
The theoretical framework establishes that a regulator that does not enjoy its independence in 
reality is illegitimate and is unable to be effective. Within the context of this framework it can 
be said that ICASA is illegitimate and unable to be effective. Other interviewees also suggest 
that ICASA’s problematic independence is the reason for ICASA’s ineffective regulation of 
the SABC. Wits University Professor of Journalism Anton Harber argues that ICASA’s 
regulation of the SABC is problematic due to its lack of independence. Harber adds that 
ICASA has not done anything noticeably independent for a while and are passive, so they are 
in affect, letting the Minister of Communications play a greater role at the SABC than she 
should be. Harber argues that an example of this passivity includes the issue of the SABC’s 
Shareholders Compact; ICASA should have assessed this Compact and check its conflict 
with the Broadcasting Act 1999 as amended.   
 
Harber’s argument that ICASA should have taken some sort of action in the SABC’s 
Shareholder Compact, is in conformity with the theoretical framework. The theoretical 
framework establishes that a public service broadcaster must be institutionally independent 
from the state so that it is able to enjoy editorial independence (Eko 2000; ARTICLE 19 
2002).  ICASA’s is mandated to ensure that the SABC is editorially independent (SABC 
television and radio license). However the SABC’s Shareholder Compact affects the ability 
of the SABC to be editorially independent. The SABC Annual Report 2007 reports the details 
of the SABC’s Shareholder Compact. The Compact stipulates that the SABC board is 
accountable to the Minister of Communications, in terms of the SABC’s Corporate Plan that 
sets out the SABC’s key performance areas. Therefore, the Minster of Communications is 
vested with the important role of evaluating the SABC’s performance. This is an erosion of 
the SABC’s independence because a public service broadcaster must be entrusted to an 
organisation that enjoys enough independence to prevent political and bureaucratic 
interference (World Television Council 2000). Unfortunately, the SABC does not enjoy 
enough independence due to political and bureaucratic interference wherein the SABC board 
is accountable to the Minister of Communications, who is a political appointee, and therefore 
the public service broadcaster is particularly vulnerable to pressure from the Minister.  
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It can be deduced that the SABC institutional independence is compromised by its 
Shareholder Compact, this results in the SABC’s editorial independence being threatened. 
ICASA is mandated to ensure the editorial independence of the SABC; however, it did not 
take any action regarding the Compact. Perhaps ICASA did not take any action against the 
Minister of Communications as a result of fear, due to the important roles the Minister plays 
at ICASA. It is therefore vitally important for a regulator to be independent from government 
ministries, so it is able to take independent stands when needed to, and not be fearful of what 
the Minister of Communications could possibly do to at regulator.       
     
Interviewees also authenticate this argument that the Minister of Communications’ role at 
ICASA could lead to the regulator operating in fear of taking any actions that might displease 
the Minister. Koster argues that the Minister’s involvement at ICASA could result in it not 
regulating in the “public interest” and rather in the “Ministers interest”. Koster adds that 
ICASA councillors could also operate in fear of their performance bonus being affected. 
Therefore, the perversion of the public interest could prevail at ICASA because its 
councillors are vulnerable to political pressure from the Minister of Communications, and 
could perform out of fear and in favour of the Minister as it could possibly impact on their 
performance bonus or result in backlash.    
 
ICASA’s eroded independence could result in it the non-representation of the public interest 
and it being vulnerable to “capture by the SABC. A regulator’s independent institutional 
location ensures that it represents the public interest and not the powerful interests 
(ARTICLE 19 2006). The perversion of the public interest can emerge due to “Capture” 
occurring, which results in a regulator systematically favouring the private interests of 
regulated parties and systematically ignores the public interest (Golding and Murdock 1997). 
The Minister of Communications prominent role at ICASA could result in it representing the 
Minister’s interests at the expense of the public interest, due to fear and vulnerability to 
political pressure.  
 
Interviewees suggest that the public interest is being perverted because ICASA is trying to 
please government. Lloyd argues that “ICASA is appeasing both the broadcasters and 
government and the public is getting neglected in it all”. Lloyd adds that the ICASA is scared 
of taking positions seen as opposing government, evident in it not making any submissions 
on the latest amendment Broadcasting Bill about the SABC removal clauses. Lloyd’s 
argument has substance in that this proposed SABC removal clauses states that a SABC 
board member can be removed from office if they are in conflict with the SABC Charter. 
ICASA is required to monitor and enforce compliance with the SABC Charter. The proposed 
removal clauses involved the SABC Charter, yet ICASA did not make a submission or make 
its voice heard.    
 
ICASA could systematically favour the SABC by not taking a “firm stand” when necessary, 
this could lead to it being “Captured” by the SABC, out of fear of the government. Therefore, 
a possible factor undermining ICASA’s ability to regulate the SABC effectively is a lack of 
independence in reality which is leading to the public interest being perverted, an illegitimate 
regulator and possible “Capture” by the SABC.  
 
5.6.2 “Politicized” appointment process 
Ideally, appointments to the council of an independent regulator, should be conducted 
through a participatory and transparent process (ARTICLE 19 2006; Kupe 2003). ICASA’s 
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appointment process is required to be characterized by public participation and transparency 
(ICASA Act 2000 as amended). The ICASA Act 2000 details ICASA’s appointment process as 
follows, the Minister of Communications makes recommendations from a list of suitable 
candidates given by the National Assembly, if the National Assembly is not satisfied by the 
recommendations they can ask the Minister to review the decision taken. When the National 
Assembly approves of the Minister’s recommendations, the Minister appoints the chairperson 
(The ICASA Act 2000). This process creates opportunity for ICASA’s appointment process to 
be highly “politicized” and hold possible erosions to its independence in that, the Minister of 
Communications is a political appointee, whose prominent role can possibly manipulate the 
process to one’s favour. Although the public, National Assembly and technical experts are 
also required to participate in the appointment process, it is the Minister of Communications 
who inevitably appoints the councilors and chairperson.  
 
As already mentioned, the Minister of Communications could appoint personnel based on the 
“Minister’s interest” rather than the “public interest”. ICASA’s “politicized” appointment 
process can be explained in the light of the “Structural” explanation. The “Structural” 
analysis contends that political entities can use the appointments to reward and retain the 
political support of important regulated industries (Golding and Murdock 1997). The Minister 
of Communications and political parties within Parliament could appoint the people that the 
regulated industry approves of, in an attempt to retain political support from the industries. 
This inevitably perverts the public interest for selfish political gains.  
 
The “politicized” nature of ICASA’s appointment process is highlighted by press reports and 
numerous interviewees. Press reports and interviewees suggest that ICASA’s appointment 
process represents political interests and does not remove all the power away from the ruling 
party. The Mail and Guardian online in June 2006 argued that ICASA councilors are 
appointed and managed in a way that diminishes their independence. Lloyd argues that 
ICASA’s appointment process has limited its independence. Interviewees also argue, among 
them Koster and Lloyd, that ICASA’s appointment process has potential for political parties 
to horse trade. Harber argues that horse trading between political parties does not appoint the 
“best people for the job”.  Thus, the “politicized” nature of ICASA’s appointment process is a 
very topical issue and recognized as problematic and an institutional weakness. ICASA’s 
“politicized” appointment process has potential for political horse trading, which means that 
the “best” people for the job would not be appointed.   
 
ICASA’s “politicized” appointment process affects its ability to effectively regulate the 
SABC, because the theoretical framework established that a regulator’s appointment process 
can affect the independence of a regulator and thus its effectiveness (ARTICLE 19 2006).  
Interviewees, among them Harber and Skinner contend that ICASA’s problematic 
appointment process is undermining its ability to regulate the SABC effectively. Harber and 
Skinner add that ICASA’s “silent” voice in the many SABC debacles is due to it appointing 
more “political” people rather than councilors who can assert an active role. Therefore, 
ICASA’s “politicized” appointment process could be resulting in ICASA not possessing the 
“best” people and specialized skills that is required to effectively regulate the SABC. 
 
The theoretical framework established that a political appointee would not serve the public 
interest and would be especially vulnerable to political pressure. In order for ICASA to 
effectively regulate the SABC so that it functions as public service broadcaster, it is crucial 
that the “best people for the job” are appointed. The “Instrumental” explanation contends that 
when personnel within a regulator are vulnerable to political pressures, the public interest is 
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perverted. Thus, ICASA’s “politisized” appointment process could be appointing people that 
would be highly vulnerable to political pressure because political appointees are particularly 
vulnerable to pressure from the people that influenced their appointment, and possibly would 
have to perform “political” favors for them.  
 
5.6.3  Inadequately skilled personnel 
An independent regulator should be equipped with people that are suitably qualified to 
provide the regulator with the necessary knowledge to effectively regulate the various 
industries (ARTICLE 19 2006). The majority of interviewees, press reports and the ICASA 
Annual Report 2007 confirm that ICASA is inadequately skilled and has difficulty in 
retaining its skilled people. A communication lawyer Lisa Thornton argues in April 2006 in 
the Mail and Guardian online, that "ICASA is 100% incapable of regulating pricing because 
it simply doesn’t have the knowledge or the staff. Thornton’s statement reveals that ICASA 
does not possess the necessary skills to perform effectively. The ICASA Annual Report 2007 
affirms that ICASA has “human capital challenges”. It can therefore be said that ICASA’s 
effectiveness is undermined because it is not equipped with enough skilled people. Press 
reports, interviewees and the ICASA Annual Report 2007 reveal that ICASA’s lack of skills 
leads to damaged work, it not adhering to time frames, canning projects, and an inability to 
fulfill its mandate. This can be seen as an institutional weakness which is not in accordance to 
the required standards mentioned, that an independent regulator should have adequately 
skilled personnel.   
 
ICASA’s high vulnerability to staff “poaching” results in the regulator suffering a lack of 
skills. Interviewees, press reports and ICASA itself, confirms ICASA’s problem with staff 
“poaching”. Many interviewees among them former IBA/ICASA councilor and current 
SABC board member Nadia Bulbulia, ICASA councilor  Kobus Van Rooyen and Rankin, 
argue that ICASA’s most competent staff with sound institutional memory are constantly 
being “poached”. Lisa Thornton, a communications lawyer argues in April 2006, in the Mail 
and Guardian online, that ICASA serves as a training ground for talent that is often “poached 
by cash-flush industry giants such as MTN and Vodacom”. The ICASA Annual Report 2007 
also confirms that ICASA’s experiencing challenges with “poaching”. Van Rooyen contends 
that the regulator fears the “poaching” of its senior and most experienced staff. Thus, 
ICASA’s personnel are highly vulnerable to staff “poaching” and when “poaching” occurs it 
negatively affects the performance of ICASA. ICASA’s inadequately skilled personnel and 
staff “poaching” are having dire consequences on the organisation and its effectiveness. This 
is not surprising since the theoretical framework establishes that a regulator requires the 
necessary skills to be effective (ARTICLE 19 2006).  
 
The “Instrumental” explanation best explains ICASA’s problem with staff “poaching”. The 
“Instrumental” explanation argues that the public interest can be distorted through the future 
orientation of personnel seeking to safe guard their employment opportunities in the regulated 
industry (Golding and Murdock 1997). ICASA’s vulnerability to staff “poaching” could 
distort the public interest in that staff could make decisions based on their own “future 
employment interests”. ICASA’s staff could seek to safeguard future employment 
opportunities and as a result could neglect the “public interest”. 
  
It can be concluded that ICASA is not equipped with the adequate skills it needs to fulfill its 
mandate, and is therefore perceived as a “troubled organisation”. The skilled people that 
ICASA does posses are speedily “poached” by the industry, resulting in a “severely 
 
 
81
weakened organisation”. The theoretical framework establishes that a regulator requires 
adequate skills to effectively regulate (ARTICLE 19 2006). ICASA’s lack of skills is 
affecting the ability of the regulator to effectively regulate the various industries. Former 
IBA/ICASA councilor Libby Lloyd posits that ICASA requires more skills such as people 
that are equipped to conduct economic analysis. Lloyd adds that with skills such as economic 
analysis ICASA would be enabled to “really question the SABC on where they are spending 
their money”. ICASA requires more skills to effectively regulate the SABC so it can really 
hold the SABC accountable and regulate it in the public interest.   
 
5.6.4. “Politicized” and “inefficient” accountability mechanisms  
 
An independent regulator’s accountability mechanisms should not undermine its 
independence (Kupe 2003; ARTICLE 19 2006). ICASA has an accountability mechanism 
that compromises its independence and thus effectiveness.  
 
ICASA has a “politicized” accountability mechanism. ICASA’s councilors are accountable to 
the Minister of Communications with regards to the fulfillment of performance targets of 
which the Minister also determines their performance bonuses (The ICASA Act 2000 as 
amended). ICASA’s reporting line to the Minister of Communications is problematic because 
this is a political appointee. The “Instrumental” explanation best explains the problematic 
nature of this accountability mechanism. The “Instrumental” explanation contends that the 
perversion of the public interest can transpire due to regulators being uniquely vulnerable to 
political pressures (Golding and Murdock 1997). There is a high possibility that the Minister 
of Communications could pressurize ICASA’s councilors. The Minister could pressurize 
ICASA councilors to perform a duty that is not in the public interest, or attempt to assess the 
regulator according to selfish political and economic interests, and not according to the public 
interest.  
 
Interviewees also suggest that ICASA’s reporting line to the Minister of Communications 
undermines the regulator’s independence. Koster is one of the interviewees that highlight the 
problematic nature of ICASA reporting to politically motivated people running the country; 
the councilors could operate in fear of backlash. Koster adds that ICASA should rather report 
to Parliament and not to a specific Minister. Lloyd states that ICASA’s performance 
agreements with the Minister of Communications are problematic because this could lead to 
councilors operating “in fear of their performance bonus being affected”. Therefore, 
ICASA’s reporting line to the Minister of Communications is not independent and thus 
problematic. ICASA is highly susceptible to political pressure from the Minister. There is 
also a high possibility that ICASA’s councilors would succumb to the political pressure as 
their performance bonuses could be affected. Thus, ICASA has an accountability mechanism 
that lacks independence and hinders it effectiveness.  
 
An independent regulator should have accountability mechanisms in place, that are 
characterised by openness and transparency (ARTICLE 19 2006). ICASA is not transparent 
and open to the public regarding important regulatory decisions and matters, and thus ICASA 
is not sufficiently accountable to the public.   
 
ICASA’s inaccessible website confirms that ICASA is not openly and transparently 
accountable to the public. The July 2007 issue of the Media magazine nominated ICASA’s 
website as “Not the medium of the month”, as the magazine received several complaints 
concerning the websites lack of regulatory information. The Media magazine reported that 
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“the ICASA’s website should be the local hub of information related to broadcasting 
regulatory issues but instead it is only a source of frustration”. ICASA’s website is crucial in 
showing the public ICASA’s regulatory activities, and therefore that ICASA is accountable to 
the public. If the public are not aware of the latest regulatory activities of ICASA, then it is 
not openly and transparently accountable. The inaccessible state of ICASA’s website gives 
the public the impression that ICASA is non-transparent and “secretive”. The Media 
magazine also reported that “many people have lost faith in the authority”. ICASA is not 
sufficiently accountable to the public which hinders the accessibility to vital regulatory 
information that the public have a right to.  
 
The theoretical framework establishes that an independent and thus effective regulator should 
have accountability mechanisms that are open, transparent and independent. ICASA’s 
“politicized” accountability mechanism and “inefficient” website undermine its independence 
and thus effectiveness, which does not conform to these required standards for an 
independent regulator. 
 
5.6.5. “Controversial” mandate and power 
 
An independent regulator should be vested with enough mandate and power so that it can be 
effective (ARTICLE 19 2006). Legislation regarding ICASA’s regulatory role needs serious 
clarification. The SABC Charter and license conditions show that many of the SABC 
controversies do fall within ICASA’s mandate, like the “blacklisting” saga and withdrawal of 
the Thabo Mbeki documentary. However ICASA chooses to remain “silent” amidst these 
controversies, and limits their regulatory role to, as Rankin states, quantitative measuring of 
genres, language programming and so on. The fact that legislation requires ICASA to protect 
the SABC’s editorial independence and it failed to take any action in the “blacklisting” saga, 
shows that legislation is not clear enough regarding ICASA’s regulatory role.  
 
ICASA’s unclear mandate and power is highlighted by some interviewees. Bloom and Lloyd 
attribute the vagueness of the SABC Charter and license conditions, as the reason for 
ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC’s debacles. Lloyd adds “it is not certain what ICASA could 
have done in the SABC’s debacles because the law is vague and ICASA can argue that it is 
not their responsibility”. On the contrary, other interviewees argue that ICASA does have 
definite mandate to get involved in the SABC’s controversies. Ntombela- Nzimande argues 
that “ICASA does not appreciate the legal “teeth” it has to address the SABC’s issues. 
Whether or not ICASA has sufficient mandate and power is a controversial issue. Most of the 
interviewees suggest that ICASA is vested with strong mandate and power to perform its 
functions effectively. Koster argues that ICASA does not utilize the strong mandate and 
power that it possesses.  
 
ICASA’s mandate and power is a controversial issue and thus needs clarification so that it is 
able to effectively regulate the SABC so that it functions as a public service broadcaster. 
ICASA’s mandate also needs serious clarification because ICASA’s narrow interpretation of 
its mandate is not helping the SABC function as a public service broadcaster. This lack of 
clarity in mandate also leaves space for one to evade its responsibility. The SABC’s tarnished 
image as a public service broadcaster suggests that the SABC is a shadow of what a public 
service broadcaster should be. A public service broadcaster has a crucial democratic role and 
needs regulation to protect this role (Siune 1998). If the SABC is going to fulfill its 
democratic role and function as a public service broadcaster ICASA’s mandate and power 
needs serious clarification.  
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5.6.6 Lack of independent and adequate funding 
 
An independent regulator should be independently funded so that its independence is not 
compromised (Golding and Murdock 1997; ARTICLE 19 2006). ICASA is not independently 
funded because it is financed from money allocated by Parliament and may receive other 
money agreed upon between the Minister of Communications and Minister of Finance 
(ICASA Act 2000 as amended). This legislation poses possible erosions for ICASA’s 
independence, hence its effectiveness. Parliament itself is not independent and consists of 
various political parties and these two Ministers are political appointees. 
 
A regulator that is not independently funded is exposed to improper interference (Golding 
and Murdock 1997; ARTICLE 19 2006). ICASA does not conform to this required standard 
and accordingly Parliament and the two Ministers could possibly subject ICASA to 
inappropriate interference. Interviewees, among them Rankin, also highlight ICASA’s lack of 
financial independence.  
 
The “Structural” explanation best alludes to ICASA’s problematic funding model. This 
approach argues that the relationship between institutions that restrict the options of the 
individuals who make decisions within those institutions does in fact pervert the public 
interest (Golding and Murdock 1997). Parliament and the government ministries could 
restrict the options of ICASA’s personnel because they could operate in fear of offending the 
Ministers, because its funding is at stake. Lloyd re-iterates this argument and states that 
ICASA’s financial independence needs to be upheld in reality otherwise “ICASA is 
perpetually going to be in a position for their budget to be cut if they do anything unpopular”. 
ICASA’s lack of independent funding makes the regulator highly susceptible to political 
pressure and interference, which results in a perversion of the public interest.  
 
Press reports, all interviewees and the ICASA’s Annual Report 2007 confirm that ICASA is 
not adequately funded. An independent regulator should be adequately funded to perform 
“credible, effective and efficient regulation” (Kupe 2003:6). ICASA’s inadequate funding is 
having calamitous effects on the organisation, which is not surprising, the rationale in the 
theoretical framework established that an insufficiently funded regulator cannot perform 
effectively (Kupe 2003:6). Interviews, press reports and the ICASA Annual Report 2007 
indicate that ICASA’s insufficient funding and capacity is having dire consequences on the 
regulator. They altogether suggest that insufficiency results in the regulator opting out of 
court fights with big operators, staff “poaching”, damaged work, not adhering to time frames, 
having less experts that it requires, canning projects, and an inability to fulfil its mandate. 
ICASA’s inadequate capacity to fight legal battles is suggestive of its institutional weakness 
and, in particular, perverts the public interest. Insufficient capacity to fight legal battles, 
according to the “Structural” explanation, perverts the public interest, because the regulator is 
at a disadvantage when arguing cases and the party with the most resources triumphs in most 
cases (Golding and Murdock 1997).  
ICASA’s insufficient funds also affect its ability to “effectively, credibly and efficiently” 
regulate the SABC. ICASA’s insufficient funding, according to interviewees, press reports 
and the ICASA Annual Report 2007, is negatively affecting the ICASA’s regulation of the 
SABC. The ICASA’s Annual Report 2007 shows that ICASA conducted the least amount of 
visits and compiled the least amount of reports on the SABC, as compared to community and 
commercial broadcasters. Rankin ascribes this “neglect” of the SABC to a human resources 
problem. The magnitude of the SABC’s services requires a greater amount of human 
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resources as compared to the magnitude of the other broadcasters. Interviewees, among them 
Bulbulia, Rankin and Bloom, also suggest that a lack of funding is the reason why ICASA’s 
regulation of the SABC is ineffective. Interviewees, which include, Ntombela-Nzimande and 
Skinner, attribute ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC debacles to the regulator not being 
sufficiently capacitated and resourced. Harber argues that “ICASA is swamped and if they 
can ignore a problem they will, it is a kind of an enforced passivity”. 
Therefore, insufficient funding is undermining ICASA’s ability to regulate the SABC and 
results in the SABC being “neglected” in terms of visits and compliance reports, which 
results in the public interest profoundly distorted. The “neglect” of the SABC is essentially a 
“neglect” of the public interest, since a public service broadcaster’s primary mandate is to 
serve the public interest (Siune 1998). 
ICASA’S insufficient funding furthermore makes it ineffective in its regulation of the SABC 
because it is, consequently, not equipped to produce quality programming reports. The SABC 
often question the methodology that ICASA employs in its programming reports. Rankin 
contends that the SABC objected to “ICASA’s Monitoring Report on SABC Television 
services 2006”. Lloyd states that the SABC questioned the methodology, correctness and 
content of this report, and ICASA agreed to issue an addendum to it because of factual 
inaccuracies. This Monitoring report undertaken by the regulator is an illustration of the 
adverse effect of ICASA’s insufficient funding.  
 
This Monitoring report is a fair attempt by ICASA to monitor and enforce the SABC’s 
television license conditions, however the report is plagued by factual inaccuracies and 
methodology flaws, which can be attributed to a lack of funding. Rankin argues that ICASA 
is under funded and under capacitated in its ability to effectively regulate the SABC. Lloyd 
posits that “the Monitoring Report on SABC Television services 2006 that was challenged by 
the SABC on the basis of methodology and factual inaccuracies shows that ICASA’s capacity 
to be able to monitor the SABC needs to be addressed”. These statements reveal that 
ICASA’s insufficient funding is hindering its ability to produce quality programming reports. 
Rankin posits that the SABC begin to question ICASA when it points out issues on the non- 
fulfillment of its public service mandate. ICASA’s attempts of monitoring the SABC, in this 
case is to a certain degree fruitless due to insufficient funds. The SABC is thus able to 
challenge ICASA, even though this report finds breaches of licenses. So ICASA is unable to 
take action against the SABC for the breaches of licenses that are evident in this report, 
because of flawed methodology.  
 
Therefore, ICASA’s insufficient funding and under capacitation, results in it failure to 
execute “credible, effective and efficient regulation”.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzed ICASA’s regulatory practices regarding the SABC, the various 
dimensions of ICASA and the SABC’s relationship and ICASA’s organisational weaknesses, 
through employing a combination of complementary theories, critical political economy of 
the media, theories of regulation as well as public service broadcasting. The chapter analyzed 
ICASA’s regulatory practices, ICASA’s role in the SABC’s commercial funding model, 
ICASA and the SABC’s antagonistic relationship, ICASA’s regulatory practice of “silence” 
as well as ICASA’s status as an independent and thus effective regulator.  
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                                       Chapter 6 
 
                                              Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study embarked on a critical analysis of the level of effectiveness of ICASA’s regulation 
of the SABC, so that it plays its role of a public service broadcaster. The research questions 
sought to determine actions taken and not taken by ICASA to ensure that the SABC performs 
as a public service broadcaster in the public interest. Secondly the factors that might 
undermine ICASA’s ability to effectively regulate the SABC, and lastly ways in which 
ICASA can be strengthened to be more effective.  
 
6.2 “Toothless” regulator  
 
The various characteristics required for an independent regulator can be regarded as the 
numerous “teeth” required for an independent and thus effective regulator. These 
characteristics or “teeth” enmesh to deliver effective regulation, without these characteristics 
or “teeth” the regulator cannot deliver effective regulation. An ineffective regulator is 
considered a “toothless” regulator instead of a “watchdog” of a democratic society. 
 
Regulators seek to protect citizens and can be perceived as “watchdogs” for a democratic 
society, the public interest theory of regulation contends that regulators protect the general 
welfare of society in the face of private corporations (Golding and Murdock 1997). In order 
for a regulator to be a “watchdog” for a democratic society it is required to be effective, this 
effectiveness can be achieved by an “independent” regulator. An “independent” regulator 
should have specific characteristics namely, guarantees of independence, a transparent and 
participatory appointment process, qualified and independent personnel, accountability 
mechanisms, sufficient mandate and power, and lastly adequate and independent funding.  
 
The study finds that ICASA has “weak teeth”, can be considered a “toothless regulator” and 
sometimes fails to show more “teeth”. The study finds that ICASA possesses some “weak 
teeth” therefore various aspects of its “teeth” needs be improved so that it becomes an 
effective regulator. ICASA can increase its effectiveness and therefore strengthen its “teeth” 
by enhancing its independence in reality, having a less perceived “politicized” appointment 
process, more skilled personnel, less “politicized” accountability mechanisms, and by a 
clarification of its mandate and power.  
 
The study’s assessment of ICASA’s “teeth” establishes that the single biggest and definitive 
factor for ICASA’s ineffective regulation of the SABC is inadequate funding. Inadequate 
funding is amongst its weakest “teeth” that is evidently affecting ICASA’s ability to 
effectively regulate the SABC so that functions as a public service broadcaster. Interviews, 
press reports and the ICASA Annual Report 2007 altogether show that ICASA’s regulation 
of the SABC is “suffering” and being “neglected” due to insufficient funding.  An increase in 
funding would allow ICASA to employ more staff on a full time basis to monitor the SABC, 
upgrade its monitoring equipment to be able to fully monitor the SABC license conditions, 
have a stand alone department monitoring the SABC, produce methodologically sound 
monitoring reports of SABC television, conduct more visits and compile more reports. 
Therefore, ICASA is unable to effectively regulate the SABC so that it plays the role of a 
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public service broadcaster, primarily because of a considerable lack of funding. Thus, 
ICASA’s funding can be regarded as one of ICASA’s “weak” teeth that are affecting its 
performance. Insufficient funding is also contributing to ICASA being a “toothless” 
regulator, because the regulator does not have the financial “muscle” to enable it to 
effectively monitor and enforce the SABC’s license conditions. The biggest factor 
contributing to ICASA’s ineffective regulation of the SABC is inadequate funding and is 
hindering the regulator from performing “credible, effective and efficient regulation” of the 
SABC (Kupe 2003:6).  
 
ICASA’s lack of funding is resulting in a “domino effect” on some of ICASA’s other “teeth”. 
ICASA’s inadequate funding is also resulting in ICASA’s inability to acquire suitably 
qualified members, retain the skill it already possesses and maximize its mandate and power. 
Interviewee, Wits University Professor of Journalism Anton Harber, argues that ICASA 
“does not have enough power because it is not given enough resources to be able to exercise 
its power, the suspicion is that they have deliberately starved ICASA of resources on order to 
weaken its authority”. Thus, ICASA’s funding seriously needs to be strengthened so that it 
can effectively regulate the SABC.  
 
There are occasions when ICASA fails to show more “teeth”. Numerous interviewees declare 
that ICASA’s problem in effectively regulating the SABC lies with its failure to enforce the 
SABC’s regulations. Harber posits “it seems that ICASA has shown itself to be ‘toothless’ in 
enforcing the SABC’s license conditions and regulations”. Former Head of ICASA’s 
Monitoring and Complaints Unit Johann Koster, argues that communication is a major part of 
enforcement, and ICASA has never been strong on communication due to under funding. 
Koster’s argument suggests that ICASA is unable to enforce the SABC’s license condition 
because it is weak in communication, which is due to under funding.  Therefore, ICASA 
needs to show more teeth in enforcing the SABC’s license conditions; however its “weak 
tooth”, namely funding, is affecting its ability to do so, this results in it being perceived as a 
“toothless regulator”. 
 
ICASA’s status as a “toothless regulator” is primarily linked to the regulator’s insufficient 
funding. Insufficient funding is the main reason for the ICASA’s “toothless” regulator status. 
Press reports suggest that ICASA’s insufficient funding is recognized publicly by 
government, Parliament, the industry and the regulator itself (The Mail and Guardian online: 
Oct 2006; The Media: Dec 2006). However there could be another explanation as to why 
ICASA is a “toothless” regulator of the SABC, perhaps a fear or a lack of will. Coordinator 
of the Save Our SABC (SOS) coalition Kate Skinner contends that “despite ICASA being 
under funded and under capacitated they lack political will, because other countries have far 
less resources than ICASA and are more proactive than them”. Fear and a lack of will are 
cited by many interviewees, including Koster, Lloyd and Skinner, as the possible reason for 
the regulator’s “silence” in the numerous SABC controversies.  
 
Therefore, it is clear that ICASA is a “toothless” regulator, which has “weak” teeth and often 
fails to show more “teeth” when required.  
 
6.3 ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC  
 
One dimension of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC is effective to a certain level and 
contributes to the SABC performing as a public service broadcaster within this level. This is 
evident in ICASA’s regulatory practice of issuing license conditions and targeting areas for 
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monitoring that uphold the key public service broadcaster characteristics. However this 
performance area is quantitative in nature and not the ideal, hence it promotes only a certain 
level of effectiveness.   
 
6.4 ICASA’s ineffective regulation of the SABC 
 
ICASA has a regulatory practice that can be characterized as “silent”. The numerous SABC 
controversies show that the SABC is a shadow of what a public service broadcaster should 
be. This shows that ICASA’s regulation of the SABC as a public service is ineffective. 
ICASA is “silent” amidst the SABC’s controversies, even though certain controversies do in 
fact fall within ICASA’s mandate for its regulation of the SABC, such as editorial and 
programming independence. ICASA has not taken any actions regarding the SABC’s 
problematic commercial funding models, despite this funding model being recognised by 
many as the major problem hindering the SABC from playing the role of a public service 
broadcaster. ICASA has not taken any adequate actions whilst the SABC’s relates to its 
audiences as consumers rather than citizens. 
 
The regulator’s regulatory practice is ineffective and inadequate because it concludes that the 
SABC has not breached any of its license conditions, however evidence shows that the SABC 
does not conform to the requirements needed for a public service broadcaster. ICASA is not 
fulfilling its mandate of protecting the integrity of the SABC, by remaining “silent” and not 
making any effective contributions to assist in the SABC’s many controversies. The SABC‘s 
integrity and image as a public service broadcaster, as a result, remains seriously tarnished. 
An unhealthy public service broadcaster results in the hindrance of democracy, thus ICASA 
is not serving democracy and the public interest.  
 
6.5 Factors hindering ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC 
 
ICASA’s institutional weaknesses are barriers to its levels of effective regulation of the 
SABC. The regulator’s lack of independence in reality is undermining its ability to 
effectively regulate the SABC. The Minister of Communication’s significant role at ICASA 
is eroding the regulators independence, by its councillors being vulnerable to political 
pressure from the Minister of Communications. ICASA seems to be fearful of taking an 
independent stand against government, evident in its lack of action regarding the SABC’s 
Shareholder Compact and not making any submissions on the SABC removal clauses in the 
latest amendment Broadcasting Bill in 2008.  
 
ICASA’s “politicized” appointment process is also hindering its ability to effectively regulate 
the SABC. ICASA’s politicised appointment process is potentially appointing the most 
“politically correct” rather than the “most suitable” for the job. ICASA’s appointment process 
does not ensure that the public interest is served but rather that there is a high possibility that 
the “political interests” are served. ICASA’s “politicized” appointment process is highlighted 
by many interviewees as problematic, including Harber, Skinner, Koster and Rankin.   
  
Another barrier to ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC is its “politicized” 
accountability mechanism, of reporting to the Minster of Communications. This makes 
ICASA particularly vulnerable to political pressure from the Minister of Communications. 
The Minister of Communications could pressurise ICASA councillors to perform a duty that 
is not in the public interest, or attempt to assess the regulator according to selfish political 
interests.  
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The lack of clarity of ICASA’s mandate and power is undermining its ability to effectively 
regulate the SABC. Lloyd cites this as the reason for ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC 
debacles, stating that the SABC Charter and license conditions are too vague and generic to 
enable ICASA to effectively regulate the SABC so that it functions as a public service 
broadcaster. Thus, current legislation regarding ICASA’s exact role regarding its regulation 
of the SABC is unclear, and as such does not establish the exact and clear role of ICASA in 
relation to the public service broadcaster.  
 
ICASA’s inadequate funding is directly undermining and impacting on the ability of it to 
effectively regulate the SABC. The inadequate funding has resulted in ICASA conducting the 
least amount of visits to and reports on the SABC, as compared to community and 
commercial broadcasters. The regulator’s inadequate funding is not fully equipping the 
regulator to effectively regulate the SABC, such as being equipped to produce factually 
correct SABC television reports. Inadequate funding is also negatively impacting on 
ICASA’s overall performance, such as it opting out of court fights with huge operators, staff 
“poaching”, damaged work, not adhering to time frames, having less personnel and experts 
that it requires, canning projects, and an inability to fulfill its mandate. Therefore, these 
hindrances to ICASA’s effective regulation of the SABC need to be addressed.  
 
6.6 Ways to strengthen ICASA  
 
ICASA needs specific transformations on various levels, so that it can effectively regulate the 
SABC and becomes a “watchdog” of democratic South Africa, rather than be perceived as a 
“toothless” regulator. This section presents suggestions to strengthen ICASA. 
  
ICASA’s independence needs to be bolstered in reality, through diluting the Minister of 
Communication’s “power” at the regulator, by lessening the roles the Minister plays at the 
regulator. The regulator should rather report to a less “political” entity such as Parliament. 
The Ministers of Communication’s power at ICASA can be diluted by involving other “less- 
political” entities in the roles that s/he is vested with. The regulator can further bolster its 
independence through becoming financially independent; otherwise it will always operate in 
fear of its budget being cut. Financial independence could also be achieved by retaining a 
portion of the surplus funds its gathers and submits to the National Revenue Fund.   
 
ICASA requires a suitable process to appoint the “most suitable people” and not the most 
“politically correct”. This perhaps can be done by assigning industry experts a more 
substantial role in ICASA’s appointment process, which would dilute a quantity of the 
“political” influence on the appointments.  
 
ICASA needs to be much more open and transparent to the public. An excellent starting point 
to improve its openness and transparency would be to and revamp its website. The public 
would then be aware of ICASA’s activities, and would regain faith and credibility in ICASA. 
The regulator’s mandate and power regarding the SABC needs serious clarification, 
specifically the SABC Charter and SABC license conditions so that when an SABC issue, 
like funding or a SABC controversy emerges, there is no need for “guessing games” with 
regards to what ICASA’s role should be. It is either ICASA “gets involved” or “stays clear” 
of the issue. In clarifying ICASA’s mandate and power regarding the SABC, ICASA should 
be bestowed with crucial duties, because regulation is fundamental to the attainment of a 
“successful” public service broadcaster. Public service broadcasters all over the world are 
declining and furthermore require regulation to guarantee its democratic role (Siune 1998).  
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ICASA and the SABC’s relationship needs to be one that is respectful, as this is cited by an 
ICASA Compliance Officer Sean Rankin as the main issue concerning the regulator in its 
regulation of the SABC. A significant starting point to achieving a respectful and cordial 
relationship is through, clarifying ICASA’s mandate and power. The SABC would therefore 
cease to be disrespectful and antagonistic towards the regulator. The SABC would be able to 
clearly apprehend ICASA’s role regarding the SABC, and would have no option but to 
respect the regulator. 
  
Lastly, ICASA seriously requires sufficient funding from perhaps the industry and possibly 
retaining a portion of the surplus funds it gathers and submits to the National Revenue Fund. 
An increase of funds would allow the regulator to give more seriously needed attention to the 
regulation of the SABC. In essence, ICASA is mandated to “regulate broadcasting in the 
public interest” and the SABC serves the majority of the South African public, yet is 
“neglected” in being regulated (ICASA Act 2000 as amended). The increased funding should 
be used to establish a stand alone department to monitor the SABC, increase its staff 
capacity, acquire better monitoring equipment and conduct more visits and inspections as 
well as reports. Sufficient funding furthermore would enable ICASA to focus on pertinent 
issues, and no longer be agonized by a deficient budget. ICASA would be equipped to be a 
“dynamic” regulator and focus on the fundamental issues. Such as re-thinking the whole 
process of its regulation of the SABC and the regulatory practices it employs, because the 
SABC’s tarnished image as a public service broadcaster shows that the SABC is not being 
effectively regulated so that it functions as a public service broadcaster.  
 
The study concludes that ICASA is to a large degree ineffective in regulating the SABC so 
that it plays the role of a public service broadcaster.  
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          Appendices 
 
                                                     Appendix A 
 
Interview guide for past IBA councilors, past ICASA councilors, media 
organisations and media analysts- 
 
Nadia Bulbulia, Kevin Bloom, Johann Koster, Libby Lloyd, Kate Skinner and Anton Harber. 
 
Nature of the relationship of ICASA and SABC  
 
· Level interaction SABC and ICASA e.g. meetings. 
· ICASA’s role relationship e.g. silent, low profile, dominant, driver, dormant. 
· SABC’s role relationship e.g. co- operate, driver.  
· Is this relationship satisfactory to ensure that ICASA adequately regulates the SABC 
so that it functions as a public service broadcaster?  
ICASA done and not done, to regulate the SABC so that it functions as a public service 
broadcaster  
 
· ICASA adequately monitor and enforce compliance SABC policy and licenses e.g. 
mechanisms, visits etc.  
· ICASA adequately deal with conditions in licenses violated i.e. authority, penalties, 
sanctions, revoke licenses. 
· ICASA done and not done safeguard public service broadcaster characteristics of 
universality and accessibility, diversity, distinctiveness, independence and funding. 
Improvement in ICASA’s regulation of the SABC 
 
· The SABC crises- ICASA’s role, done and not done? 
· Why have not done this? 
· What could ICASA have done in the SABC crises? 
· Preventative measures in place by ICASA to prevent SABC crises? 
· Suggestions ICASA can improve in its regulation of the SABC. 
 
Factors undermine/enable ICASA’s ability regulate the SABC effectively: 
· Independence 
o Independent from the ruling party. 
o Independent from other political parties like the opposition.  
o Independent from the broadcasting industry. 
· Appointment and membership. 
· Mandate and powers. 
· Funding. 
 
ICASA effective regulator 
· In what ways can ICASA be strengthened be effective regulator? (in general) 
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Appendix B 
 
                       Interview guide for the SABC – 
                       
                              Phumelele Ntombela-Nzimande 
 
Nature Relationship ICASA and the SABC  
 
· Level interaction SABC and ICASA e.g. meetings (different levels, CEO to CEO, 
board to board, management to management). 
· ICASA Annual Report 2007 “ICASA’s Research Initiative licensees are meeting 
programming needs children, youth, women and people with disabilities”, how often 
do ICASA and SABC collaborate on issues such as these? 
· SABC Annual Report 2007 “Key Performance Objective: Annual information sharing 
session with ICASA –Not achieved”, why was this not achieved? 
· How does the SABC view ICASA in terms of the role of the regulator? 
· What role does ICASA play with regards to the SABC? 
· ICASA’s role relationship e.g. silent, low profile, dominant, driver, dormant. 
· SABC’s role relationship e.g. co- operate, driver (ICASA alleges SABC does not 
respect them as regulator and not co-operative at times). 
· Is this relationship satisfactory to ensure that ICASA adequately regulates the SABC 
so that it functions as a public service broadcaster?  
ICASA done and not done, to regulate the SABC so that it functions as a public service 
broadcaster  
 
· ICASA adequately monitor and enforce compliance SABC policy and licenses e.g. 
mechanisms, visits etc.  
· How does ICASA deal with license conditions violated/ adequate i.e. authority, 
penalties, sanctions, revoke licenses. 
· ICASA Annual Report 2007: SABC had least amount of visits and reports compared 
to other broadcasters, why? 
· With reference to ICASA’s radio monitoring reports conducted every 3 months and 
annually, when there is non compliance what does ICASA do? 
· Tell me about the “pulled” Monitoring Report on SABC Television services period 
March 2006- March 2007, by the Monitoring and Complaints Unit? 
 
ICASA done and not done, to regulate the SABC so that it functions as a public service 
broadcaster    
 
· ICASA’s role in safeguarding the SABC’s universality and accessibility, diversity, 
distinctiveness, independence and funding. 
· SABC Annual Report 2007: What role does ICASA play in the SABC’s PBS 
Colloquium/funding model? 
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Improvement ICASA’s regulation of the SABC 
 
· The role of ICASA in the SABC crises e.g. Thabo Mbeki Documentary, Freedom of 
Expression pickets and complaint to ICASA, board saga, “blacklisting”, not releasing 
full “blacklisting report, suspensions. 
· What ICASA done and not done in the SABC crises?  
· Why have ICASA not done this? 
· What does the SABC think ICASA’s role in the SABC crises should be? 
· What ICASA could have done in the SABC crises? 
· Preventative measures in place crisis by ICASA to prevent the SABC crises? 
· Suggestions so ICASA can improve its regulation of the SABC 
 
Factors undermine/enable ICASA’s ability regulate SABC effectively, with particular 
reference to: 
· ICASA’s independence. 
· ICASA’s appointment and membership. 
· ICASA’s mandate and powers. 
· ICASA’s funding. 
  
ICASA effective regulator 
 
· In what ways can ICASA be strengthened to be an effective regulator? (in general) 
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Appendix C 
 
Interview guide for the ICASA Monitoring and Compliance Unit- 
                                       
                                                  Sean Rankin 
 
Regulatory environment of the SABC 
 
· Explain the regulatory environment of the SABC, policy, and licenses, Broadcasting 
Complaints Committee of South Africa (BCCSA), National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB), Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC)? 
· ICASA’s role regarding the SABC as the public service broadcaster? 
· Exactly how does ICASA go about this, how does ICASA monitor compliance of the 
SABC licenses and regulate the SABC? 
· Objectives/strategic e.g. plan of action, work according to plan e.g. monitoring reports 
and structure report, visits, meeting, time frame i.e. annually? 
· Who goes about steering the regulation of the SABC? Is there a structure in place or 
protocol? What is the Ministers role in this? 
· How often during the bi-laterals that ICASA has with the Minister of 
Communications, does the discussion of the SABC and its compliance as the public 
service broadcaster? 
· Are there proper processes in place, to ensure that ICASA’s chairman meets with the 
Minister of communications, to discuss how ICASA is dealing with the public 
service, after all that is the key service? 
· What is the Minister of Communications’ relationship and independence to the 
SABC’s regulation? 
· Does ICASA monitor the SABC Annual report for discrepancies and allegations in 
evident in the public domain and how seriously does ICASA take allegations about 
the SABC in the public domain?  
· What do you think about the type of monitoring ICASA employs for the SABC?  
· In term of “top watch monitoring i.e. quantitative” do you think that ICASA’s 
regulatory practices are ineffective in that it does not focus on issues of actual content, 
the value of the content, analysis of the content i.e. qualitative? Why is this not being 
done? 
· After an ICASA monitoring report is completed and violations are detected, how do 
you ensure compliance? How far is ICASA willing to go to ensure compliance? 
· What is the SABC’s required to do so that ICASA can fulfil its mandate e.g. log 
sheets, keep programmes? (Monitoring requirements 2005) 
· Is the SABC co-operative with the regulator e.g. visits, monitoring reports? 
· Does the SABC respect the regulator and the role it is vested with? 
· Explain the monitoring devices [reports (structure) and visits (structure)] used to 
monitor SABC television and radio? Which areas does ICASA monitor and how does 
it go about doing this? Such monitoring the SABC areas of universality and 
accessibility, diversity, distinctiveness, independence and funding. 
· In terms of the SABC Annual Report 2007, what role does ICASA play in the PBS 
Colloquium/funding model? 
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ICASA Monitoring and Compliance Unit  
 
· Is ICASA’s monitoring and compliance of the SABC a stand alone department? What 
expertise lay within ICASA’s Monitoring and Compliance Unit?  
· How many people work within ICASA’s Monitoring and Compliance Unit? 
· How many people are involved in the monitoring of the SABC?  
· What is each person’s function in this monitoring of the SABC? 
· What other projects do these people also work on besides the SABC e.g. E-TV, 
MNET etc.  
· The broadcasting environment has changed (i.e. the Electronic communications Act 
2005) so how has ICASA been monitoring the SABC from the time of the SABC new 
licenses to presently? 
· Has ICASA acquired any new equipment technically and otherwise to monitor the 
SABC?  
· Is there a consorted and proper effort by ICASA in raising the issue around 
monitoring the compliance of the SABC? 
 
State of the SABC as the public service broadcaster 
 
· How does ICASA view the SABC in terms of meeting its obligations i.e. met, 
exceeded or not? 
· Has ICASA issued any fines, penalties, sanctions to the SABC or referred the public 
service broadcaster to the CCC? 
· What are the areas that are a challenge to ICASA with regards to its regulation of the 
SABC? 
· What are ICASA’s concerning points in its regulation of the SABC? 
· How does ICASA view the performance of the SABC as a public service broadcaster 
and ICASA’s role in this? 
 
Nature Relationship ICASA and the SABC  
 
· Level interaction SABC and ICASA e.g. meetings (different levels, CEO to CEO, 
board to council, management to management). 
· ICASA’s role relationship e.g. silent, low profile, dominant, driver, dormant. 
· SABC’s role relationship e.g. co- operate, driver. 
· Is this relationship satisfactory to ensure that ICASA adequately regulates the SABC 
so that it functions as a public service broadcaster?  
Issues of concern  
 
· The ICASA Annual Report 2007 shows that the SABC had the east amount of visits 
and reports compared other to broadcasters, why? 
· Explain the controversial “Monitoring Report on SABC Television services by the 
Monitoring and Complaints Unit period March 2006- March 2007”. 
· After a monitoring report is finalised, what steps are taken, does ICASA hold the 
SABC accountable and therefore enforce compliance? 
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SABC crises 
 
· Explain ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC crises e.g. Thabo Mbeki Documentary, 
Freedom of Expression Institute pickets and complaint to ICASA, board saga, 
“blacklisting”, not releasing full “blacklisting” report, suspensions? 
· What has ICASA done and not done, are there any “behind the scenes work” by 
ICASA regarding the SABC crises?  
· Why have ICASA not done this? 
· What could ICASA have done? 
· Does ICASA have preventative measures in place at the SABC to prevent crisis? 
 
ICASA’s improvement of its regulation of the SABC 
 
· Any suggestions on how ICASA can improve regulation in its regulation of the 
SABC? 
· What is needed to do this? 
 
Factors undermine/enable ICASA’s ability to regulate the SABC effectively, with 
particular reference to: 
 
· ICASA’s independence. 
· ICASA’s appointment and membership. 
· ICASA’s mandate and powers. 
· ICASA’s funding. 
 
ICASA effective regulator 
 
· What are the main challenges facing the regulator? 
· In what ways can ICASA be strengthened to be an effective regulator? (in general) 
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Appendix D 
 
                        Interview guide for an ICASA councilor – 
 
                                              Kobus Van Rooyen 
 
 
Regulatory environment of the SABC 
 
· Explain the regulatory environment of the SABC, policy, and licenses, Broadcasting 
Complaints Committee of South Africa (BCCSA), National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB), Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC)? 
· What is ICASA’s role regarding to SABC as the public service broadcaster? 
· Exactly how does ICASA go about this, how does ICASA monitor compliance with 
the SABC licenses and regulate the SABC? 
· What are ICASA’s objectives and strategic plan regarding its regulation of the SABC 
i.e. plan of action, work according to plan e.g. monitoring reports and structure of 
reports, visits, meetings, time frame annually? 
· Who goes about steering ICASA’s regulation of the SABC? What structures are in 
place and protocols to do this? What is the Minister of Communications’ role in this 
process? 
· How often during the bi-laterals that ICASA has with the Minister of 
Communications, is the issue of the SABC and its compliance as the public 
broadcaster discussed? 
· Are there proper processes in place, to ensure that ICASA’s chairman meets with the 
Minister of communications, to discuss how ICASA dealing with the regulation of the 
public service, after all this is the key service?  
· What is the Minister of Communications’ relationship and independence to ICASA’s 
regulation of the SABC?  
· What is the relationship between the Broadcasting Complaints Committee of South 
Africa (BCCSA) and ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) 
regarding the regulation of the SABC? 
· What are the jurisdictional issues between the BCCSA and CCC and how are 
complaints involving the SABC resolved? In light of the claim that all complaints 
goes directly to the BCCSA, therefore complaints are rarely referred to ICASA.  
· How many/what percentages of the SABC complaints are sent from the BCCSA to 
the CCC? 
· What does ICASA do upon receiving a BCCSA ruling on a SABC matter? 
· Is your position as both chairperson of the BCCSA and member of the CCC an 
infringement of ICASA’s independence? 
 
SABC crises  
 
· In the CCC hearing on the Freedom of Expression Institute’s complaint, the  Freedom 
of Expression Institute was asked to conduct an investigation, is it not ICASA’s 
mandate to investigate? Please provide your view on this case? 
· Explain ICASA’s “silence” in the SABC crises as well as its ruling on the Freedom of 
Expression Institute’s complaint? 
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Regulation of SABC 
 
· Is there a consorted and proper effort in raising the issue around monitoring and 
compliance of the SABC? 
Improvement of ICASA’s regulation of the SABC 
 
· Any suggestions on how ICASA can improve in its regulation of the SABC? 
· What is needed to do this? 
 
Factors undermine/enable ICASA’s ability regulate the SABC effectively, with 
particular reference to: 
 
· ICASA’s independence. 
· ICASA’s appointment and membership. 
· ICASA’s mandate and powers. 
· ICASA’s funding. 
 
ICASA effective regulator 
 
· What are the main challenges facing the regulator? 
· In what ways can ICASA be strengthened to be an effective regulator? (in general) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
